Towards International Criminalization of Transboundry Environmental Crimes by Qudah, Hamdan
Pace University
DigitalCommons@Pace
Dissertations & Theses School of Law
5-2014
Towards International Criminalization of
Transboundry Environmental Crimes
Hamdan Qudah
Pace University School of Law, hqudah@qudah-law.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawdissertations
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Environmental Law Commons, and the International Law
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Dissertations & Theses by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hamdan Qudah, Towards International Criminalization of Transboundry Environmental Crimes (May 2014) (SJD dissertation, Pace
University School of Law), available at http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawdissertations/16/.
TOWARDS INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINALIZATION OF TRANSBOUNDRY  
ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES 
 
 
By: HAMDAN QUDAH 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted in 
Fulfillment of the  
Requirements for the Degree of  
 
Doctorate in Judicial Studies 
 
At 
 
Pace Law School 
 
May 2014 
 
 
i | 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Contents 
Introduction ................................................................................................................................................... 1 
Chapter 1 ....................................................................................................................................................... 6 
NATURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES AND THE FAILURE OF THE CIVIL LIABILITY 
SCHEME TO PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT ...................................................................................... 6 
I. Internalization of Pollution ............................................................................................................... 6 
II. Polluter Pays Principle and Criminal Liability ................................................................................. 9 
III. Corporate Environmental Crimes and Corporate Control........................................................... 10 
IV. The International Community and Environmental Crimes ......................................................... 16 
V. Criminal Deterrence of Environmental Crimes .............................................................................. 19 
VI. International Jurisdiction of Environmental Crimes ................................................................... 22 
VII. International Law and International Environmental Crimes ....................................................... 23 
VIII. Ecocide as an International Crime .............................................................................................. 25 
Chapter 2 ..................................................................................................................................................... 31 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ................................................... 31 
CRIMINAL LAW ....................................................................................................................................... 31 
I. The Transboundary Nature of Environmental Damage .................................................................. 31 
II. Protection of the Natural Environment During Warfare ................................................................. 35 
III.  International Criminal Liability for Crimes Against Nature ....................................................... 40 
A. International Conventions ........................................................................................................... 40 
B. The 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES) ............................................................................................................................................... 45 
C. The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes ........ 47 
D.  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) ................................................... 48 
IV. Regional Agreements Establishing Criminal Liability ..................................................................... 49 
A. The Council of EU Convention on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law ..... 50 
B. The Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of 
Transboundary Movements and Management of Hazardous Waste ................................................... 50 
C. The Convention for the Preservation of Fur Seals in the North Pacific ......................................... 50 
D. The Agreement Between Canada and the United States on Great Lakes Water Quality of 1978.. 51 
V. Environmental Damage as a Violation of Customary International Law .......................................... 51 
Chapter 3 ..................................................................................................................................................... 54 
ii | 
 
NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF PENAL PROVISIONS OF INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONVENTIONS ..................................................................................................... 54 
I. Implementing Environmental Laws .................................................................................................... 54 
II. Stages of Treaties Implementation into National Law .................................................................... 55 
A. Signature and Ratification of the Treaty by the State ................................................................. 56 
B. Ratification Process .................................................................................................................... 57 
C. Implementation of Treaties in Domestic Penal Legislation ........................................................... 57 
D. Implications of Military Alliances .............................................................................................. 61 
III. Harmonization in Domestic Penal Legislation ........................................................................... 63 
IV. Legal Persons – Criminal Liability for Pollution ........................................................................ 67 
V. Transnationalization in Domestic Penal Legislation ....................................................................... 70 
Chapter 4 ..................................................................................................................................................... 74 
REGIONAL COOPERATION IN CRIMINALIZING ENVIRONMENTALLY HARMFUL 
ACTIVITIES............................................................................................................................................... 74 
I. History of Regionalism ................................................................................................................... 74 
III. Variability in the Application of Domestic Law ......................................................................... 79 
IV. Environmental Standards in Individual Nations ......................................................................... 80 
V. Regional Regimes ........................................................................................................................... 82 
A. Asian Regional Partners Forum on Combating Environmental Crime (APREC) ...................... 83 
B. The European Union and the Brief History of Criminal Environmental Cooperation in Europe
 85 
C. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) ....................................... 87 
Chapter 5 ..................................................................................................................................................... 90 
INTERNATIONAL NATURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES ......................................................... 90 
I. Transboundary Character ................................................................................................................ 90 
II.      Limitations and Obstacles to the Emergence of International Environmental Crimes ................. 92 
III. Arguments for International Environmental Criminal Law ........................................................ 96 
IV. Criminalization ........................................................................................................................... 99 
A. Nature of the harm ...................................................................................................................... 99 
B. Mens Rea .................................................................................................................................. 101 
IV. Corporate Liability and Responsible Corporate Officer Liability ............................................ 102 
A. Corporate Liability .................................................................................................................... 103 
B.  Piercing the Corporate Veil ................................................................................................... 104 
C. Corporate Officer Liability ....................................................................................................... 106 
VI. Internalization ........................................................................................................................... 107 
CHAPTER 6 ............................................................................................................................................. 109 
iii | 
 
ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COURTE ............................... 109 
I. Necessity of an International Environmental Court ...................................................................... 109 
II. Environmental Destruction Is a Fundamental Human Right ........................................................ 111 
III. The History, Failure, and Need for an International Environmental Court .............................. 112 
A. The History of Proposed International Environmental Courts.................................................. 113 
B. Failures of Previously Proposed IEC’s and the Glaring Need For A Functional IEC .............. 114 
C.  Expansion of Existing Courts ............................................................................................... 115 
IV. The International Criminal Court as a Model for an International Environmental Court ......... 116 
A. The ICC’s Jurisdiction over Crimes Against Humanity Inherently Includes Grave Crimes 
Against the Environment .................................................................................................................. 117 
V. Domestic Law Enforcement is Ineffective to Adjudicate Environmental Crimes ........................ 121 
CHAPTER 7 ............................................................................................................................................. 123 
THE EUROPEAN UNION ....................................................................................................................... 123 
I. History of the European Union .......................................................................................................... 123 
II. The Union's Contemporary Legal Environment .............................................................................. 124 
III: Criminal Law Provisions for Environmental Crimes: History and Structure ................................. 128 
IV. Legal Structure of Criminal Provisions of International Environmental Crimes ........................... 129 
A.  Analysis of the Crimes .......................................................................................................... 129 
B.  Corporate Criminal Liability ................................................................................................. 130 
C.  Criminal Sanctions and Fines .................................................................................................. 130 
D.  Secondary Sanctions and Measures ......................................................................................... 131 
V. Implementing the Directive.............................................................................................................. 131 
VI. Current Analysis of the European Union’s Impact on Environmental Protection .......................... 132 
VII. Current Concerns with European Union’s Policing of Environmental Crimes and Solutions ...... 134 
VIII. The European Union as a Model for a Global Union ............................................................... 137 
A. Positive aspects of the European Union as a model for a Global Union .................................. 138 
B. Drawbacks of the European Union as a model for a Global Union ............................................. 140 
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................................... 142 
I. Status of International Criminal Law Currently............................................................................ 142 
A. Current International Treaties ................................................................................................... 143 
B. Failure of Individual States ....................................................................................................... 144 
C. Failure of Domestic Legislation ................................................................................................ 145 
II. Regional Cooperation ................................................................................................................... 146 
A. European Union ........................................................................................................................ 147 
B. Criminal Sanctions and the European Union ............................................................................ 148 
iv | 
 
C. International Court of Justice .................................................................................................... 149 
D. Failure of Proposed International Environmental Courts ......................................................... 150 
III. Exemplary Models to Criminally Sanction Environmental ...................................................... 151 
A. International Criminal Court ..................................................................................................... 151 
B. European Union ........................................................................................................................ 152 
III. Suggested Methods to Increase International Cooperation ....................................................... 154 
A. Promoting Regional Cooperation Towards a Unified World Order ............................................ 154 
B. Model of Harmonization .............................................................................................................. 156 
VI. International Environmental Supreme Court ............................................................................ 159 
VII. The Need for a Global Union .................................................................................................... 162 
 
1 | 
 
Introduction 
 
"Enforcement of environmental laws is essential to attaining the international objective of 
sustainable development to be effective; however, this enforcement must be routine, reasonably 
resourced and predictable-an arduous challenge". - Nicholas A.  Robinson 
 
 On April 20, 2010, through willful conduct or by gross negligence, British Petroleum 
(BP) released several hundred thousands of gallons of crude oil into the Gulf of Mexico. The 
only remedy afforded to the victims was a scheme of civil liability under the “Polluter Pays” 
principle.
1
 This principle asserts that private parties who generate the pollution should bear the 
costs of clean up. BP’s failure to seal an exploratory well caused an explosion, sinking the 
Deepwater Horizon oil rig.  This unleashed a gusher of oil that lasted for months and coated 
beaches with thick oil all along the Gulf Coast. The initial corporate response from BP was to 
downplay the severity of the spill. This created significant misinformation that delayed effective 
remedial measures from the American Government and BP.
2
 
 Immediately after the spill, public opinion and private parties began suggesting that the 
nature of accident, and the special circumstances surrounding the gross dereliction of duty should 
trigger criminal liability, in addition to civil penalties. Under public pressure and aggressive 
Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) campaigns, the United States Attorney General, Eric 
Holder, charged BP officers aboard the drilling rig with manslaughter in connection with each of 
the 11 men who perished. The charges alleged that the officials were negligent in supervising 
tests to seal the well.
3
  Prosecutors also brought charges against BP’s former Vice President for 
Exploration in the Gulf of Mexico, David Rainey. Mr. Rainey was prosecuted for obstruction of 
Congress and making false statements in relation to the rate at which oil was spilling from the 
well. BP agreed to a settlement of an estimated $4 billion over a five year period. This includes 
$1.256 billion in criminal fines; it became one of the largest fines levied by the United States 
against a corporation.  The corporation also plead guilty to 11 felony counts related to the deaths 
of BP employees, a felony related to obstruction of Congress and two misdemeanors.
4
 
 In the Deepwater Horizon spill, the crime was committed by an international corporation, 
with business entities across the globe. The location of the incident was within the territories of 
the United States. Of particular interest within the penalties brought forth against BP, are the 
sanctions the corporation faced in U.S. courts.  Public pressure and awareness were significant 
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factors in the swift and heavy-handed response suffered by BP. A failure to respond by the U.S. 
government would have placed the governing apparatuses in a position to lose confidence in its 
ability to handle environmental crisis.  
In similar situations involving international corporations, when a crime happens outside 
of the company’s domiciliary nation state, the country in which the crime took place could be 
reluctant to take legal action beyond civil penalties for economic or political reasons.  In other 
instances, a nation could find that it lacks sufficient jurisdiction to dispense damages. Domestic 
governments may also be reluctant to defend the victims of other foreign nationals when their 
rights collide with the economic interests of the home state. 
 In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum (Shell), victims of crimes against humanity in 
Nigeria alleged that Shell was complicit in the violent suppression of a nonviolent movement. 
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari and asked whether lawsuits 
concerning human rights could be brought under an Article III court, (a federal court within the 
United States) when the abuses occurred outside the U.S.   The Obama administration submitted 
a brief arguing that courts should not allow the human rights claims to be heard in a federal 
venue. The Department of Justice did not urge a blanket rule against all cases arising in foreign 
countries, but it did argue that in a case like Kiobel, where the defendant is a foreign corporation 
doing business in the U.S., and where the abuses were committed by government forces within 
their own territory, the courts should deny the victims application by withholding jurisdiction.   
 In circumstances that closely parallel these facts, we see that national courts are unable or 
unwilling to take criminal legal action for political or economic reasons. In the case at hand, 
Shell had close relationship with the Nigerian military regime during the early 1990s.  The 
corporation provided monetary and logistical support to the Nigerian police.
5
  Frequently, crimes 
against the environment result in financial remediation and little if any criminal liability.  
Inflicting criminal liability upon international polluters such as BP or Shell would pose a set of 
questions regarding legal doctrines and may leave many questions unanswered. Among the 
inquiries to be addressed are those regarding applicable law, enforcement of that law, proper 
jurisdiction and other economic or international comity concerns.   
 Vast arrays of issues arise when dealing with international corporations, or when the 
effect of the action in question has a transnational geographical spread. BP for example, is an 
international corporation. The company explores for oil in 30 countries. It markets Shell products 
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in more than 80 nations and operates 22,400 gas stations around the world.
6
   A corporation with 
this type of global reach and business brings forth challenges when attempting to address 
criminal liability from conduct that was seen during the Deepwater Horizon incident. This 
dissertation will attempt to address this issue.  
The devastation of the BP oil spill continues to have an intense environmental impact and 
will likely cause severe economic damage to several generations. The damage will include local 
fisheries, and more importantly, the oceans upon which they survive.
7
 It is important to note that 
financial remediation alone will not result in an effective deterrence of willful or negligent 
environmental destruction.   
The system of the Polluter Pays Principle demands that the harm done to the environment 
be internalized by those that have caused the harm.
8
 This incentivizes corporations to factor in 
the environment as an expense related to the cost of production. Therefore, if harming the 
environment is profitable, since civil liability will be outweighed by profit, than harming the 
environment is an expense worthwhile in the line of business. Only tough and aggressive 
international criminalization of environmental crimes will be able to achieve the outcome future 
generations of our world desire; a healthy and vibrant planet with vast eco-diversity.  
As the argument is made for an international system to bring individuals to justice 
through criminal statutes, it is critical to recognize the corporate system that serves as a back 
drop to the current political and economic climate of liability. The twenty and twenty first 
century has seen the creation and dawn of the global corporation. From the British East India 
Company, to Exxon and Apple, global companies enjoy a special place within the framework of 
the modern legal system.  
In 1886, the U.S. Supreme Court asserted that corporations under the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the Constitution are legal persons.
9
 Since this ruling, corporations within the U.S. 
have been afforded legal protections that include the rights of selling and buying property, 
transferring assets, and the ability to initiate and defend against law suits. In the early uses of 
corporations, a large public service sentiment was tied closely to the establishment and missions 
of American companies.
10
 States within the Union saw their municipalities, universities, guilds, 
transportation systems and other public entities seek incorporation status.
11
 By the 1800s, there 
were only 335 business corporations, which only amounted to a minuscule force in the American 
economic landscape.
12
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After the Supreme Court Case of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,
13
 the public-service 
aspect of corporations was in steep decline.
14
 From this period until the present, corporations 
have become a major driver of the global economy and the immoral pollution of the natural 
earth. In a recent case that solidified the bedrock upon which corporate law has been forming 
over the centuries, Citizen United expressly granted corporations the right of speech in a split 
decision.
15
 Under the U.S. Constitution, this would grant corporations a fundamental right that 
cannot be infringed by the government unless it falls under the standard of strict scrutiny 
(government has a necessary and compelling interest in infringing the right). This decision has 
empowered corporations to continue transforming the American legal system by swaying 
politicians and the public opinion into ways that align with their specific business interests. One 
of the many assets that these companies have includes their ability to spend great sums of money 
in specific areas of use. For instance, millions of dollars can be used for a public image blitz. 
This recent decision opens up the flood gate of corporate money in U.S. political campaigns. The 
end result is a weaker, less capable political system that can reign in the power of corporations 
and their interests.  
Recent congressional opposition to climate change legislation can be explained by the 
corrupting influence of financial contributions in the form of campaign donations. These 
donations do not discriminate by party and find root in politicians across the spectrum.
 
Since 
1990, total financial contributions have exceeded $239 million in direct campaign donations. 
16
 
These donations are back by significant resources being channeled into Washington D.C. in the 
form of lobbying funds to directly contact and convince legislators to act against the interest of 
the environment. In turn, U.S. leaders legislate against environmental protections including 
drilling, zoning, and regulations.  
The argument for an international organization to reign in corporations is given additional 
merit by the Citizen’s United Case. As will be discussed under current models such as the E.U., 
international organizations have the ability and willpower to check institutions, such as global 
corporations, when domestic government are unable or unwilling to do so. Regardless of the 
system that is used to bring criminal prosecution, the nexus between corporate personhood and 
corporate responsibility is a key analysis that is discussed in this dissertation. Criminal liability 
of corporate actors must in essence pierce the corporate veil to attach to directors and those 
individuals who make decisions on behalf of their companies. Throughout the twentieth and 
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twenty first centuries, countless actions have gone unpunished because of the blanket protection 
that is often afforded to those acting under the corporate umbrella. With the proposed solution of 
an international mechanism enforcing stern criminal laws against corporate polluters, the 
environment as a whole will benefit from responsible conduct that will be the natural result of 
such policies.  
This dissertation puts forward the argument that violations of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights should be penalized under a criminal body of 
international law.  The theories brought forth under this proposal stems from the field of green 
criminology, which explores the criminal application of law in the context of environmental 
protection.  The concept of crimes against future generations can be the crux of new law that can 
be used to criminalize conduct against the interest of future populations. In an effort to maintain 
sustainable development which centers on environmental protection, economic protection and 
social development, the principle of crimes against a generation can be built on the principle of 
basic normative ethics that teach us to care for ourselves and others.  
The underlining proposal is to establish a new sovereign international court that has the 
ability to supersede domestic decisions and implement international principles for the execution 
and enforcement of environmental protection. This dissertation argues that it is acknowledged 
that domestic and international regulatory instruments are semi-effective. Currently, there exists 
a plethora of legal instruments on environmental protection. Although bodies of law exist, as 
well as courts to hear violations, the current ability to stop the very worst acts of environmental 
destruction is nonexistent. Gross acts by corporations continue as they are largely unsanctioned. 
To further elaborate on the gaps and solutions proposed, this dissertation shall delve into the 
existing international and national legal responses to gross environmental damage and the 
feasibility of a new area of criminal justice.  
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Chapter 1 
NATURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES AND THE FAILURE OF THE 
CIVIL LIABILITY SCHEME TO PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT 
I. Internalization of Pollution 
A brief discussion of the internalization of pollution costs is helpful for conceptualizing 
the problem with enforcing environmental protection worldwide. It also illustrates how the 
current civil liability scheme does not discourage environmental pollution.  Within the legal 
infrastructures of all existing countries, governments have the authority to regulate private 
citizens on the use of personal property; this is so, especially when such use is likely to cause 
negative externalities. Regulation of pollution is justified because pollution imposes costs on 
others. 
 
If the effects of pollution were solely suffered by a property owner, there would be less 
justification for the imposition of environmental restrictions.
17
 
The traditional way for polluters to internalize costs under a pollution control regime, is 
for the regulators to charge the company for its emissions. Within the context of this method, this 
treatise argues that civil penalties are not effective in in persuading the leaders of international 
corporations to comply with environmental regulations. It is evident that criminal sanctions need 
to be enforced by a regulatory scheme to incentivize corporate leaders to cease illegal activities 
that result in damage to the environment. By carefully installing criminal sanctions, governments 
could induce companies to reduce carbon emissions. Such penalties can increase the marginal 
cost of production to then exceed the benefit of continued environmental destruction. In this 
circumstance, the corporation and its officers would be liable for significantly more damages, 
both civil and criminal. This would create a system designed to put pressure on the culprits of 
environmental crimes by holding them fully accountable.
18
 
 A common way to understanding the problem of external and internal costs is by looking 
through the prism of a single property owner’s interests. This is illustrated by the following: an 
owner of a ballpark does not put a fence around his field, so balls sometimes break the windows 
of the neighboring houses. The owner gains by omitting the fence; he saves a substantial sum of 
money.  Through this omission, the neighbors suffer a harm because the windshields on their 
cars keep breaking.  The neutral spectator can observe these circumstances and conclude that if 
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the amount of money saved by not placing the fence is less than the amount of monetary damage 
to the neighbors, a waste has occurred. This interplay of interests should be contemplated in the 
aggregate; we decide whether there is waste by comparing the gains and losses of all the parties 
involved.  The challenge is to have the ballpark owner understand this, and curve selfish gains 
for the benefit of the community.
19
 
  The argument follows that approaching the solution to the ballpark simulation is to 
calculate all the interests at stake. Then we should ask, if there was a single owner, what would 
that person do given the circumstances?  The problem has its genesis because the owner of the 
ballpark has separate interests from his neighbors. Therefore, he doesn’t take their losses as 
seriously as he takes his own.
20
 This is analogous to the challenges faced by criminalizing 
international environmental polluters. The environmental objective is that when corporations 
pollute on a global scale, there will be criminal sanctions enforced on them by an international 
governing body able to exercise jurisdiction such as the International Criminal Court.
21
 
Specifically, corporate executives and employees will receive criminal sanctions, while corporate 
profits suffer from both civil and criminal penalties.  
 When Corporations like BP and Chevron-Texaco engage in legal contest against 
government agencies and private NGOs, they employ white-shoe law firms and substantial 
financial resources to win high profile cases. The corporate philosophy is to safeguard the 
interest of the shareholders, as a fatal liabilities verdict could force a company into bankruptcy, 
or simply into a new corporate entity. The costs associated with challenging government 
agencies and environmental activist organizations are internalized as the “cost of business.” 
Therefore even if a corporation were found liable under civil penalties, those costs are accounted 
for and no real net loss to the corporation has come to fruition.  
 Acts against the environment deny basic livelihood of inhabitants, virtually altering 
health, shelter, water, education, nutrition and physical safety in a region.
22
 The avenues of 
recourse afforded to these communities are few and the costs high. Court systems in certain 
regions can be easily corrupted by the vast financial resources of large corporations, effectively 
denying any available of justice for community groups. The costs of litigation can itself run into 
the millions of dollars, disallowing poorer groups to engage in legal battles over years – all while 
the corporate war chest flows with profits from the illegal acts that set the chain of events into 
motion.  
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Between 1971 and 1972, Texaco began unprecedented oil exploration as it extracted 1.5 
billion barrels from Ecuador.
23
 Subsequently, the company has been responsible for the world’s 
worst oil spill, even surpassing the Exxon Valdez disaster. Texaco spilled approximately 18.5 
billion gallons of water that was contaminated by oil. The financial benefit to the corporation 
was estimated to be $2 per barrel. To acquire this economic benefit, a criminal decision was 
made to illegally dispose of toxic waste in manner that brought great harm to the citizens of 
Ecuador. Tragically, the cost to the environment and the local communities is immeasurable.
24
 
 These dumping pits resulted in significant contamination of the groundwater and 
ecosystem. Reports have estimated that thirty thousand people in this region do not have an 
alternative water source. Therefore, the local population must use this water to drink, bathe, and 
cook. Furthermore, a significant portion of the local citizenry is now afflicted with cancer. 
Women in the region have experienced frequent miscarriages during pregnancy, and children are 
now suffering from skin related diseases that arose from bathing in contaminated waters.
25
 
 The real tragedy was the legal outfall that came as a result of the illegal dumping. The 
lack of a transnational body that could prosecute and hear the case resulted in a true miscarriage 
of justice. While the initial arbitration award was for $40 billion, after years of costly tactics and 
illegal bribes, the matter was settled for a mere $40 million. Texaco was able to place significant 
legal pressure on its challengers by draining the financial capital of the community bringing suit. 
This was done by filing motions to change venue, bribing judges, challenging every legal 
question in court, and extending proceedings.
26
  
 Corporations benefit greatly from their lack of legal status on the international level.
27
 
This in turn is amplified by the lack of uniformity in the application of international law and 
norms to corporate activities. “While a number of voluntary codes of conduct or sets of norms 
applicable to corporations have been developed to fill this gap, such voluntary initiatives, lacking 
effective measures to monitor and sanction non-compliance, have proved to be ineffective and 
insufficient.”28 The violation of international law subverts the rule of law and the administration 
of justice for the common person. The Texaco-Chevron case study exemplifies the ability of 
corporations to use their status as floating international bodies to pick and choose their forums, 
and then using any means necessary to undermine the opposition, including corruption. 
Governments are also complicit as they accept bribes and welcome corporate profits into their 
treasuries, effectively placing corporate and personal interest over the citizens of their states.  
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II. Polluter Pays Principle and Criminal Liability 
 
 Professor Hans Chr. Bugge, a Professor of Environmental Law at the University of Oslo, 
has noted that there are four main policies of the Polluter Pays Principle. First, it economically 
promotes efficiency. Second, it promotes justice. Third, there is a promotion of the 
harmonization of international environmental policies. Finally, it specifically defines the proper 
way to allocate pollution costs within a certain State. 
29
  
 Proponents argue that the Polluter Pays Principle is the optimal mechanism for two 
prongs of enforcement, prevention and remediation. In fact, this principle plays a particularized 
role in incentivizing the potential pollution by only holding the polluter civilly responsible for 
environmental contamination. The avoidance of potential future pollution is not a priority under 
this theory. This is because the undertaking of the preventive mechanisms is likely to exceed 
remedial retributions.
30
 Furthermore, corporations understand that there is a possibility that they 
may not be prosecuted at all for their infractions.   
 The failure of this system has caused a significant drain on developing countries. 
Through legislative and judicial acts, many nations oblige themselves to pay victims of 
environmental harm when the actors fail to compensate.
31
 In other words, states, local 
governments, and the polluters themselves are joint and severally liable for damages from 
environmental crimes.
32
 This has in turn virtually gutted the purpose of the Polluter Pays 
Principle by turning it into the Government Pays Principle. This new method of operation shifts 
the responsibility from the actor, to the State, and in turn to the general population (through taxes 
and damages).
33
 This is seen in nations like India where the government is mandated to make 
direct disbursements to victims while it is permitted to seek damages from the actor. This would 
be an efficient method of paying and collecting, except the Indian government is unable to chase 
after those who break the law while it suffers from administrative deficiencies.
34
 Rather than 
deter corporate polluters, this has had the opposite effect in developing nations.  
  When deterrence has failed to be achieved, one can conclude that such policies will not 
result in the furtherance of environmental protection.  In the instance of environmental 
protection, full deterrence cannot be effectively achieved without criminal liability. The 
deterrence of a crime is the essential goal of criminal law. Legislators have sought to optimize 
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the control of crime by devising a penalty-setting system that assigns criminal punishments in 
accordance with the unlawful conduct of the perpetrator. The magnitude of the penalty should be 
sufficient to deter a thinking individual from committing the specific crime.
35
 Commentators 
writing for the American Criminal Law Review support the notion that criminal punishment is 
the proper mechanism to effectively deter crimes against the environment.  Those commentators 
argue that criminal penalties are favorable when prosecution deters future infractions and brings 
justice through remedial measures.
36
 The reasoning behind this follows closely to general notions 
of crime, punishment and deterrence. For those who have the means to commit illegal acts, there 
must be a reaction or response to discourage actors, and criminal prosecution is an optimal 
solution.  
III. Corporate Environmental Crimes and Corporate Control 
 
 BP and Halliburton are allegedly responsible for committing environmental crimes by 
polluting the Gulf of Mexico. These two companies are legal persons pursuant to controlling 
U.S. law.
37
 A perversion of justice towards Corporations can be linked to the vast amounts of 
financial resources at their disposal. This money is used increasingly to influence media 
coverage and convince politicians of corporate friendly legislation.  Regarding the Gulf of 
Mexico, BP launched a comprehensive marketing and propaganda campaign to paint the 
Deepwater Horizon incident as a natural disaster, rather than a criminally sparked tragedy. Due 
to this effective use of finance, the media shifted the conversation from criminal negligence, to 
the discussion of alternative clean energy and compensation for victims. BP effectively changed 
the national dialogue to suit its corporate interests.  
 There is however significant outrage at the incident. Within the media, pundits called for 
immediate cleanup efforts in the Gulf of Mexico. Coupled with these demands, calls rang out for 
civil penalties to be brought against BP. In comparison to other disasters, these calls for penalties 
are generally rare, but many argued that BP’s actions inflamed an already dire environmental 
situation in the Gulf of Mexico. Experts and observers further called for the freezing of assets 
held by BP in the U.S. A portion of the discourse even revolved around the banishment of BP’s 
corporate presence within the territorial United States. Proponents for criminal prosecution were 
few and sporadic. Nearly all media coverage on the Deepwater Horizon oil rig was either silent 
or against criminal prosecution.
38
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 The media played a crucial role in changing the national dialogue from the criminal acts 
of the corporate polluter to the need for alternative green energy and appropriate victim 
compensation. There was a strategic downgrade in the importance placed on the impact of the 
pollution on the environment. News networks continued to misdirect the blame onto innocent 
parties while manufacturing controversial stories that diverted attention from BPs criminal 
liability. Corporations with vast financial capabilities can easily divert the public focus by 
utilizing media actors. BP and other companies are armed with the knowledge that the severity of 
corporate punishment is linked to public opinion and anger. 
 The media is able to shape and frame the public’s perception and anticipated acceptance 
of corporate criminal behavior.  Historically, providers of news information have influenced the 
public acceptance of illegal actions by corporate and individual environmental polluters. Those 
who wish to influence the general population seek to do so through legacy media networks and 
networks of mass self-communication (through broadband and other internet technologies).
39
 As 
the general population now has access to “communicative bridges” such as YouTube and 
Facebook, corporations have the same ability to use these forums of information dissemination.
40
 
However, the corporate pocketbook allows a far greater reach than the average users. News 
propaganda significantly contributes to a constant clouding of the unfortunate facts that 
accompany environmental crimes.  
Corporations invest substantial sums of money and time into preempting negative 
information that could impact their interests. It is within their ability to commit assets for internet 
surveillance in order to protect themselves from embarrassing revelations.
41
 Furthermore, this 
edge in technology puts them steps ahead of damage control and public relation efforts. This 
furthers the notion that international environmental criminal prosecution is necessary as domestic 
governments can be challenged in attempting to prosecute and bring corporate violators to 
justice, given their ability to effectively change public opinion.
42
 
A prime example illustrating corporate influence can be found in commentator and radio 
talk-show host Rush Limbaugh, who has an estimated three million daily listeners. His assertion 
in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon incident suggested that environmentalists probably 
bombed the oil rig to stir up substantial support for the ‘cap and trade’ bill. He went on further to 
state that the oil gushing out under the surface is as natural as ocean water. These comments are 
part of a larger pattern of corporate support that reaches commercial airways through media 
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actors like Rush Limbaugh. Unless the global community finds a systematic way to bring 
corporations like BP to justice, media outlets will continue to support and relieve perpetrators of 
environmental crimes.
 43
 
Within the George W. Bush Administration experts have documented the effects of 
lobbyists “with regard to the politicization of climate change.” The number of lobbyists in 
Washington D.C. representing the oil and gas industry number at least 786. This is more 
lobbyists than there are members of the U.S. Congress (535).
44
  These lobbyists, combined with 
the systematic use of media as discussed supra, define a narrative that undermines the scientific 
and true realities of climate change and the environmental impact of human conduct. “Politicians 
tend to gain significant amounts of information through these sources. This includes the lobbyists 
and news media outlets. The constant flow of information from one area of though slowly 
changes the agenda of politicians themselves to believe the well-funded anti environmentalist 
philosophy.
45
 
When observing the contemporary American landscape, it is apparent that the Republic 
Party has swayed further toward a group of corporate donors that have built the anti-environment 
narrative. The current Republic party, protecting its corporate donors, effectively blocks any 
attempt to mitigate the quickly changing environment. Unfortunately, the Republican Party also 
leads efforts to repeal already existing legislation that protects the environment.
46
 In 2010, after 
Republican victories in the mid-term elections, vote tallies showed that the house attempted to 
repeal or undercut environmental laws  more than two hundred times.
47
 This record of 
Republican voting is illustrated in 2011 by their attempts to repeal an authority that was firmly 
established in Massachusetts v Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that allowed the EPA to 
regulate greenhouse gas emissions. This vote was also coupled with another which had the sole 
purpose of stating that climate change was not real.
48
 
In recent years, the discourse within the Republican base has been shaped by a growing 
faction called the Tea Party. This right wing populist movement has been accredited with 
pushing extremist views into the political mainstream. This right wing faction has been 
supported by activist billionaires such as the Koch Brothers who are industrialists that are 
invested in hydrocarbons. These billionaires and media outlets that are funded by the right wing, 
have given the tea party enough grassroots energy to surpass the power of long established 
political institutions, effectively changing the American conversation on numerous issues.
49
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Therefore, the conclusion is that one out of the two major American political parties has been 
virtually high jacked by private interests who profit greatly from the subversion of interests in 
line with the environmental cause. Mann and Ornstein have concluded recently through 
academic study that the GOP is an American outlier that has facilitated extreme political thought 
that counters progress in Washington.
50
 
BP serves as a shining example of corporate influence in Washington D.C. Over time, the 
corporation has aggressively lobbied the federal government on regulation and policy, 
specifically around the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill. This coupled with a heavy marketing 
campaign touching on BPs efforts in the cleanup have swayed decision makers in Washington. 
To see other corporations work similarly with this modus operandi in the U.S. or elsewhere, we 
need go no further than Texaco-Chevron in Equador as discussed supra.  
Corporations are able to influence policy making decisions that aim to regulate them in a 
rapidly globalizing economy. Illustrative of this is the Minerals Management Service’s decision 
to expressly grant BP’s lease at the Deepwater Horizon a “categorical exclusion” from the 
National Environmental Policy Act in 2009. Such exclusion came through hard fought 
negotiations and persuasion through lobbyists in Washington employed by BP. Again, 
corporations who have large sums of money to spend can not only shift the national conversation 
from crimes the they have committed, but they can also influence regulation to allow greater 
ability to create profits and harm the environment. A decision to categorically exclude BP from 
the National Environmental Policy Act of 2009 is an example of a failure to effectively regulate 
international corporations by a national government. 
 A recent U.S. Supreme Court Decision allows corporations the absolute right to 
uninhibited contributions to political candidates. This has served only to embolden corporate 
mingling in political affairs. In this ruling, the Court invalidated laws and regulations that 
separated significant corporate influence from public elections by allowing an unlimited amount 
of private money to enter political action committees.
51
 This decision has opened up the flood 
gates. An influx of special interest money in American politics has begun to rapidly undercut the 
integrity of its elected institutions. The Republic, founded upon representation of the American 
people, now favors representation of private interests with substantial sums of money.   
In light recent public attention to the environment and global warming, corporations 
around the world have begun to alter their image to reflect environmental responsibility. It is a 
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fact that corporations do not exist for the welfare of people, or the planet. Rather, the corporate 
goal is to make as much profit as possible for the interested shareholders. It then comes as no 
surprise that environmental damage is not a significant consideration when corporations are 
planning their business model. The same can be said for calculating potential costs and profits 
when weighting environmental safety. The free capitalist market inherently views the 
environment as a collateral cost to production in light of the financial burden caused by 
following the rules, and therefore, corporations will only act to alter their image rather than 
significantly change their practice of conservation.
52
  
 The consequences are apparent as a result of the influence of corporations in the media 
and political institutions. The corruptive nature of these powers has politicians serving as willing 
accomplices in an agenda that serves private corporate interests. The urge to drill,
 
regardless of 
the social and economic consequences, represents a mindset at odds with sustainable 
development.
53
 In 2008, the John McCain/Sarah Palin ticket used the slogan “Drill Baby Drill.”  
The apparent goal of the slogan was to support the idea of attaining self-sufficiency in energy 
production, while decreasing the dependence on foreign oil. This is a prime example of how a 
policy fits perfectly within the interest of certain oil companies that spend billions to influence 
Washington. This relationship between corporate money and political action is a fact that should 
not be ignored and left unquestioned. As long as Corporations have significant support in 
political circles, they will continue to evade liability and undermine the interests of citizens.
54
 
 Political corruption is another form of pervasive corporate conduct that continues to 
undermine the ability of domestic governments to combat illegal action. In 2001, a former 
employee of BAE systems informed British authorities that an arms dealer was bribing Saudi 
officials to win lucrative arms contracts.
55
 When the Saudi Government threatened the United 
Kingdom with the loss of a $10 billion arms contract, and severing of intelligence cooperation, 
the U.K. dropped the investigation.
56
 It was soon picked up by the United States and what was 
uncovered was the largest corporate corruption scheme in history.
57
 BAE was forced to pay a 
$400 million fine to the U.S. What the BAE incident represents is the ability of corporations to 
bribe politicians throughout the world. With the environment, we see corporate actors bribing 
local officials to dump toxic wastes and obtain illegal permits. 
 Economic globalization has given tremendous power to corporations. This has limited the 
right of self-determination for local communities. This is done when corporations impose 
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restraints on the government’s ability to intervene or properly utilize its authority to regulate a 
sector of commerce. With the emergence of a global economy, the difficulty in implementing 
environmental law stems from jurisdictional and choice of laws issues. Many countries and 
numerous organizations, both domestic and international, have been debating this problem for 
years. With the continued growth of economies all over the world, environmental protection has 
been pushed to the forefront of international affairs.
58
 The lack of sufficient solutions for this 
emerging problem has caused a gradual and increasing deterioration of the environment. 
Furthermore, it has created a dire set of circumstances for human rights as forests, farms and 
oceans deteriorate.  In particular, the unregulated and under regulated extraction of natural 
resources, exploitation of hydrocarbons and open pit mining have caused severe detrimental 
effect on biodiversity, contamination to the land, water and air.  
 National governments have been constrained from taking actions by the political power 
marshaled by influential corporations. As a result, corporations have tried to suppress the rights 
of native communities in many regions that have tried to challenge the harmful actions of these 
companies; companies who are only driven to maximize profits while causing significant harm 
to the environment. The tactics used by corporations in the suppression of public opinion and 
outrage include media deception, corruption of the judicial/political process, and the push to 
criminalize public dissent.  
 Globalization has been driven by free trade agreements. These agreements also play an 
integral part in providing corporations free reign to secure their interests above the welfare of 
people and the environment. For example, such covenants also allow companies the ability to 
utilize legal safe havens, free of certain liabilities that are not enjoyed by local businesses. 
Unfortunately, the result in the aggregate is the silencing of opposing voices, which ultimately 
leads to adverse effects on human rights matters in health, food, and security. It also interferes 
with any substantial long-term development of countries participating in the global economy.
59
 
 The insistence for a system that promotes the public domain and democratic control over 
resources would be wholly inconsistent with the principles of free market capitalism. At a 
minimum, what is needed is effective governmental oversight and proper regulation that can 
protect the environment from corporate polluters. An effective regime of governance can be 
achieved by establishing enforceable laws that protect the environment and legal mechanisms 
that aim to repair the damage done by the ills of capitalist production. Another avenue of 
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achieving this goal is to have states ally with each other by agreeing to international 
environmental treaties. This would require meaningful participation in assuring the prosecution 
and oversight required for environmental protection. These are the straightforward solutions to 
secure environmental preservation. To do this, we must shift the corporate analysis from a cost 
cutting-profit driven mentality, to process that involves weighing harm to the environment. 
 Environmental preservation that is not instantly driven by profits can still achieve a long 
term goal of profit maximization while maintaining a healthy environment.  For example, a rule 
restricting property uses may limit the economic potential of a parcel of property, but by 
supplying the entire community with improved environmental quality, the rule allows an owner 
to enjoy the benefit of a clean environment. In the long run, real property may be more valuable 
if they exist in a clean community, rather than one that has been degraded.
60
 
 The reasons for committing corporate environmental crimes are varied.  And thus, ways 
to fight these crimes differentiate. A crime may occur because there is a presence of ignorance 
regarding environmental obligations, negligence or deliberate and intentional illegal acts.  In the 
case of Deepwater Horizon, and many other environmental crimes, a decision was made by 
company employees in full knowledge that the act(s) were illegal and would result in 
environmental harm.  It is ineffective however to attempt to deter international crimes with pure 
national laws because enforcement of domestic law can only achieve a limited remedy against 
powerful perpetrators.
61
 
 The transnational element is significant for some particular attacks on the environment. It 
seems that a substantial amount of environmental harm caused in the modern economy is not 
done so by nation states. Since the international link is generally omitted in most environmental 
calamities, the primary jurisdiction of the country where the offense has occurred is exercised 
over penalties. It is these local laws that are enforced against polluters. The issue with this 
current mode of regulating environmental harms is that the state with jurisdiction, implementing 
domestic sovereignty, “greatly limits the ability of [other] states to arrest and prosecute those 
responsible.”62 
  
 
IV. The International Community and Environmental Crimes 
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 In 1987, Professor Nicholas A. Robinson stated it was “time to do something because we 
had already launched irreparable change to the environment. . . . But the urgent pace of 
international development is slow.”63 Over the past four decades however, general awareness for 
environmental issues has been on the rise. With the emergence of green energy, and a 
willingness of countries to further cooperate with their international partners to stave 
environmental crime and catastrophe, concrete progress has been measurable and significant. 
However, the destruction and degradation of the environment is exceeding the international 
response in speed and ferocity.  
 Specifically in the current period of the Anthorpocene Epoch’s Great Acceleration, 
increasing disruptions to human society are inevitable. The warming of the ice caps in 
Greenland, and new reports of Antarctic melting will flood coastal cities and cause a crisis of 
mass migration.
64
 One need look no further than Hurricane Katrina and the emergency alarmed 
by nation states such the Maldives that are being threatened with absolute submergence within 
the next few generations. Al l though the task of changeing the current momentum is 
astronomical, crimes of unregulated and unchecked pollution adds to the oncoming crisis of 
climate change.
65
  
 When looking at existing agreements, a lack of speed in solving issues of environmental 
degradation is apparent. For instance, in the Kyoto negotiations, the premise of the accord was 
based on the assumption that nations can address climate slowly. When stepping back and 
looking at the totality of accomplishments between the various international covenants, one is 
hard pressed to find significant headway in reversing global environmental damage between the 
Stockholm Convention and the Copenhagen Accord.  
 In light of the current landscape of international progress, the importance of criminal 
sanctions and injunctive measures to deter crime are extremely important. Crimes equal in their 
broad effects and deliberate destruction of environmental habitats during war are covered by the 
Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. Specifically, the field of law covers forced 
migrations of civilians due to environmental damage.
66
 For many years the international 
community has sought to find a legal formula that is suitable for redress regarding international 
crimes against the environment.  This need is urgent in light of the obvious incompetence of 
national forums to effectively provide such capabilities.  Environmental activists have begun to 
call the destruction of ecosystems crimes against peace and the welfare of nations. Such a 
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classification would place these crimes at the same level of genocide and crimes against 
humanity.  If the UN adopts "ecocide" as a fifth "crime against humanity,” then certain cases of 
egregious misconduct could be adjudicated at the International Criminal Court (ICC). This legal 
recognition would create sufficient precedent to supply support for existing environmental 
mechanisms charged with protecting community interests.  
  There is an illuminating possibility that international crimes against the environment may 
one day fit into the jurisdiction of the ICC. This may become a reality because domestic laws are 
seen as insufficient in handling the most egregious transnational crimes. Domestically, these 
types of offenses generally beget civil penalties from relevant government agencies. 
Unfortunately, these laws are generally insufficient to penalize perpetrators. The current 
classification of environmental destruction is not a crime against humanity under the 
contemporary international legal structure. This is because these types of crimes do not 
systemically attack a specific civilian population, although the results can be very similar.  
 The severity of the impact on biodiversity and the degradation of environmental health 
when considering these acts give sufficient ground to consider the criminality of the conduct on 
an  international scale. Uncontrolled pollution has the ability to destroy entire eco-systems and 
therefore reduce bio-diversity within a region. Just as important, the health of locals where the 
pollution takes place can be severely harmed as is seen in South America with American oil 
companies. To categorize such conduct as world-wide crimes would be appropriate for an 
international community embracing globalization.
67
 
 Opponents of international environmental laws have worked tirelessly to stymie any 
substantial measures to advance legislation in an effort to protect communities. Many arguments 
have been put forward through lobbyist, governments and scholars to defeat any attempt to 
create a unified system of criminalization of the most serious crimes. For instance, an argument 
was made that it is very difficult to establish the causation element of why the act occurred, let 
alone whether it was deliberate or not. Opponents further state that there is great difficulty in 
linking harm to specific corporations given the diversity of actors who commit crimes and a lack 
of investigatory resources. This is why the degree or extent of culpability is not weighed in most 
environmental crimes on an international scale. Most of these crimes are designated as strict 
liability offenses; accordingly civil fines are the only proper remedy for these violations.
68
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 The pertinent question is whether BP can be prosecuted in a criminal forum. Under 
current controlling U.S. laws, it can be a felony to pollute the waterways, but a court cannot 
sentence a corporation to prison.  When implementing a criminal system internationally, fear of 
incarceration is necessary to insure corporate obedience. Criminal liability is ultimately enforced 
by such penalties. However, under current law, a company can only be court ordered to pay civil 
fines, and there is no possibility of criminally convicting the executives of the condemned 
corporation.
69
 
Ultimately, BP may be civilly responsible for its environmental crimes and may pay fines 
in the billions of dollars. The world however, will not see the controlling executives serve prison 
time, despite the known fact that the occurrence in the Gulf of Mexico was a criminal act.  
Opponents of executive criminal liability assert that a balancing test between government interest 
and the burden of prosecuting such crimes are unfavorable for a criminal liability regime. The 
argument rests on the premise that the proof necessary to show an executive had a direct 
involvement and was criminally negligent is a significant prosecutorial burden, and that being an 
executive of a corporation should not expose that person to criminal liability.
70
The fact is that the 
cost of prosecution is worthwhile when considering the protected interest and the effect of 
deterrence on the offending officers and others who are similarly situated.  
 There is evidence that much environmental harm is executed in a deliberate fashion, with 
full knowledge of the crime. There is also a weighing of beneficial interests upon which crimes 
are committed. Frequently, the purpose behind corporations committing intentional crimes rests 
on the corporation’s interest in seeking an inexpensive way of performing their business, even if 
substantial fines would be levied in the future. The polluting corporation is generally fully 
conscious that its actions are illegal and the decision to take such conduct was made. This is 
because it was the most economically effective way of protecting the best interests of the 
company, even with the element of illegality attached to such action.
71
 
V. Criminal Deterrence of Environmental Crimes 
 
 Criminal prosecution will have the effect of shifting the status quo of current corporate 
business. On the national and international levels, corporate officers will assess not only the 
profit risk and loss statements when considering committing a crime against the environment, but 
their own freedom and risk of incarceration and financial penalties.  Although the reality of such 
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a system is apparent, developing mechanisms to implement them are challenging given the vast 
resources of special interests.  
 For example, in 1987, the United States Sentencing Commission created general 
sentencing guidelines.
72
 The purpose behind this act was to deter criminals, by enforcing 
environmental statutes that were already in the books, through stricter penalties. However, the 
corporate involvement in the actual process of recommending, developing, and executing the 
guidelines were borderline corrupt. These guidelines were flexible and broad enough to fit 
corporate interests, while still giving the public the perception that stricter laws and regulations 
are in place. This in essence is comparable to state legislators asking felons for advice on 
drafting state criminal law.  
 The schematic change this dissertation is arguing for is that international polluters would 
be liable under international criminal prosecution, and not just civil fines. Criminal liability 
would have an effect on the actions of transnational corporation. The reason such measures need 
to be taken are evident in characteristic of companies to put corporate welfare above the global 
environment, and in doing so causing widespread damage to the environment.
73
 The creation of 
the ICC contributed substantially to decreasing the crime of genocide. Political leaders noticed 
that the international community was actively voicing their strict stance on the crime of 
genocide. In 2002, the ICC was establish under political pressure and the need to prosecute war 
criminals.  
 The establishment of the ICC was a revolutionary and ground breaking step forward for 
international cooperation in the pursuit of justice against criminal actors. “It serves both as a 
practical and symbolic articulation of the scheme (referring to the Kantian model of the 
international community) and a powerful push to its full realization.”74 Although the court has 
short comings and successes, scholars have designated the two faces of the court to be a 
“watchdog court” and a world “security court.”75 It is important to note that this institution is not 
just a court system, but an entire criminal justice system with a prosecutor, defense unit and 
judges (unfortunately it still lacks its own enforcement agency or prison).
76
 It does however work 
with the hallmarks of any criminal court, implementing warrants, indictments and judgments that 
are to be followed by nation states.
77
 It is this court system that could accept a new mandate of 
including environmental crimes within its jurisdiction to serve the community of nations. 
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 What makes the ICC an attractive option as a mechanism of prosecution is its role as a 
United Nations “security court.” Fletcher and Ohlin make the argument that the U.N. Security 
Council refers matters to the ICC under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. The intention is that the 
Court use its power as a U.N. institution to restore international peace and security when there is 
a conflict between parties.
78
 In essence, the Court serves as an impartial body seeking only to 
find solutions to complicated issues on the global stage. To allow the ICC to increase its 
jurisdiction over environmental matters however, there must be a concord to expand its purview 
and many fundamental structural changes.  
The ICC is structured to adjudicate cases for four crimes against the peace: crimes of 
aggression, crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes.
79
 The benefits of adding ecocide 
to the list of jurisdictionally proper crimes pursuant to the Rome Statute would provide more 
authority for the international community to prosecute individual corporate executives in serious 
violations of environmental protection schemes. This would cause many parties to revisit current 
practices. For instance, extractive mining may all together cease or be limited. Chemicals that 
leak into bodies of water that cause harm to the established ecosystem would become illegal and 
their use obsolete. All of these events would greatly further the cause of environmentalism.  
 It is clear that ecocide has the same result in certain situations as genocide and war 
crimes.  It is misleading to downgrade the seriousness of ecocide.  This crime itself “is the 
heedless or deliberate destruction of the natural environment through various human activities 
that endanger human life. It is the extreme environmental degradation of the vital areas needed 
for the survival of indigenous communities.”80 The peaceful enjoyment of land by populations 
that inhabit them are severely affected at the loss of bio-diversity. Eventually, environmental 
crimes that rise to the rank of ecocide cause wide spread displacement of communities. They are 
often categorized under the term “environmental refugees.” These individuals are forced to 
migrate when they are left little to no choice to remain in their homes.  
The commission of ecocide is indeed the very antithesis of life, resulting in the depletion 
of natural resources and poverty. This in turn causes war and facilitates crimes against humanity 
and peace. As such, it could be regarded as a crime against the peace, and the self-interested 
perpetrators should be subject to international prosecution.   Nations will have to engage in 
competition over  resources such as water, oil and minerals with historic consistency. Recently, 
Sir David King of the United Kingdom predicted a “resource wars” that would engulf the 
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coming century. The United Nations has publicly accepted the premise of his argument and has 
called for caution and action to avert such a crisis.
81
 
VI. International Jurisdiction of Environmental Crimes 
 
 This dissertation argues for the creations of an international legal system combined of 
both national courts and one international court specializing in environmental crimes. 
Alternatively it proposes that the International Criminal Court’s purview should encompass 
universal jurisdiction over conduct, not already within the ICC’s Rome Statute, that affects 
future generations.
82
 Crimes against future generations by those parties who place profits over 
their moral duty to others are an international problem, and it heeds the call for global action that 
will canonize an international legal binding framework.
83
  
 The crime of Ecocide contains the necessary elements that qualify it to be under the 
sharpest scrutiny with the international community, similar to other crimes against peace.
84
 This 
call to protect the interests of environmental integrity must be answered immediately. A failure 
to do so will inevitably leave the human race vulnerable and unprepared to take on some of the 
most challenging issues of the 21
st
 century. 
It is clear that future generations are disadvantaged because of harmful actions that 
neglect the interests of this class. This disregard for the future finds its roots in the consistent 
defense of the status quo of the current socio-economic and political structure. What makes this 
group so vulnerable is their inability to bargain for proper treatment. The unfortunate result will 
mean future generations are inevitably destined to inherit a poor quality of life in consequence of 
current environmental destruction. This degraded inheritance poses severe consequences for the 
sustainability of life. Human health and security are automatically threatened when natural 
resources are depleted. Crimes against the environment coupled with the changing climate will 
inevitably result in catastrophe with famine, exodus, and loss of life.
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 This dissertation makes the argument for an international legislative scheme that outlines 
defined offenses. These laws would be universal protocols that would serve the international 
community by creating a proper mechanism to deter and punish potential perpetrators from 
committing crimes against the environment.
86
 Attached to these laws would be a schedule of 
fines and incarceration recommendations for the illegal shipments of waste, discharge of 
dangerous substances, and the unlawful possession of protected wild life. These categories would 
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be structured with the purpose of eliminating conduct causing significant deterioration to the 
environment in an effort to protect habitats and the general health of the planet.  Such legislation 
would curb environmental disasters like the recent Deepwater Horizon oil spill and the chemical 
catastrophe in the Ivory Coast, where 500 metric tons of toxic waste were released from a Dutch 
cargo vessel.
87
 
VII. International Law and International Environmental Crimes 
 
  
The September 11
th
 attacks (9/11) in the United States gave rise to extreme patriotic 
feelings within the country and brought together a coalition of international actors ready to 
commit to an immediate response. In the U.S, Political will increased for war, and the nation 
came together to make decisions, even though contemporary scholars still judge the wisdom of 
those choices. 9/11 serves as an example of how the world can unite to create agreements (in this 
case, conventions against terrorism) when an incident occurs that shocks the conscience.  
The U.N. Convention against Illicit Drugs is another example of how such cooperation 
was boosted by an existing problem; it represents the will and ambition of politicians to make a 
global effort against criminal organizations that feed from the financial benefits of producing and 
running narcotics.  This agreement made strides in the free flow of information between nations 
to regulate and combat the flow of drugs across borders. It created the most advanced and 
effective international criminal law yet seen.
88
 Unfortunately, international enthusiasm is not the 
same when it comes to combating international environmental crimes.  When discussing recent 
environmental catastrophes, it is important to capitalize on current and ongoing disasters that 
affect the global commons, in order to establish a sound system of law to protect the 
environment and achieve sustainable development.  
The recent disaster in the Gulf of Mexico, the hazardous waste incident in the Ivory 
Coast, and other notorious environmental disasters show how environmental crimes can have a 
devastating effect on people and the environment. These tragedies continue to reinforce the need 
for more stringent measures to ensure a sustainable future. 
 There have been a wide range of laws that have been adopted by several nations and 
international bodies. These legislations have been created to adjudicate war crime and prosecute 
human rights violators. Although these bodies of law and their enforcement mechanisms have 
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strengthened over time, environmental law that is safeguarded by criminal sanctions for 
violators, continues to be evaded because of jurisdictional issues and lack of political will.  The 
boundaries and circumstances of environmental crimes do not have an international legal 
definition.   
 In the international forum, categorizing legal and illegal activities can become a difficult 
legal analysis. There is debate that genocide is an illegal action. The elements of genocide, 
including the extermination of a specific human population, does not closely mirror any conduct 
that could be justifiable. Unlike genocide, determining whether an environmental crime has 
occurred in the international forum is challenging. In order to guide the discourse, this 
dissertation argues that an international agency, such as the ICC, is the correct body to adjudicate 
these issues. Going further than the ICC, a proposal is set forth establishing a new legal system 
that would establish a new court on the international level. A prolonged delay in creating the 
required infrastructure to protect our environment will continue to allow transnational 
corporations to go unpunished for their crimes.
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 The model to be implemented will provide provisions for criminal liability and direct 
agency oversight. Jurisdiction will be exercised by the international body when the most serious 
of environmental crimes occur; in the alternative, when states are unable or unwilling to 
prosecute under a domestic court of competency. The notion of sovereign rights will surely 
provide challenges to this model of prosecution, but using existing examples of international 
cooperation will allow a feasible blueprint to be articulated. This approach will encourage states 
to make substantial changes to their existing body of law in this area. Such changes of law are 
necessary if individual states wish to adjudicate domestic matters of environmental concerns.  
The proposed model that will facilitate international jurisdiction over crimes against the 
environment will have several fundamental challenges. These challenges stem from the nature of 
international law which is constantly changing through new agreements and can sometimes be 
difficult to enforce. Furthermore, environmental harm can many times be a boon to local 
economies. Therefore, local politicians and citizens seek to continue supporting the degradation 
of their lands in order to reap immediate benefits. This causes an issue with sovereignty and the 
ability to allow individual states to determine their own course of action.  
There are three fundamental reasons that undercut absolute authority.
90
 First, every 
sovereign nation is not legally required to apply a sentence ordered by the courts of any other 
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country against a natural or a legal person. Second, there is no international agency that has 
executive global international police duty, similar to the missions created under Chapter 7 on the 
United Nations Charter.
91
  Finally, there is a lack of an international or regional body that may 
properly exercise jurisdiction over a sovereign nation.  The only applicable exception to this is 
the European Court of Justice at Luxembourg. This court can properly assert its power to enforce 
compliance with standing European Community environmental laws. However, jurisdiction fails 
outside the euro-zone. Since 1993, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has formed an ad hoc 
Environmental Chamber consisting of seven judges handling petitions lodged by individual 
States. The jurisdiction of the ICJ is extremely limited due in major part to the court’s inability to 
bind states who reserve the authority to follow or refuse compliance with court orders. Further 
limitations can be traced to the ICJ’s lack of jurisdiction for claims that arise from individuals 
and corporations.
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 An international body that has the characteristics to adjudicate international 
environmental crimes is both possible and necessary. Legal experts and commentators have 
produced various proposals that are forging a direction forward.   For example, the United 
Nations has made  a recommendation termed the “Swiss Initiative.” This called for the formation 
International Court on Human Rights with the inherit ability to adjudicate matters arising from 
multinationals.  Additional proposals have been introduced that recommend that the ICC have 
competent jurisdiction over legal persons such as corporations. Both of these examples serve as 
prime examples of how challenges to create a universal body for environmental regulation can be 
overcome.  
VIII. Ecocide as an International Crime 
 
 The term ecocide is a legal doctrine upon which parties can be criminally convicted for 
activities that harm the ecosystem, land, and humans in a given location. The common definition 
is “the extensive damage to, destruction of or loss of ecosystem(s) of a given territory, whether 
by human agency or by other causes, to such an extent that peaceful enjoyment by the 
inhabitants of that territory has been severely diminished.”93 In recent years, international 
lawyers and activists have reviewed their calls for the creation of a body of law that incorporates 
ecocide into current legal systems and international agreements.
94
 Efforts have centered around 
making ecocide “the fifth International Crime against Peace.”95 
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The crucial establishment of ecocide as an international form of criminal conduct would 
bring it under the purview of the ICC and other international courts that adjudicate corporate 
culpability. This is especially the case when national governments are unwilling or unable to take 
proper judicial actions to enforce and redress environmental crimes. A recommended way to 
produce this outcome is to have ecocide be labeled under provisions of international legal norms, 
such as a fifth crime against the peace. 
 When observing criminal activity that transcends national borders, a significant 
component to the development of a legislative scheme is recognizing the failure of both bilateral 
and unilateral enforcement measures. No government possesses sufficient resources to police 
every crime that occurs in the transnational forum. Even rarer are countries willing to unilaterally 
pursue a criminal when doing so would involve a blatant affront to another nation’s sovereignty.  
International norms develop in order to eliminate the potential havens from which criminals can 
flee.  That is the very substance of an international criminal norm.
96
 
 Genocide, a crime that is subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC is a result of criminal 
intent, planning and execution. Ecocide however, is the result of greed and aggravated 
negligence. This is coupled with an indifference to human life, allows this crime be criminalized 
in the same legal processes that international humanitarian law applies to armed conflict. 
Genocide is a horrific policy of extermination that is intentionally planned by political and 
military leaders to destroy large groups of people. The unnecessary exploitation of resources and 
ecological degradation will eventually force families from their homes by literally destroying 
their surrounding environment. This unfortunate result is the probable and expected consequence 
to environmental destruction; the end result frighteningly parallels planned extermination.
97
  
 The ICC seems to be the appropriate forum through which criminal prosecution and 
adjudication can be effectuated. The court is empowered with identifying individual actors who 
possess criminal mens rea. Corporations repeatedly act with the intent of only earning large 
profits and thoroughly disregarding provisions that were created to prevent human and 
environmental disaster. Such disasters lead to mass exodus, with people being forced to abandon 
their homes and become refugees. The same result can be found under the reign of Saddam 
Hussein when he utilized chemical weapons. Evidence has shown that wars over resources occur 
directly as a result of contamination and the rights to limited natural resources.  
27 | 
 
 Many domestic legal systems continue to shirk their duty by protecting criminal 
polluters. This is another reason why the ICC would make a proper forum through which 
environmental crimes can be prosecuted. Most nations already have controlling law to 
criminalize polluters, but these crimes must be linked to a mass killing of a group of people. 
When seeking efficiency and effectiveness, what is required is both national and international 
courts that prosecute environmental crimes.
98
 
 
IX. Domestic Legal Failures and Need for International Jurisdiction 
 
Despite the current establishment of national or regional forums, these mechanisms are 
extremely limited because many governments do not have the will and resources to properly 
monitor environmental impacts. What is needed is a firm coalition for international monitoring 
and the enforcement of criminal provisions. Such laws can be wholly distinct from the ICC or 
properly under its competent jurisdiction. This system would be designed to address domestic 
governmental failure in reporting and effectively responding to environmental harms.
99
   
At its backbone, an international mechanism for monitoring criminal provisions would 
mirror some of the existing adjudicative tribunals in several nations. In the United States, the 
federal appellate courts serve as “circuit courts” encompass smaller “district courts.” At the apex 
is the “supreme court” which serves as the court of last resort.  Within the appellate system, 
certain courts have specific subject-matter jurisdiction that include drugs, domestic violence, tax, 
bankruptcy, and others. These areas can be seen as specialized topics assigned to a specific body 
within an already established judicial body. Other countries such as Sweden have established a 
“water court” focusing on water rights issues. Denmark also has created a “nature protection 
board” focused on the conservation of the environment.  
Environmental courts and tribunals have been arising more frequently in the 1970s after 
the emergence of the environmental movement. Currently, in only 35 nations, there exists some 
form of environmental court or tribunal.
100
 In each of these courts, certain strengths and 
weakness can be attributed to local legal culture and socio-economic circumstances. However, 
certain benefits arise from all of these systems, such as consistency in the application of law, 
expertise of judicial professionals in the environmental field, and the reduced costs of 
environmental damage. Furthermore, the general benefits to the non-environmental legal system 
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can be seen by the relief in backlog as specialized environmental courts handle environment 
based cases efficiently.  
Specifically within the United States there is lacking any national environmental court. 
National tribunals do exist however with in the executive branch to perform functions within the 
EPA. However, state courts for the environment do exist. The Vermont Environmental Court 
was the first U.S. court to specialize in the environment. “It hears appeals from state land use 
permit decisions (Act 250), from state environmental permits and other decisions of the Agency 
of Natural Resources, and from municipal land use zoning and planning decisions. The Court 
also hears municipal land use enforcement cases, and enforcement actions brought by the 
Agency of Natural Resources and Natural Resources Board. Almost all cases are heard de novo, 
with an evidentiary trial, and are scheduled for a courtroom in the county in which the case 
arises.”101 Its enforcement functions center on civil penalties allowed by statute. The court itself 
has the authority to set civil penalties by recapturing economic benefits or instituting fines under 
statute.
102
 This in turn makes it economically challenging for parties to break environmental law. 
This “sanctioning” is the main form of deterrence.  
The goal that the international community should strive for would be one that includes an 
international policing mechanism for state and corporate compliance, which is controlled by 
international environmental law – a step above the domestic systems just discussed. Setting aside 
the prospects that the ICC may be granted jurisdiction, attention must be brought to the urgent 
need for national courts and the international community to effectively adjudicate environmental 
crimes. This would undoubtedly protect and insure that domestic legal actions are enforced 
against polluters.  
 What should now be undertaken is a comprehensive international codification of 
environmental laws that guarantee individual states are responsible in helping prevent and 
properly punish environmental criminals. In light of the fact that domestic courts have a binding 
mechanism that punishes violators is an option for the international legal community to strongly 
consider. As stated by Professor Nicholas Robinson in his address in Johannesburg South Africa, 
nations cannot obtain sustainable development without regional cooperation of judicial 
institutions who systematically apply fundamental environmental principles
103
 This uniform 
application of the law, under the assistance of criminal sanctions provides the international 
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community the ability to effectively and systematically tackle aggressors against the 
environment.  
 After years of continued failure in dealing with environmental crimes through domestic 
systems a time for change has come.  Considering the gravity of the crimes and their effects on 
human life, the tremendous power of the offending transnational corporation to corrupt officials 
and silence dissenting communities has crossed an event horizon.  The academic community 
must now provide a solution. It has become apparent that voluntary codes of conduct, self-
regulation and national courts have failed to tackle human rights and environmental abuses of 
transnational corporations. Ultimately, calls for the current system of broken enforcement to be 
replaced by a binding international code are well founded. This would limit the powers and 
influence of transnational corporations, and standardize their responsibilities and obligations, 
which they have successfully resisted over time.
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 This fundamental change starts by identifying international environmental crimes which 
cause systematic violations of human rights. We must develop effective regulations and control 
irresponsible corporations by aiming to cure the imbalance created by the new current realities. 
This can be accomplished by establishing a system where corporations are accountable, do not 
hold more power than nation states, and can no longer define for themselves responsibilities and 
regulations. There must be a reversion of theory upon which profits are prioritized over the 
wellbeing of people and nature. This can be achieved by forcing international companies to 
submit to an international code, which would define the limits of corporations’ legal 
responsibilities for the consequences of their activities. This binding legal framework must have 
the ability to prosecute, adjudicate and enforce decisions. The content of these laws should be the 
result of a synthesis of the ad hoc codes of the ILO, the OECD and the proposals discussed at the 
UN in the 1970s.
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 There is a challenge in pinning down the responsible party when the actor is a 
corporation. Identifying a certain company as the polluter requires filtering through a network of 
corporations. The same issues arise when attempting to pierce the corporate veil, as it can be 
difficult understanding and finding the truly responsible parties, especially when corporations are 
layered in parent and sibling companies.
106
  
 Substantive evidence has produced ample facts that illustrate international corporations 
are a source of environmental crimes on the global stage. Illuminated by this, economic and 
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environmental crimes carried out by these companies should be properly identified as “crimes 
against humanity.”107 A new legal framework argued for in this dissertation will propose the 
formation of an international environmental tribunal that can properly adjudicate claims against 
transnational companies. This body would be responsible for defending the basic rights of people 
affected by criminal environmental activities.
108
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Chapter 2 
 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL   
CRIMINAL LAW 
       
“Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an 
environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being, and he bears a solemn 
responsibility to protect and improve the environment for presentation and future generations.” – 
1972 Stockholm Declaration of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment 
 
 The Stockholm Declaration sought to set principles in the field of environmental law. 
Following closely in its footsteps, the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 
reiterated in its Principle 1, “Human beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable 
development. They are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature.”109 
These declarations of principles were eventually codified in the 1998 Aarhus Convention. This 
agreement affords new rights that allow for public engagement in the process of environmental 
protection decision-making. The convention directs signatory states to create procedural rules 
and legislation to enact laws to achieve the goals of the agreement. These goals – the right to 
information, right to public participation, and right to the access of justice for environmental 
protection, create the “three pillars” of environmental justice behind the agreement.  
 This agreement has helped usher the rise of “third generation” rights that are sometimes 
in contradiction to long settled common law surrounding economic development, property rights, 
and employment arrangements.
110
 There is a struggle with governments on how to balance these 
conflicts between environmental protection and development; however as scholars continue to 
focus on the commons, more just legislation can be promulgated through the international 
community.
111
  
I. The Transboundary Nature of Environmental Damage 
 
“The urgent need for refining and observing environmental rules becomes increasingly 
evident as the trends in environmental degradation deteriorate worldwide.” 112 As massive super 
storms pummel unsuspecting regions, and droughts and fires ravage communities, it has been 
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more evident now than ever the consequences of human consumption on our world. For example 
in 1998, Hurricane Mitch caused massive devastation in Central America. Death and destruction 
were left in its wake as the damage was multiplied the excessive foresting that failed to capture 
water and hold soil steady.
113
 Also worthy of note is the excessive melting of the ice caps in 
Greenland, which is exacerbated by black ice that results from forest fires and carbon emissions. 
The reality is clear that our planet is vulnerable to change and human conduct.  
When considering the consequences of environmental harm and its international effects, 
we must observe the dire need to install criminal sanctions. A failure to do so will result in 
irreparable damage to our communities. These crimes will continue to impact the life support 
system that nature has developed over millions of years. The imperative to create these 
mechanisms has never been stronger.  
Currently, criminal conduct that is not within the jurisdiction of a national court and is 
not covered by competent international jurisdiction is allowed to simply go unpunished. Without 
a court to adjudicate matters, a prosecutorial body is unable to punish perpetrators. This failed 
system provides criminals an avenue to enrich themselves at the expense of the others and to the 
detriment of the global community. In addition to the current state of affairs, directives and 
aspirations of many international treaties have failed to bring results because of their lack of a 
powerful and centralized enforcement mechanism.
114  
Several treaties addressing environmental concerns have been promulgated. For example, 
during the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development, also known as the Earth 
Summit, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) was born. One hundred and ninety two 
nations, including the European Union, are now parties of this convention. 
 In April 2002, the signatories of the CBD committed to drastically reducing the loss of 
biodiversity by 2010 in an effort to alleviate poverty and improve general global conditions.
115 
Predictably, this benchmark was never attained.  This is illustrative of world leaders failing to 
deliver on promises made in 2002 and during other covenants to combat the decline of global 
biodiversity. The international community has instead been the steward of a planet that has seen 
biodiversity decline at alarming rates. A recent study brings these findings to light and illustrates 
the lack of will shown by international leaders based upon their 2002 CBD commitments. This 
study asserted that the "analysis shows that governments have failed to deliver on the 
commitments they made in 2002: biodiversity is still being lost as fast as ever, and we have made 
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little headway in reducing the pressures on species, habitats and ecosystems.” This statement was 
made by lead author Dr Stuart Butchart of the United Nations Environment Programme World 
Conservation Monitoring Centre and BirdLife International.
116 
Sadly, despite numerous 
successful conservations measures and agreements supporting biodiversity, targets emphasized 
by them still have not been achieved. 
 The same failures are seen with the Kyoto Protocol. This agreement forged in Japan, 
introduced flexibility mechanisms which were defined as alternative methods for achieving 
reduction of emissions as a component of an effort to address the changing climate.
117 
The 
categories set out by the protocol include: Clean Development Mechanisms, Joint 
Implementation, and Emissions Trading.  Each of these classes are aimed to “(1) stimulate 
sustainable development through technology transfer and investment, (2) help countries with 
Kyoto commitments to meet their targets by reducing emissions or removing carbon from the 
atmosphere in other countries in a cost-effective way, and (3) encourage the private sector and 
developing countries to contribute to emission reduction efforts.”118 The acceptance of these 
mechanisms remains highly controversial. Criticisms were drawn at the inclusion of these 
priorities by U.S. (even though the U.S. eventually withdrew).
119 
Additionally, elements of the 
protocol have received further criticism as emissions reductions have not been effectively 
achieved.
120 
It is important to note however the effectiveness of one international body in 
accepting and agreeing to the measures of the Kyoto Protocol. The European Union was able to 
effectively set key agenda items in part because of their ability to subordinate themselves to the 
greater international community.
121
 
 
 
In 1995, the United Nations was awakened by disastrous environmental degradation, and 
the calls by global citizens and special interest groups for tougher national and international 
measures to protect the environment. These protests included calls for criminalization of certain 
activities.  The Economic and Social Counsel of the United Nations reached resolution 1994/15, 
wherein it called upon the community of nations to “consider acknowledging the most serious 
forms of environmental crimes in an international convention.”122 The resolution also urged 
member states to focus on the need for law enforcement resources to address environmental 
crimes. The premise behind the proposals was the viability of an international criminal court 
being able to adjudicate matters of environmental concern under criminal doctrines.
123  
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The Council urged signatory states to adopt a list of recommendations in their domestic 
laws.
124 
The purpose of these recommendations was to provide the basic ground work for 
criminal sanctions when endangering the environment.  Provisions that signatory states were 
asked to provide included certain core criminal offenses.
125 
They involved a variety of mens rea 
levels, intent, reckless or negligence, that are required to find a party guilty of causing imminent 
risk, damage, or injury. The Council stressed that these offenses should be categorized separately 
in accordance with the harm of the conduct (damages). As a consequence, the injury caused by 
the offense would be reflected in a proportional sanction against the offending party.
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The position was also taken that states should impose criminal fines on corporations.
127 
This alone would require a fundamental change in the domestic laws of signatory states, 
including the criminal philosophy of liability; enforcement mechanisms would also require 
significant remodeling.  Overall, this enforcement strategy would be facilitated by the provisions 
of technical assistance, through relevant international agencies such as the Commission on Crime 
Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ) and the U.N.
128 
 
The resolution also encouraged cooperation among the internal agencies of member 
states.  Forums for discourse and enforcement were identified through relevant international 
agencies. They include the CCPCJ, the network of institutes of the United Nations Crime 
Prevention and Criminal Justice Program, and other similar regional institutes.  The Council has 
emphasized the threats posed by environmental crimes, which inflict irreparable damage. They 
pointed out that cross border cooperation has to be regarded as a top priority to mitigate long-
term harmful effects.
129 
This resolution was neither the first nor the last of the many international attempts to 
move forward transnational cooperation in fighting environmental crimes.  However, similar to 
the fate of many other attempts, the resolution remained a dead letter without any meaningful 
implementation of its recommendations.  Although many of the ideas proposed were ambitious 
in scale, none had any noticeable impact. The failure to these propositions to take hold points to 
the harsh reality that international criminal law and international environmental law are restricted 
at best when considered together, despite their depth of law.
130 
This could be attributed to one or 
more reasons; chief among them, the corporate might factor, and its influence on national and 
international law. 
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As the climate begins to change, and the environment as a whole is thrown into the 
forefront of a global conversation, calls for international laws penalizing certain attacks on the 
environment and derivatively future generations have mounted. There is an urging of harsh 
punishment for perpetrators of trans-boundary crimes against the environment and for stricter 
criminal enforcement.
131 
However, there are critics that think that environmental crimes are not 
suitable for criminalization.  The voices that disfavor criminal liability are seen in the text and 
spirit of many international treaties and conventions, including the Convention against 
Transnational Crime which completely omits any reference to environmental crimes. 
 At one time, the United Nations gave credence and attention to the application of 
criminal law in the context of environmental protection. These efforts were predominately 
focused on organized crime. A recommendation was made that “National and supranational 
authorities should be provided with a wide array of measures, remedies and sanctions, within 
their constitutional and legal frameworks and consistent with the fundamental principles of 
criminal law, in order to ensure compliance with environmental protection laws.”132 These U.N. 
efforts never amounted to significant progress, and the Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime eventually omitted any reference to the environment.   
 The omission of the environment occurred, despite the undisputable fact that 
environmental crimes are often transnational in nature. They involve organized crime activities 
such as trafficking in natural resources, the illegal trade in wildlife, unregulated fishing and the 
illegal exploitation and trafficking in minerals and precious stones. The Convention touched 
upon the illegal sale and manufacturing of firearms and human trafficking as relevant global 
issues.
133 
These initiatives all failed to touch upon what are arguably the gravest threats. 
 
Although examples of such failures are evident in the formation of a body of law, the 
international community has paid specific attention to providing protection for the environment 
during war time. Such focus suggests that the global community is more interested in regulating 
war than in protecting the environment.  
II. Protection of the Natural Environment During Warfare 
 
This topic will be reviewed briefly as the purpose is to give a general background for this 
dissertation.   This subject has been the discussion of many treatises and research papers. The 
law in this area is much clearer, and volumes of treaties have been specific in criminalizing 
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activities during armed struggles; specifically activities with the purpose to destroy the 
environment as the mean to achieve military advantages.
134 
The long-term effects of 
environmental damage caused as part of belligerent military operations may have serious after 
effects on the ecosystem. The area of law to address this long term damage is lagging, but there 
are still some instruments available to pressure violators. 
 
The international community turned attention toward such endeavor following many 
atrocities committed during war, specifically during World War II. This included acting 
affirmatively to prevent war related activities that create major consequences on the natural 
environment.
135
 
 
War is conducted based upon internationally recognized principles. This includes self-
defense and the protection of sovereignty. This right however, to engage in war, is not absolute. 
“The Law of War prescribes restrictions on three aspects of armed conflict: the definition of war, 
relations between neutral and belligerent states, and the conduct of war.”136 Touched upon the 
law of war includes recognized boundaries in the treatment of prisoners, nationals, property, 
vessels, weapons, and occupied territories. 
  
 
International rules on the conduct of war are intended to avoid unnecessary suffering or 
injury to combatants, civilian populations and property. But under the Law of War, the definition 
of “unnecessary” is decidedly limited. Generally, by declaring a military necessity, states can 
exempt themselves from the restrictions of the Law of War and sidestep barriers towards illegal 
conduct.
137  
Limitations are present however. A States' ability to claim exceptions on the basis of 
military necessity is one. First, local covenants established by nation-states or regional 
governmental bodies set out rules that regulate the use of certain weapons.
138
 Secondly, the use 
of weapons of mass destruction are governed by well establish international customary law.
 
This 
is evident by opinions from the ICJ. In 1996, the ICJ ruled on nuclear weapons concluding that:  
"States must never make civilians the object of attack and must consequently never 
use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military 
targets... it is prohibited to cause unnecessary suffering to combatants: it is accordingly 
prohibited to use weapons causing them such harm or uselessly aggravating their 
suffering. In application of that second principle, States do not have unlimited freedom 
of choice of means in the weapons they use."
139
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The 1907 Hague Conventions did much in establishing a system of law that addresses 
armed conflict. Unfortunately, the environment was not a priority in 1907, and therefore the 
articles agreed upon do not offer explicit protection. Within Article 55 of Hague Convention II, 
when occupying enemy territory, nations may not destroy or permanently alter the land, nor use 
natural resources irresponsibly. The environment itself can be interpreted as property of the state 
and therefore, invoking the Hague is within legal abilities. The convention further provides for 
compensation for the destruction of seized enemy property. It is unclear however what exactly 
the term property covers (e.g. air, water, land).  
In the wake of the Vietnam War, a global concern emerged in light of U.S. military 
operations that cause severe environmental damage.
140 
About 3 million Americans served in the 
armed forces in the Vietnam War during the 1960s and early 1970s. During that time, the U.S. 
armed forces used large amounts of chemical agents known as defoliants. Once dispersed, these 
chemicals caused the leaves to fall off plants and trees. One of these defoliants was called Agent 
Orange. Throughout the war, many troops and civilians were exposed in mass numbers to this 
specific variant.
141 
Many years later, questions remain about the lasting health effects of those 
exposed.  More Vietnam Veterans were being diagnosed with different forms of skin cancers, 
which were later determined to be caused Agent Orange, specifically dioxins contained within.
142 
After multiple generations and relative stability in the region, the true after effects of U.S. 
operations have become apparent.
143 
 
In response to what had transpired in Vietnam, the international community responded 
with the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.
144 
Article 35 asserts that Parties 
to warfare are “prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be 
expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the environment.”145 Within 
Article 55, this prohibition is further elaborated.  
 Article 55, which is titled “Protection of the natural environment,” states under the first 
provision, “Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread, 
long-term and severe damage. This protection includes the prohibition of the use of warfare 
means which is intended or expected to cause such damage to the natural environment and 
thereby prejudice the health or survival of the population.” Under second provision, the Article 
states, “attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals are prohibited.”146 Reprisal 
during wars is one of the disputed areas of the law of war.
147
  Even the Supreme Court and its 
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learned Justices have struggled over the true extent and breadth of anti-reprisal treaties, 
sometimes being in stark contrast to the views and opinions of the U.S. Congress.
148
 
The 1977 protocol purported to virtually ban all forms of reprisal during armed conflicts. 
The language of Article 55 under the second provision of Protocol 1 is clear as to the prohibition 
of “attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisal.”  The purpose of this prohibition 
is stated is “to avoid prejudice to the health of the civilian population.”149 Despite being 
unambiguous, scholars are continuing to debate the boundaries of this prohibition. Their 
questions revolve around the definitions of reprisal and the natural environment. These inquiries 
stretch to understand how far the protocol reaches in the protection of biological environments, 
and the specific beneficiaries of the protection (e.g. humans and wildlife). Questions have also 
been raised to ascertain the specific types of resources to be protected, such as forests and 
water.
150 
The actual implementation of Protocol I may be hard to gauge, but the purpose is defined. 
The covenant aims to make significant advances in the protection of the environment from the 
effects of conventional warfare. It prohibits wartime damage to the environment even when it is 
a military necessity under the traditional rules of jus in belli.  A central challenge with the Article 
is that the criterion of widespread, long-term, and severe damage are not well defined. For 
example, “long term” can be considered to occur over the expanse of numerous decades or after 
10 years. The conjunctive use of these terms contemplates a higher threshold of damage before 
its prohibitions are implicated.
151 
 
 
Some scholars argue however, that the language of the article is too vague to impose 
criminal liability under international humanitarian law.
152 
They assert that while it imposes the 
affirmative duty to be cautious, the article falls short of being a control on warfare that damages 
the environment. An example of this is the use of the expression “long-term.”  The simple 
ambiguity of “long term” turns a clear mandate into a murky and toothless prohibition. The only 
use for the protocol would be in the most outrageous violations that generate international 
outcry, or when an offending party is too powerful to be punished.  Ambiguity, whether in the 
language of the legislation or concerned scholarly writings, opens the doors for selective 
application of the law.
153  
Damage caused by warfare on the environment has been further protected by the 
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental 
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Modification Techniques (ENMOD). The ENMOD is the first international agreement that 
governs the impact of armed conflict on the environment. It is a foundation for further 
agreements as it touches upon the manipulation of the environment for war. This was adopted by 
the U.N Security Counsel in December 1976 and opened for signature in May 1977. This was 
largely done to address the use of defoliants in Vietnam. In 1980 the ENMOD was ratified by the 
United States.
154
 The convention aimed to prevent deliberate and catastrophic environmental 
changes from being triggered by hostile conduct.
 
The agreement is referred to as a non-use 
agreement, where it prohibits certain weapons from use. Other agreements take a different 
approach by halting the creation and production of weapons. This is the first environment-
specific law of armed conflict in history.
155 
This covenant coupled with Article 55 and 35 are 
now seen as a clear expression of international law in area.  
Within the ENMOD, signatories agreed to not “engage in military or other hostile use of 
environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the 
means of destruction, damage or injury.”  Ratification was fiercely opposed by environmentalist 
because of the disappointing language of the ENMOD that only attached the protection of the 
environment to warfare. 
156 
 Furthermore, a fear out of the language’s lack of control and 
regulation was amplified as legal scholars argued the ENMOD could legitimize weapons 
targeting the environment.
157
 Furthermore, Additional Protocol I allows for the prohibition of 
environmental damage even if human suffering is not shown.  Time will be indicative as to 
whether this treaty will be respected by the most powerful nations within its intended boundaries. 
A key observation centers on the language within the ENMOD and the ambiguity surrounding its 
provisions. 
In his dissertation “The Responsibility of Head States for Environmental Crimes Under 
International Law” submitted at Pace Law School,  Mishari Alefan argued that the Iraqi 
government’s decision to set a fire to the oil fields in Kuwait, while simultaneously dumping 
millions of tons of crude oil into territorial waters, is an example of environmental crime. 
Unfortunately, since no Iraqi government officials were prosecuted for the offense, the impact of 
the provisions are still vague.
158 
Although the ENMOD has been around for more than three 
decades, it has never been used, even though there have been cases upon which it could have 
been invoked.        
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Examining some of these cases, the Mexican army in 1998 targeted a well-known 
insurgent, the Mediterranean fruit fly, for "phytosanitary" reasons; Zapatistas alleged that the 
army was trying to wipe out the rebels' food crops.
159 
The loss in crops affected fruits and 
vegetables that are required and relied on by the citizens of local areas in Mexico.  The spraying 
endangered the livelihood and welfare of these people.
160  
Colombia serves a model example of domestic law destroying the local environment. The 
War on Drugs has given license for the use of herbicides in areas where environmental impact is 
severe. From the air, approximately 25,000 hectares were treated with a chemical agent 
containing glyphosate.
161 
The use of these agents were designed to stem the production of plants 
that led to the manufacturing of narcotics.
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Also in the 1990s, the United States' instituted the High Frequency Active Auroral 
Research Program (HAARP) to study the behaviors of the ionosphere with the goal of enhancing 
communications and surveillance systems. This initiative created a giant antennae beam that 
blasted powerful frequencies into the ionosphere. 
 
Representatives of the Russian Federation 
alleged that these can induce region wide headaches and psychological distress. There were also 
allegations that such blasts could rupture oil and natural gas pipelines.
 
In times where cases like 
these have been brought to the international forefront, the ENMOD has remained silent. 
 Although their authority has not been exercised, the group's power in theory is 
considerable. In a detailed study, legal experts Susana Pimiento Chamorro and Edward 
Hammond point to the "remarkably simple and direct" language with which ENMOD commands 
its fact-finding committee to take complaints straight to the U.N.'s most powerful agency, the 
Security Council.
163 
Which has lately shown signs of leaving its war footing and warming up to 
climate as a security-related concern.
  
III.  International Criminal Liability for Crimes Against Nature  
A. International Conventions  
 
Various international treaties contain mandates for criminal sanctions against violations of 
certain environmental norms.  However, all unanimously fall short of expressly asserting 
international jurisdiction over these crimes, exacting punishments, or designating an international 
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body of enforcement. Furthermore, they failed to create an international system independent of 
domestic mechanisms to deal with these crimes.
164  
The introduction of environmental protections as a priority in international law arose 
rather late. Recently, global catastrophes and activists have brought the relevant discourse to the 
forefront. In the first half of the century, the international community adopted agreements that 
protect the birds, polar bears, whales, fish, and fur seals. Other covenants such as the Convention 
on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora served as broader nets 
protecting a wide array of species. In the 1970s, nations saw the terms of the International 
Convention for Prevention for Pollution from ships, and the 1979 Geneva Convention on Long-
Range Transboundary Air Pollution come into effect.  
These international conventions have dealt with the issue of environmental crimes 
through general directives. Signatory states are required to follow certain mandates to 
criminalize certain activities.  States have varied in their individual implementation of these 
treaties for many reasons. Chief among these reasons are costs of implementation, the resilience 
of perpetrators, especially powerful and politically connected corporations, protecting their 
economic interests and corruption.  Also many attempts to create the desired level of protection 
at the international level through criminal sanctions are frustrated at the outset during the 
establishment of agreements.  For example, a treaty that attempted to regulate environmental 
crimes in the international forum was made at the Rome conference. Although the ICC Statute 
that would have brought criminal liability into consideration was considered, it was ultimately 
rejected.  These occurrences are too commonplace.   
 
Crimes against the environment such as illegal fishing, trade of endangered species, CFC 
smuggling, illegal logging, and the unsanctioned dumping of wastes have been the subject of 
many international treaties.
165 
The number of international treaties regarding the environment has 
ballooned as countries are alerted to the ever growing presence of dangerous actors in the 
destruction of the environment. Pressure is also being exerted by indigenous people and NGOs.  
NGO’s are becoming more persuasive in shaping international environmental criminal law.  
They are enhancing the knowledge base for international governance of the matter.  NGOs 
accomplish this task by compiling and disseminating relevant information to policy-makers and 
the broader public.  A particularly well-known example in the area of implementation review is 
TRAFFIC International (the wildlife trade monitoring network), which has regularly provided 
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information to the signatories of Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of 
Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).
166 
 
The legitimacy of NGOs stem from their mission and purpose. They are generally 
established to represent the public interest and therefore, they are able to garner public trust. This 
in turn allows them to influence public opinion more effectively than other organizations. Studies 
have shown that NGOs and their measured strength have correlated to the passage and adoption 
of key international legislation.  The Kyoto Protocol is an example of the effects of NGOs and 
their ability to persuade the adoption of legislation within nation states.
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 When 26 transitional 
economics were studied in Europe and Eurasia between 1998 and 2009, it was found that nations 
which had higher NGO strength oversaw a quicker adoption of the protocol.
168
 Furthermore, the 
study revealed that NGOs gain influence and support over time as “citizens [obtained] 
opportunities to observe new sources of political agency.”169 
 
As the international community is trying ineffectively to face the challenges imposed by 
adverse environmental activities, environmental crimes are rapidly growing due to strong 
demand, low risk, and other factors.  In an effort to combat this, nations are attempting to put 
into place international agreements to halt the rapid growth of environmental offenders. Efforts 
however have been stymied by poor bureaucratic management, corruption, and lack of resources.  
 The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (Marpol 
Treaty),
170 
the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution,
171
 and CITES have 
implemented criminal provisions.
172
 The Basel Convention on the Control of Trans-boundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal is another covenant that includes such 
mechanisms.
173
 Most of these conventions inhibit certain activities and their focus on 
criminalization of differentiating conduct varies.   The effect of these treaties remain limited 
when it comes to criminal sanctions at the national and international level.  Many countries fail 
to either to pass domestic legislation or undertake ratification procedures; so they may comply 
with their international obligations.  In many nations, the process of transforming international 
prescriptions into national law is very slow.
174  
Treaties have failed to protect the environment, because they lack obligatory provisions 
and enforcement mechanisms.  For example, the provisions of ENMOD have no effective 
enforcement or remedial provisions for a breach of duty, such as reparation or monetary 
compensation.
 
Instead, any state party which has reason to believe that another signatory state is 
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acting in violation of the convention's obligations, may lodge a complaint with the U.N. Security 
Council. This U.N. body would then investigate the claim and make a report.
 
Article V(2) 
requires the U.N. Secretary-General to convene a Consultative Committee of Experts at the 
request of any signatory.
 
However, ENMOD does not provide for any civil or criminal liability. 
It remains to be seen whether the Consultative Committee has more than soft authority.
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In 
light of these circumstances, substantive adjudication of matters affecting member states have 
yet to be litigated.  Many states continue to fail in their responsibilities and commitments under 
the various treaties. This is mostly due to lack of political will and the involvement of 
corporations in politics and environmental policymaking.
 
 According to U.N. sources, there are currently over 500 international agreements or 
treaties related to the protection of the environment. The majority of these accords have been 
concluded in recent years.
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Finalizing an agreement however, is only a step towards a far 
reaching goal. The most difficult challenge is to breathe life into the substantive objectives of 
these treaties. This can only be done by implementing and enforcing them.  Countries that 
embrace a treaty by becoming a signatory are not bound by its commitments until an internal 
legislative body ratifies the treaty.
177 
This turns into a sophisticated dance between politics and 
lobbyists with corporate and economic interests. The backing of corporations and other 
influential constituencies may not be easily be secured. For instance, corporations in the business 
of oil and offal fuels will marshal their political power to resist ratification of international 
treaties that would otherwise mitigate climate change. These industries are politically powerful 
and have the ability to defeat attempts at ratification. Elements of legislation that would 
otherwise strengthen the global community find their demise in bodies of representatives who 
are bombarded by corporate money.
178 
Another mechanism used by the international community is widening the jurisdiction of 
conventions to regulate and expand categories of activities in illegal trafficking of a number of 
restricted substances such as wildlife.
179
 
 
The criminalization of certain environmental crimes are 
encompassed in the terms of various treaties. International conventions generally require 
signatory states to implement domestic regulatory schemes that punish prohibited acts that are 
originally addressed in the convention. The preciseness and clarity of these convictions, their 
degrees, and specific elements are varied.  Some require that parties take "appropriate measures 
to ensure the application of the [agreement in question] and the punishment of infractions against 
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[those] provisions.”180 Other treaties have required parties to "enact and enforce such legislation 
as may be necessary to make effective the… provisions [of the agreement] with appropriate 
penalties for violation thereof.”181 
Other less effective conventions have included clauses providing violations "shall be an 
offense punishable under the law of the territory in which the ship is registered," or "shall be 
made a punishable offense by each State Party under its national law.”182 The least effective 
examples requiring criminal sanctions through implication provide that the parties "shall enact 
and enforce such legislation and other measures as may be necessary for the purpose of giving 
effect to [the] agreement.”   
Various agreements structure their conventions so that "the penalties specified under the 
law of a party shall be adequate in severity to discourage violations of the present Convention.”  
For example, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) states, “penalties 
provided for by the laws and regulations of States for vessels flying their flag shall be adequate 
in severity to discourage violations wherever they occur.” Also the Bama-ko Convention 
addressing the ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movements and 
Management of Hazardous Waste within Africa states, “each state shall introduce appropriate 
national legislation for imposing criminal penalties on all persons who have planned, carried out, 
or assisted in such illegal imports. Such penalties shall be sufficiently high to punish and deter 
such conduct.”183 
These conventions contain frequently what is known as "policing provisions." These 
provisions allow signatory states to enforce the rules. For example, this rings true of the 1911 
Convention for the Preservation of Fur Seals in the North Pacific. This covenant provided in 
Article 7 states that “it is agreed on the part of the United States, Japan and Russia that each 
respectively will maintain a guard or patrol in the waters frequented by the seal herd in the 
protection of which it is especially interested, so far as may be necessary for the enforcement of 
the foregoing provisions.”184 
Generally, the vast majority of international environmental conventions explicitly 
recognize the penal nature of an environmental crime by setting an affirmative duty to prohibit, 
prevent and ultimately, prosecute. These conventions are usually a source of obligation within 
the international community, not a source of law.
185
 Generally, conventions lack the ability to 
combat the offenses themselves. This stems from the domestic interests of signatory states that 
45 | 
 
lead to a failure of enforcement consensus. 
B. The 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES) 
 
 Under the under the terms of the 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), trade in certain products derived from wildlife is 
prohibited.
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Some 900 plant and animal species are included in this ban. These organisms are 
generally in danger of extinction and an additional 29,000 additional species that are threatened 
by commerce also receive protections.
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It is fair to say that CITES has disrupted the trade operations for many threatened species. 
Unfortunately, the trafficking in these and other animals continues and the organization itself still 
falls short in many instances in protecting wildlife.  Generally, the majority of illegally traded 
wildlife exists in developing countries such as Brazil, which supplies “10 percent of the global 
black market” of trafficked species.188 What makes this form of conduct an international crime 
that deserves an effective international response is the trans-boundary nature of these acts.  The 
demand to create these markets arises from collectors seeking wildlife or the products of wildlife 
for ornamentation, clothing, medicine, food and other uses.  
The multibillion-dollar Asian medicine industry poses the greatest risk to endangered 
species in the continent of Asia. One of main challenges facing the community of nations, in 
which all countries need to play a prominent role, is the protection of wildlife and natural 
resources.  This includes the need to protect endangered species, reduce water and air pollution, 
and conserve natural resources including forests.  The decision to protect or not to protect is a 
question of policy; nations are constantly confronted with conflicts between technological 
developments and the advantages it entails. These advances are generally nonconforming to the 
desire of living in a clean environment.  
The African Elephant is an observable example of the implementation and effectiveness 
of CITES. The elephants began their rapid decline during the 1980s and 90s as they were hunted 
for their ivory tusks.
189
 Since 1985, elephants have sparked heated debates at every CITES 
Conference. In the 1980s, the elephant was added to Appendix II creating export requirement 
permits, but this was still inadequate to protect the animals. In 1989, the Elephant was listed 
under Appendix I granting it additional protections.
190
 This in turn prohibited any international 
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commercial trade of the animal or its parts. However, in 1997, Botswana, Zimbabwe and 
Namibia took the approach of shifting the elephants from Appendix I to a sub class of Appendix 
A. This once again opened up the allowance of limited trade. 
191
 
It has been argued that there has been two fundamental failings of CITES in the 
protection of the African Elephants. The first was in 1997 when the international body 
capitulated to Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe by allowing them to auction off 50 tons of 
government ivory stockpiles. They were sold to Japanese traders in 1999.
192
 Again in 2002, 
CITES voted to allow Botswana, Namibia and South Africa to auction another 60 tons of 
ivory.
193
 This is a fundamental failure of the international body to protect against natural 
resources and the illegal poaching of elephants. Indirectly, these accessions increase the demand 
of ivory as more and more markets are temporarily flushed with the rare goods.
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 Although 
CITES has done a service to the world by banning trade of certain Appendix I species, the 
political nature of the organization still has not been extinguished. In order to counteract such 
failings, other international organizations or bodies of law would bring progress to certain 
categories of illegal activities, such as the poaching of elephants in Africa. In order for this to 
happen, public opinion must be aware of the international shortcomings.  
 It is thoroughly documented that the global community became aware of the dangers of 
environmental crimes in the early 20
th
 century. Even with such a head start, little has been done 
internationally to face the challenges imposed by the continuity of such crimes, despite their 
undeniable consequences.  Research about this field of law has paid very little attention to 
dealing with environmental crimes.  Acid rain, pollution, and global warming are all only a few 
of the symptoms associated with the problem. Other issues such as genetic changes, allergies, 
and defective births are side effects that are rarely discussed.  Another moral question stems from 
the use of animals in genetic testing. Critics argue that such use falls under cruelty and inhumane 
treatment of nature’s creatures.195 The awareness of these environmental issues within nation-
states is a relevant topic of conversation when discussing the current state of the legal structure 
and possible solutions to combat loopholes. Within the current public sphere, “what is failing to 
occur, as evidenced by the worsening of many environmental problems, is a process whereby 
members of society internalize specific knowledge and alter their behavior quickly enough to 
mitigate environmental harm.”196 
Environmental degradation is not a new concern. However, it was only in the latter years 
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of the twentieth century – as pollution accelerated – that global awareness of the problems 
mature.  Understanding the natural environment and its problems must also be international in 
scope. In the development of this awareness, the global consciousness has come to realize that 
our world constitutes a single ecosystem composed of the interaction of all living organisms and 
their natural environment. There is still a long way to go however when it comes to internalizing 
the rapid information that is readily available to the world population. With the rise of the 
internet and accessible media, the world and its leaders need to be educated on the issues so they 
can act on them. Furthermore, the stewardship of this system of life is so vast an undertaking that 
the care of the earth cannot be the task of one country alone; this problem is part of the process 
of globalization.
197 
A cohesive effort of the international body would properly regulate man 
made risks; risks that are associated with new technologies that pose unforeseen consequences 
that could take thousands of years to reverse.
198 
C. The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes 
 
Similar to other international conventions, the Basel Convention requires states that are 
signatories to create mechanisms of enforcement within the domestic legislative schemes. The 
language of the covenant requires states to set appropriate bench marks and agencies to oversee 
them, and the enforcement of penal provisions against violators of the convention.  It states that 
parties to the convention “shall consider illegal traffic in hazardous wastes and other wastes to be 
criminal.”199 It also asserts, "Each party shall introduce appropriate national domestic legislation 
to prevent and punish illegal traffic." This method is observed across many agreements. 
The Basel Convention does not strictly forbid the movement of hazardous waste. It 
merely regulates such movement. In light of this approach, the Basel Convention faces problems 
that several other international agreements have encountered. Furthermore, the materials that the 
convention covers is limited to prescribed wastes that contain “hazardous characteristics.” If  a 
material is not enumerated, the movement of that waste is not regulated, allowing frequent 
polluters to exploit the loophole.  
Implementation of provisions contained within the Convention raises several questions. 
The agreement does not independently promulgate regulations of how the rules are to be 
enforced. There is also a lack of guidance on how the waste disposal is to be monitored. The 
Convention falls short by merely tracing restrictions that other programs have established. 
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Unfortunately, many existing programs have fundamental errors embodied within it them. These 
failures in turn are now included in the commitments of this Convention.  This only increases the 
number of problems and confusion surrounding the regulation. 
D.  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)  
 
Regulation was needed during the twentieth century to counter the “freedom of the seas” 
theory. This doctrine stated that domestic law only extended to a small area of the water outside 
a nation’s coast, and the rest of the ocean was not within the jurisdiction of any individual nation. 
This new regulation aimed to expand national jurisdiction over the seas. The theory found its 
genesis in a growing awareness of depleting fish stocks and increasing levels of water pollution.   
UNCLOS expressly requires that penalties be specified under the law. The course of 
repercussions should be sufficient to discourage violations of the agreement. It states, "Penalties 
provided for by the laws and regulations of States for vessels flying their flag shall be adequate 
in severity to discourage violations wherever they occur." UNCLOS primary provisions address 
territorial jurisdiction. The convention put in place regulations that designated a 12 mile long 
zone outside a nation’s shores. This regulation allows a country to enforce their laws within that 
limit. They are also granted 24 miles to enforce other certain laws to prevent enumerated 
violations. UNCLOS has been utilized to hold criminals responsible for water pollution in 
violation of national law or treaties. 
 The scourge of piracy and the international community’s attempts to reign in the 
“enemies of all mankind” gives us a good understanding of the prosecutorial shortcomings of 
UNCLOS. The international Maritime Organization (IMO) has reported that off the cost of East 
Africa during 2007, 60 attacks took place. In 2008, 134-153 incidents took place and in 2009, 
222.
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 In additional to robbery on the high seas, murder and rape have been reported as an 
attached consequence to these atrocious acts. Furthermore, estimates reach $15 billion of lost 
profits (not including ransoms) between the Indian and Pacific Oceans in just 2006. 
201
 
 The U.S. Constitution explicitly grants the U.S. Congress jurisdiction to penalize pirates 
on the high seas. This long-standing tradition exists in many other nations that also allow for 
their governmental apparatus to extend jurisdiction over piracy. In a modern day context 
however, a nation-state must observe the legal ramifications carefully before prosecuting pirates. 
Traditionally, pirates have received the legal definition as “enemies of all mankind.”202 Under 
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this legal definition, they do not fall under the protection of any state, and therefore any state 
may exert jurisdiction over them. In the modern context however, UNCLOS abrogates 
statelessness created by legal terminology.  
 The Geneva Convention of the High Seas (Geneva LOS) is another covenant that speaks 
to the international law of the seas. The provisions of Geneva LOS and UNCLOS are very 
similar. UNCLOS supersedes Geneva LOS, and although the U.S. is not a party to UNCLOS, it 
is to Geneva LOS. Article 105 of UNCLOS gives nation-states the right to capture pirates and 
determine their criminal penalty.
203
 However there is a limit to the exercise of this jurisdiction. 
The Commission’s commentary to Article 19 of Geneva LOS, which closely mirror’s 
UNCLOS’s article 105, states in part that “[t]his right cannot be exercised at a place under the 
jurisdiction of another state.”204 States have used this to avoid the prosecution of pirates so other 
nations may deal with the enforcement responsibilities.  
 The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) is a juridical body that issues 
advisory opinions on the meanings of the provisions contained in UNCLOS.
205
 ITLOS falls short 
however of being able to judicially try the suspects of piracy itself. In the case of environmental 
criminal law, ITLOS is constricted similarly in that it cannot arbitrate matters but only issue 
advisory statements on the UNCLOS. Under the current legal infrastructure of UNCLOS, 
Geneva LOS and ITLOS, states follow the practice of sending captured pirates to other 
jurisdictions in part due to the lack of a uniform body  charged with enforcing international 
criminal law against piracy.
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 Although UNCLOS sets a firm foundation to enforce international criminal provisions 
against pirates, it falls short from being able to enforce it through a judiciary system. This 
example illustrates the difficulties in handling criminal matters in other sectors of public interest, 
mainly environmental criminal law. Academics have argued that there are solutions that can be 
implemented to give enforcement powers to provisions under these bodies of law. One such 
suggestion is the strengthening of ITLOS to allow it to adjudicate matters and dispense 
punishment appropriate to the crimes committed.   
 IV. Regional Agreements Establishing Criminal Liability  
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Regional agreements have proven to be more dynamic in their efforts to mandate states to 
resort to criminal sanctions.  The most important agreements are concluded among and between 
member states of the European Union.   
A. The Council of EU Convention on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law 
 
The Council of Europe has adopted “a convention on the protection of the environment 
through criminal law.”207 The European Union “has also adopted a similarly worded directive on 
the basis of substantial domestic convergence.”208  Animal209 and ocean protection treaties 
include penal provisions.
210 
B. The Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary 
Movements and Management of Hazardous Waste  
 
This regional agreement was entered into to protect environmental interests in Africa. It 
asserts, "Each state shall introduce appropriate national legislation for imposing criminal 
penalties on all persons who have planned, carried out, or assisted in such illegal imports. Such 
penalties shall be sufficiently high to punish and deter such conduct."
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 The Bamako Convention drew on regulations that the Basel Convention implemented. Its 
provisions regulate hazardous waste materials, and they also ban the exporting of waste in 
international waters. Furthermore, it regulates the process for international movement of this 
waste with a notification mechanism. Finally, it applies an affirmative duty on the country to “re-
import” any waste they have exported previously.  
C. The Convention for the Preservation of Fur Seals in the North Pacific 
 
Similar to other agreements, this convention contains some enforcement provisions that 
permit parties to take action immediately to enforce the rules of the agreement. Article I provides 
that violators against the Convention’s ban on pelagic sealing “may be seized” by domestic 
authority where the infraction exists.  It also states under Article VII that each party "will 
maintain a guard or patrol in the waters frequented by the seal herd in the protection of which it 
is especially interested, so far as may be necessary for the enforcement of the [Convention].” 
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The Interim Convention on Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals 
 
The convention allows "duly authorized official of any of the Parties" to board and search 
"any vessel... subject to the jurisdiction of any of the Parties”. They are allowed to conduct this 
search so long as the official "has reasonable cause to believe... is offending against the 
prohibition of pelagic sealing...." The Convention goes on to provide that if after searching the 
vessel the official "continues to have reasonable cause to believe that the vessel or any person on 
board thereof is offending against the prohibition, he may seize or arrest such vessel or person."   
D. The Agreement Between Canada and the United States on Great Lakes Water Quality of 1978. 
 
  This agreement was founded to help maintain and replenish the biological integrity of the 
Great Lakes. The purpose of drafting these regulations were to protect wildlife, air and water 
quality, and the people who live in close proximity to the bodies of water. An addition to that 
agreement affirms,  "As soon as any person in charge [of a vessel] has knowledge of any 
discharge of harmful quantities of oil or hazardous polluting substances, immediate notice of 
such discharge shall be given to the appropriate agency in the jurisdiction where the discharge 
occurs; failure to give this notice shall be made subject to appropriate penalties." This form of 
regulations produces a more comprehensive form of rules then a more narrow case by case 
analysis. 
 The focus of this agreement is to eliminate toxic chemicals from entering the waters of 
the Great Lakes. The signatories have focused primarily on five factors, (1) presence and 
ambient concentration in the Great Lakes environment, (2) degree of toxicity, (3) persistence in 
the environment, (4) bioavailability, and (5) potential to bioconcentrate and bioaccumulate. The 
purpose of these factors concerns the serious environmental damage that can occur from banned 
substances.  
 
V. Environmental Damage as a Violation of Customary International Law 
 
 Severe environmental damage breaches the responsibilities and trust placed on 
individuals and corporate actors on the highest level. Such damage to the environment sets in 
motion a chain of incidents that cause loss of life and great suffering. Not only can affirmative 
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acts make a party culpable, but so can the failure to act, for instance in the scenario of climate 
change.  The new thinking places a duty upon states to prevent degradation or in theory, find 
themselves in breach of the public trust.
212
 
 International customary law provides a general principle that states should provide access 
to Environmental Justice. Traditionally, customary law emerges through decisions and norms 
established by the conduct of nations. They are not the result of formal written agreements.
213
 
These laws are time-honored customs that have been recognized by nation states through the 
history of practice and recognition of norms. In today’s contemporary legal systems, it is the 
norm for states to provide a judicial means to adjudicate environmental issues. This in turn is the 
current practice because states themselves acknowledge their duty to facilitate such justice.
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 As discussed supra, the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information is an example of 
such customary international law that has been codified. After the signing of this convention, 
international customary law was in line with the principle of free and open access to information, 
touching upon access to justice in the environmental context. “States that deny access to justice 
for environmental claims violate this customary duty, and are thus in violation of international 
law.”215 An example of this would be the intentional destruction of files, evidence or hampering 
of litigation between parties. Such conduct would effectively make equal justice unattainable for 
citizens within a state.  
 States themselves can fail to provide the necessary resources and security to public 
interest. In this situation, international mechanisms can be built to support the application of 
international customary law. All though the State may have failed for myriad of reasons to 
uphold its duties, the cooperation of a State when international parties engage to assist is crucial 
in its commitments to international law. An example of this type of international assistance is 
when “UNEP, together with the Environmental Law Programme of the IUCN, provided 
consulting services to assist nations in establishing and refining their environmental 
legislation.”216 
 Once international law has been established through domestic codification, enforcement 
is the next approach in making sure environmental damage can be reduced in line with 
international customary law. Generally, International enforcement of environmental laws can be 
observed through two different prisms; that of domestic enforcement and enforcement with 
international assistance.
217
 Relevant to our analysis lies the latter, which requires domestic 
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schemes to abide by international law.  Within this scheme, domestic legislative bodies would 
create enforcement mechanisms through their own agencies, or permit international agencies to 
hold quasi-jurisdictions within sovereign borders.   
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Chapter 3 
NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF PENAL PROVISIONS OF 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONVENTIONS 
 
I. Implementing Environmental Laws 
 
In order to be effective, environmental laws require enforcement. Implementing these 
laws requires a judiciary and a prosecutorial body to carry out enforcement. A lack of either of 
these independent and non-prejudicial parts can lead to a lack of enforcement or a miscarriage of 
justice. A coherent regulatory system is the most efficient method for insuring compliance and 
enforcement of environmental laws. For many years, the environment was not subject to 
regulation by lawmakers on a domestic or international scale.
218
 The first real thrust of 
environmental law saw the creation of specialized administrations and a body of law for them to 
administer. This first set of legislation pertained to threatened species conservation, wilderness 
conversation and pollution control. The laws were the progeny of the 1972 Stockholm 
Conference on the Human Environment.
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 Certain countries began passing environmental legislation after the 1972 Stockholm 
conference. They were slow to discover that without specifically authorizing prosecutors and 
judges to enforce this legislation, polluters would not comply with these laws.
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 In the late 
1980’s, both judges and prosecutors received more attention from NGO’s and policy makers. 
Unfortunately, in most countries, judges are still unfamiliar with environmental issues. These 
failures of knowledge by the adjudicators of justice result in the lack of implementation of 
environmental law on the national level.
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 Challenges facing the judiciary in the enforcement of environmental laws vary among 
nations. Some environmental issues are very technical and complex. This results in a knowledge 
deficiency as lawmakers and adjudicators do not have the scientific knowledge, ability, or 
expertise that is needed to make proper decisions relative to the case. One way to reduce the 
cloudy issues of enforcing environmental law has been to exchange data concerning information 
about successful implementation of environmental laws between sectors of the government 
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responsible for enforcement. This model has been successfully used by NGO’s such as the WWF 
TRAFFIC, the Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA) and Global Witness. All three 
organizations set up Secretariats to oversee this process. Additionally, societal unawareness of 
environmental issues is generally reflected in the judiciary presiding over these cases, and may 
lead to an indecisive approach to environmental problems. Other challenges are attributed to 
constitutional limitations, prioritizing states’ interests in implementation, and conflicts with 
codes.
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 For most countries, proper enforcement and implementation of environmental laws 
require reforming the whole regulatory system.
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 Commentators have stated that developing 
countries would benefit from subtle support structures by the developed world community. This 
would assist them in facilitating a transitional justice project intent upon reforming their legal 
body to align itself with international norms. Most importantly, it will establish the process of 
cultivating the ‘glue’ that will ultimately hold together the uniform system of justice.224 This 
would involve enacting green laws, empowering citizens and NGO’s by giving them standing to 
bring cases in courts, and most importantly, a capable judiciary that is well aware of both the 
relevance of the case, and the laws to address the problems at hand.  
 The Global Community must recognize the importance of creating international bodies 
that carry out the implementation of environmental legislation under transnational jurisdiction. 
This need springs from the failure of national laws to afford the necessary minimal 
environmental protection through effective implementation of international treaties.
225
  
 As signatory states, each party can have a specific role that is designated to them in 
implementing environmental treaties. These specific obligations can be examined by reviewing 
the penal code and the process of its enforcement. States may implement environmental treaties 
by enacting civil law statutes, criminal statutes or both. Usually, they create or authorize existing 
administrative agencies to carry out day to day implementation of environmental treaty 
obligations. 
II. Stages of Treaties Implementation into National Law 
 
 Three stages encompass the implementation of penal provisions included in various 
treaties. These steps are taken to enact provisions on a domestic level.  They are: 
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A. Signature and Ratification of the Treaty by the State 
 
 Under International Law, the signing of a treaty does not make it legally binding upon a 
state; the ratification of the treaty creates a binding legal effect. An example of this is when the 
United States became a signatory to the Rome Statute, and remained so from December 2000 to 
May 2002. The Rome Statute established the ICC. During this time, the treaty was not ratified by 
the U.S. Senate.
226
 In May 2002, the President of the United States ordered the “unsigning” of 
the Rome Statute. However, during this period between May 2002 and the formal release of 
obligation, the U.S. was bound to not “defeat the object and purpose” of the Rome Statute. While 
under the purview of the Rome Statute, an obligation existed for the U.S. to cooperate with its 
purpose, including surrendering persons to the ICC within U.S. territory. Because of these 
obligations, the Bush Administration sought the removal of American commitment from the 
international covenant. 
 Although the U.S. attempted to unsign the treaty, it may still however be considered 
bound to its commitments under international customary law. For example, “[o]f the 189 U.N. 
member states, 159 have ratified Additional Protocol I. While some of the Protocol’s articles 
have not yet reached the level of customary international law, others may have, such as ‘Article 
51, prohibiting attacks against civilians, including target area bombardment . . . .’”227 Law can 
still become binding upon a party if it has reach the level of international customary law. Once 
accepted by nation states, and affirmed as to its validity, countries moving in the opposite 
direction of such directives can be ostracized for their actions.  
 The controlling application of treaties upon domestic law and state action are captured in  
Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. This provision declares that the 
mere signature of a treaty only prevents a state from taking actions contrary to the direction of 
the treaty. Explained simply, a state should not frustrate the purpose of the covenant. It reads: 
A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty 
when:  
(a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the treaty subject to 
ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not to become 
a party to the treaty; or  
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(b) it has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry into force of the 
treaty and provided that such entry into force is not unduly delayed.
228
 
B. Ratification Process 
 
 Ratification is a process by which a nation formally confirms its commitment 
domestically to an international agreement. If a treaty requires a separate process through 
domestic mechanisms to become binding depends on the terms of the treaty, as well as the 
domestic legal requirements of the signatory state. Generally, the ratification process is 
accomplished through a confirmation vote in a legislative body of the signing country. 
Theoretically, this results in a representative decision by the citizens of the state. 
 The process of ratification has become more relevant as countries of the world are 
democratizing. International commitments have a larger impact on the average citizens’ daily 
lives, stemming from economic to quality of life concerns. Citizens exercise their right to 
summon their legislatures to influence the policies and direction of government. Unfortunately, 
this healthy civil influence is hindered by the influence of other parties participating in national 
law making.
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 Corporations, now considered legal persons, tend to lobby fiercely against the 
ratification of treaties that may have adverse consequences on their economic interests. 
 When a signing nation completes the process of ratification, that country then becomes a 
State party to the treaty. This obligates them to carry out the provisions and mandates of the 
agreement.
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 Throughout this process, states attempt to fulfill their obligations in good faith 
according to the principle of pacta sunt servanda, the cornerstone of international law. The 
notion of pacta sunt servanda, incorporated in article 26 of the Vienna Convention
 
and typically 
translated from the Latin as “agreements must be kept,” underlines the importance of voluntary 
agreements. Consenting to a promise is powerful tool of evidence showing that the rule or 
agreement is “binding” upon the agreeing parties.231 It therefore should come as no surprise that 
one of the most basic principles of international law is the principle of pacta sunt servanda–that 
is, that nations are bound to keep the promises they make. 
C. Implementation of Treaties in Domestic Penal Legislation 
 
 Based upon the source of international law, the effect of implementation has varied 
consequences on states. For example, a given country is not required to offer legislation 
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accepting international customary law. This is because as members of the international 
community, all nations are implicitly obliged to heed customary law.  On the other hand, when 
the international law in question is a specific treaty, it often requires that states who are parties to 
the agreement act in unison to implement statutes. This in turn may impact existing law that has 
been settled, or it may upset the cultural/legal norms within the country.
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 This has important 
implications for the development of the economic resources such as trade, agriculture and 
manufacturing. 
 There are mainly two feasible methods in which persons or groups can be prosecuted 
under for engaging in activities that are harmful to the environment. They are, (1) directly 
through the application of international law, or (2) through domestic legal channels. International 
agreements usually require domestic channels to criminalize certain conduct.
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 As previously 
discussed, such obligations are only carried out in a meaningful and practical way. If the State 
party implements the treaty within its own legal system, the internal laws of the State must meet 
the obligations under the covenant. By doing this, signatory nations achieve compliance with 
their commitments. The mere passing of laws on the domestic level is not in itself assurance that 
the treaty will be followed. There must be full scale implementation of benchmarks that measure 
compliance and enforcement. The relationship between international conventions and domestic 
regulatory schemes often hinge on a country’s commitment to a monist or dualist legal system.  
In the monist system, no additional implementation procedures are required to bring the 
nation within its commitments to the international agreement.
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 When a conflict arises between 
two contradictory laws, the treaty will trump domestic rule, as long as the legal norm of the 
country places international agreements above domestic law. Non-self executing treaty 
stipulations can only be carried out judicially (or have a supremacy clause effect which binds 
judges) once there is legislation authorizing the treaty's implementation. After the implementing 
legislation is passed, treaty stipulations should executed, as a matter of enforcing national foreign 
relations policy decisions. This should be in accordance with the legislation and the implemented 
treaty.  It is important that authority of the treaty not be solely derived from an act of congress. 
Foreign policy makes generally state that treaties have a supremacy effect against all domestic 
law. For instance, if congress or a local government were to enact legislation to counter or 
constrict treaty obligations, such law would be null and void. Unless the authority of the treaty is 
purposefully undermined in the provisions of the agreement, the treaty obligations ought to be 
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regarded as enforceable law (with full Supremacy Clause effect). This would provide the 
government with legal authority to enforce national foreign policy decisions made by the federal 
government against conflicting state actions. This ensures the supremacy of treaties over 
domestic laws.
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Authority for treaties under the U.S. Constitution stems from Article VI. The reason for 
this stems from the ability of the federal government to make commitments in a quasi-
confederate system of government, where states have sovereign authority under a federal body. 
In a situation where a state disobeys the intent of the federal government, the constitution 
provides the ability of foreigners to use federal courts to make their grievances known.
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 To ensure the separation of powers however, the U.S. Constitution requires that the 
Senate provide “Advice and Consent” to the President making a treaty.237 Therefore, 
international agreements by U.S. government will not take effect unless the Senate provides its 
approval. This check and balance scheme limits the power of the executive to commit the U.S. to 
international agreements.
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 Pursuant to this approach, many treaties in the United States are known as “self-
executing.” A treaty is considered self-executing when, by its terms, it creates rights without the 
need for implementing legislation.
 
Some legal cases, if not most, view the term self-executing to 
be synonymous with private rights of action. To a certain degree, however, the logic becomes 
circular; in order for a private right of action to arise the treaty must be self-executing. However, 
the treaty is self-executing if it provides for a private right of action.
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 There have been instances when the legislature is required to pass law for treaty 
implementation. For example, the specific criminal component outlining bad acts and motives 
must be enumerated by the legislature, not the principles of the treaty.
240
 In this instance, the 
U.S. Congress would legislate laws that would penalize certain criminal conduct while outlining 
the appropriate punishments.  
 In a dualist system, international law is separate from national legislation. Proponents of 
dualism argue that between internal and international provisions, there cannot exist any forms of 
conflicts since these provisions do not cover the same subject matter. This is premised on the fact 
that internal provisions are applied exclusively between the state's borders and cannot intervene 
in the international legal system. Though a state that adopts a dualist system is bound by 
ratification when observing obligations under an international treaty, the treaty itself will only be 
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integrated in the domestic legislative scheme upon an act of the legislature. This would require 
specific parliamentary action.  The United Kingdom is an example of a country with a dualist 
system. In such parliamentary systems, treaties only become part of domestic law if an enabling 
act of the parliament has been passed.
241
  
 The dualist approach roots its principles in the separation of powers.
242
 Within the 
executive rests the ability to initiate and sign treaties.  Thus parliamentary implementation serves 
as an important check for the executive power. In other words, if the parliamentary check was 
lacking, the executive would have the ability to change domestic laws without recourse by 
signing international treaties.
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 This in turn would subvert the legislative process. 
 Incorporation of treaties into national law can take place through a number of channels. 
The first method is by amending the law in order to reflect a newly ratified treaty. Another 
process is by adding the treaty to the existing domestic law as additional statutory provisions that 
would require that the treaty be re-written. Third, the treaty could be added to domestic law in its 
entirety, unmodified. In the previous case, when a conflict between a treaty and domestic law 
arises, the judge will enforce the domestic law, not the treaty. This method would require the 
judge to harmonize the two parallel laws to an acceptable extent.  
 Within the judiciary of each nation state, conflicts arise between domestic and 
international laws. What happens when a conflict is identified is usually determined by “conflict 
rules.” This regulates the jurisdiction and manner upon which conflicts should be adjudicated.  
Many treaties have provisions that observe domestic law in its principles and goals. For 
example, Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, asserts “a party may not 
invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.” This 
recognizes the nature of the domestic element in the implantation of treaties, and empowers 
national governments to subjugate domestic conflict.  Article 46 makes an exception to Article 
27 when a country agrees to be bound to a treaty, in violation of domestic law. The provision 
recognizes the importance of such domestic laws as being of greater interest to the nation state. 
In contrast, states have their own constitutional, statutory and common law rules that determine 
the effect given to international law.
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 One of the main issues that have a major influence on the effectiveness on the 
enforcement of a treaty, is the emphasis placed on such agreements in the international hierarchy 
of law. Transnational treaties do not exceed the authority of the constitution of any country. In 
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the United States for example, the Constitution's specific incorporation of treaties into the law 
does and should not grant the treaty a preemptive status. Treaties are but a part of domestic laws, 
requiring state courts to examine their terms and purpose.
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 In some countries, such treaties are 
equal to legislation and in others they serve as common law. In other nations, the authority of 
international law occupies a status below constitutional provisions and legislation.  
 The authority of an international treaty when pitted against domestic law is crucial to its 
application. The degree to which a treaty is directly applied in a domestic forum, and to what 
degree it is treated as state law without a further act of transformation, has been subject to debate 
for more than a century. The direct application of a treaty requires it to have enforcement 
mechanisms within domestic boundaries.  However, even if international agreements are 
considered valid in domestic law, they may not be immediately applicable.
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 Factors that play 
into the applicability of these agreements touch upon context and principles that are identified 
upon its founding. 
D. Implications of Military Alliances  
 
An alliance between nations to protect their mutual interests with the forces of their 
military goes beyond security interests in its implications. Organizations like the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and the South 
American Defense Council each assure mutual protection while shifting domestic policy to 
accommodate their international obligations. These alliances, similar to non-military agreements, 
also leave room for domestic interpretation and enforcement of international law. In the context 
of environmental criminal law, it is important to understand the mechanisms of militarily 
alliances and their usefulness in being able to implement international agendas. The counter is 
also true, in that domestic policy can shift and change military covenants on the international 
scale. The creation, selection of parties, and effectiveness of military alliances and treaties are 
relevant to the exploratory mission of finding a firm foundation to promulgate environmental 
criminal law.  
The differences between nations on their domestic legal structures are overlooked in the 
discussion of alliances and treaties. Entering into military alliances is a crucial component of any 
countries foreign policy. Therefore, who a nation selects as their close military partners warrants 
an inquiry in the context of international relationship creation. Generally, nations whose 
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domestic legal structures closely resemble each other are more likely to select each other as 
parties to a military alliance.
247
  There have been numerous scholars that have argued interstate 
cooperation is bolstered by a common cultural background. When these alliances are formed, 
parties integrate by adopting certain beliefs and skills from their counterparts.
248
  
 The content of the alliances themselves are also adjusted to match the domestic schemes 
of signatory states. “When drafting an alliance agreement, states can incorporate into their 
treaties numerous details concerning the functioning and execution of an alliance….”249 Civil 
law contracts, common law contracts, and Islamic law contracts are some domestic principles 
and legal doctrines that can make a treaty or alliance ambiguous and ineffective, or precise and 
efficient. For instance, common law states and Islamic states place a greater amount of 
contingencies on military alliances, while civil law countries place fewer.
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 Research has found a major difference between military and non-military alliances. 
“Opportunistic abrogation is less likely for alliances including democratic states and alliances 
that are linked to nonmilitary cooperation.”251 There is also information showing alliances that 
are between democratic states are less likely to end with a violation of terms.
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 All of this data is 
important to understand and digest when it comes to promulgating environmental protection 
schemes on the international arena. 
 Understanding what factors help bond nations together, and the reasons why certain 
international covenants succeed while others fail, will help strengthen an academic 
recommendation for a new protective scheme. Environmental criminal law is a new field in 
penal enforcement that still has not been adopted on the international scale. The values that 
certain nations place on military alliances or non-military alliances may be a stepping stone in 
asserting the environmental agenda in a venue that maybe non-traditional. For instance, a 
military alliance could be lobbied to consider environmental protection as a national security 
interest worthy of armed protection. As alliances vow to attack or defend any nation that is 
attacked within an alliance, it is possible to categorize certain acts against the environment as 
attacks on the national security interest. Furthermore, the likelihood of states to keep their 
military alliances over nonmilitary alliances, and the frequency of regional alliances over vast 
global military cooperation gives us the scholarly deduction that an environmental criminal 
protection system may be implemented on a local and stable scale.  
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III. Harmonization in Domestic Penal Legislation 
 
 One purpose of international treaties is to create a universal understanding of a prohibited 
act. This realization must be disseminated to the extent that it can be effectively used to 
implement penal codes in the various signatory countries. Such an understanding could lead to 
the criminalization of a prohibited act at domestic level in ways that create consistency and 
predictability among the various countries.
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 An obstacle facing such harmonization is the 
reality that most treaties, in dealing with issues of prohibition, limit their mandates without going 
further to demand a specific penalizing method to be adopted by member states, whether 
criminal or administrative. States would also have wide discretion over the substance and form 
of the penalties adopted to meet the requirements of the treaty. Standardization of prohibited acts 
and punishable behavior would eventually lead to harmonization of national laws when it comes 
to adequacy of implementation.  
 Developing prohibited acts that are universal, and coupling them with penalizing 
procedures will most likely impact procedural and substantive issues of environmental law. 
Examples are evidence of the commission of the crime, or proof of causality between the act and 
the harm. The definition or nature of the specific environmental crime affects the burden of proof 
that must be met to successfully prosecute the crime in question.
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 A violation of an 
administrative regulation would most likely require different standards compared to violation of 
a criminal code. In addition, the very nature of environmental crimes necessitates a different 
treatment of evidentiary issues because of the nature of the harm.
255
 Damage to the environment 
can often be caused by long term accumulation of certain actions, rather than the immediate 
result of single conduct. This is frequently the case in other non-environmental crimes. The 
ability to meet the burden of proof also depends on the level of protection offered to the 
environmental medium. For instance, prosecuting the endangerment of an environmental entity 
generally requires a lesser burden than a case involving specific damage to the medium.  
 It is important to turn to recent history on environmental criminality, in concept and 
practice. Societies are still unsure about what parameters define environmental crimes. This is 
closely related to the historical reality that the environment has not been considered significant in 
value.  Therefore, building law on the subject cannot be found in traditional environmental legal 
principles and precedent.
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 Unlike other crimes that benefit only the criminal, crimes against the 
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environment may have societal benefits, such as employment opportunities and economic 
prosperity. For example, in the light of existing scientific evidence on global warming, continued 
encouragement of such activities represents intentional harm that is immoral and destructive to 
collective public interest. This is concurrent to the particular industries and companies that also 
benefit from such crimes.
257
  
 Historically, the scope and severity of environmental crimes have been measured by the 
amount of pollution they cause. This scale is coupled with enforcement being centered on 
controlling the amount of pollution through administrative regulations. Here, the purpose of 
criminal law is to ensure the proper enforcement of the regulatory scheme. Prosecutorial focus 
must remain on important issues including the lack of permits. The lack of this element limits the 
function of criminal law, as many acts of pollution are not prescribed in the permit scheme. 
These types of conduct would go unpunished despite their seriousness. The threat that this 
pollution poses to the environment is far more serious than mere administrative disobedience. 
This dependency on administrative law to enforce environmental treaties has created serious 
limitations on the effectiveness of domestic law and international treaties. This is strongly 
correlated to the power vested in administrators who make controlling regulations, not 
legislators. A few models have been presented that focus on the environmental interest rather 
than adherence to the administrative scheme.  
 The first model is the Model of Abstract Endangerment. This essentially focuses on 
criminalizing disobedience of administrative requirements,
258
 such as a failure to obtain 
appropriate permits. It does not punish for damages committed against environment. Rather, it is 
a penal code designed to punish entities that do not adhere to the dictate of government 
regulations. This model reflects the notion that adherence to government regulations are more 
effective in preventing environmental damage. The Abstract Endangerment Model couples 
existing regulations that touch upon licensing, paperwork and monitoring of pollution producing 
conduct with enforcement mechanisms designed to touch upon criminal law. The language 
contained within the criminal provisions generally identify the illegal conduct and the specific 
punishment to go along with infractions. There are also incentive provisions that reward parties 
that adhere to the rules of compliance with mechanisms that protect them from further liability 
and enforcement actions.
259
 The focus here is on vindicating administrative values. 
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 The second model, Concrete Endangerment, criminalizes actions that violate 
administrative law and pose a danger to the environment. This model raises the bar closer to 
protecting ecological values rather than regulatory schemes. It requires proof that the activity is 
dangerous to the protected medium, such as water, air, or soil. An example of a violation of this 
second model involves the Belgian Surface Water Protection Act of 1971. The courts have a 
legal presumption that any discharge of waste water is considered pollution. This follows the 
requirement that dischargers gain legal status through permits. Conversely, when no permit is 
available for the specific form of discharge, the presumption does not apply. In this case, the 
prosecutor would have to provide evidence that the discharge “could have changed the water 
quality of the receiving surface water.”  This would be a violation of this second model.260 
 The third model of sanctions for serious environmental pollution punishes harm to the 
environment even if the act is not otherwise unlawful. This model severs the link between 
administrative regulations and criminal law. It aims to punish serious environmental harm 
regardless of whether there was an underlying administrative violation. Under this model, crimes 
must be extraordinarily serious in order to justify a presumption that the harm was beyond the 
contemplation of the regulations; that such risk was never permitted to be taken. Some legislative 
structures provide margins that anticipate room for error.
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 Not understanding minor infractions 
or unintentional ones would be contradictory to its purpose.  
 Environmental treaties usually require that states enact penal laws to enforce its 
provisions with respect to “prohibited activities.”262 However, most treaties do not provide a 
definition of the prohibited acts. Signatory states may use administrative regulations to impose 
penalties for actions such as violations of certain limits of discharge, or improper permits or 
bookkeeping.
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 Here criminality becomes complementary to the administrative scheme. The 
concept of environmental harm is usually not presented; it is the protected interest of the 
administrative measure itself and not the ecological value.  
This poses a challenge to the very basic idea that criminal law should be implemented to 
protect against harm. However, it could be argued that the enactment of the legislative law aimed 
at protecting an environmental medium could be imposed regardless of the occurrence of the 
harm.
264
 Here, all that is needed to prove a crime is the occurrence of the violation, regardless of 
the mens rea or the degree of damage to the ecological medium.  
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 There is sharp criticism against the concept of abstract endangerment and its strict 
liability premise. It originates from the delegation of power from the legislative to the executive 
authority of government. This raises a constitutional issue in countries that do not criminalize a 
violation of penal code that is ambiguous.
265
 (Nullumcrimen, nullapoena sine legepraevia et 
scripta). Furthermore, the model has been called ineffective for its inability to prosecute against 
those who have not violated an administrate rule, even though substantial harm has occurred. For 
example, for the various mediums of soil, water and air, the agency in charge of monitoring 
enforcement would set levels of “acceptable” contact between the environment and the pollutant 
itself. This baseline would consider the various conflicting interests involved in the drafting of 
the legislation as well as the underlying principles of its goals.
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 The Council of Europe Convention adopted the Abstract Endangerment Approach by 
requiring member states to implement directions through criminal or administrative measures.
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Article 4 of that Convention refers to inter alia; the unlawful operation of a plant. It allows its 
signatories to rely on administrative law to accomplish the ends of the convention. 
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 The concrete endangerment approach has a direct impact on the way a crime can be 
proven. This is due to the relationship between harm and criminal liability. Policy-makers in the 
1980’s became concerned about the dependency of criminal environmental law on administrative 
law, and sought to separate the two by sanctioning violators directly. This affected the way 
environmental crimes were proven. Rather than discussing an abstract analysis to the risk posed 
to the environmental medium and human health, criminal consequences under this approach rely 
on the nature of the damage to the environmental medium and the scientific diagnosis of such 
damage. Two elements of the crime that must be proven include an allegation of the occurrence 
of an illegal emission or discharge, or the violation of statutory or administrative duties 
(including the condition of a license). Even under this approach, which is stricter than the 
abstract endangerment model, administrative law provides a defense from criminal liability for 
the polluter. Perpetrators can avoid sanctions by proving compliance with regulations. Thus, the 
administrative scheme has a determinative influence on criminal liability since the emissions or 
pollution can be charged as a criminal offense if they were committed illegally. 
 The Serious Pollution Model attempts to provide protection against extremely harmful 
acts of pollution. Here, administrative authorities are not engaged in the process. The power is 
shifted from polluters to prosecutors because criminal liability can still exist even if 
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administrative conditions are met. The administrative link is broken because parties who follow 
this theory understand that administrative code cannot always encompass harmful conduct of 
perpetrators. The assumption administrative body did not permit the damage or risk at bar. The 
end results require that the harms cause by the release of pollutants be “extreme in nature.”269  
 Casual links still remain however, as a very difficult field to predict with reliability. The 
Korean and Japanese legislators have taken this into consideration and introduced presumptions 
within their legal systems that address causation. This legal doctrine asserts that a presumption 
exists when material that would normally cause damage if released would arise upon the release 
of the material. The Koreans have gone a step further by placing penal provisions to couple the 
presumptions.
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 In harmonizing domestic legislation, two forces can be largely helpful in accomplishing 
this goal. First, an international body that leads in changing law and practice. Second, a domestic 
organization that lobbies and provides information to government bodies directly responsible for 
implementing vital environmental law. UNEP was established in 1972 to be the leading 
international organization in the realm of environmental protection. However its weakness has 
been cited in its lack of centralized authority. Furthermore, rather than function as a long term 
institution, it has been spending time and resources in short time fixes, lacking presence in 
policy. All though this international organization has been a force in the realm of environmental 
protection, it has fallen short of creating true impact with domestic policy and legislation.  
 IUCN on the other hand was established in 1965 and it operates within most nations in 
the world. It has in recent times been focusing on providing judicial institutions resources and 
material to assist in the adjudication process of environmental matters. It has also made strides in 
creating cooperation amongst international bodies by planning summits and meetings. This and a 
range of information that it has provided to judicial institutions has created a lasting impact in the 
development of law on the domestic scale.
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IV. Legal Persons – Criminal Liability for Pollution 
 
 The debate over the criminal accountability of corporations committing environmental 
crimes has become increasingly more pertinent in light of serious atrocities committed on their 
behalf. These tragedies have acutely affected the environment and areas of public and private 
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interest. Companies such as Exxon, Pfizer, Bayer, BP, and Halliburton have recently breached 
several environmental, health and safety laws.
272
 The direct financial and human consequences 
of such actions are steep, and the damage that these crimes cause to the environment are 
extensive. 
 State signatories to environmental treaties must commit to enforce penal sanctions 
against parties who break the law on behalf of themselves or corporate entities. The ability to 
penalize these entities, either civilly or criminally varies among nations. However, there is no 
established protocol in international law for the penalization of a corporation’s activities 
conducted by personnel or agents, even in the absence of a direct act by the company. In nearly 
all countries, the illegal actions of a corporate employee must be within the scope of their 
employment. The philosophy of the Responsible Corporate Officer doctrine holds individuals 
responsible for civil penalties and criminal sanction when avoidable violations occur. 
Furthermore, under most circumstances, evidence must exist that their actions were authorized 
by or with the consent of a senior official, and within the scope of his or her authority. In this 
section, the criminality of corporate entities will be discussed firstly in the context of the liability 
of individual employees and then the corporation itself.  
 1. Corporate activities are typically the result of myriad coordinated decisions, leading to 
the potential for a wide range of delegated responsibilities. As a result, it can be difficult to find 
and prosecute the person or persons liable for a crime in the case of “organizational 
wrongdoing,” which can lead to an “organized irresponsibility” of individual employees. Thus 
the indirect liability of a director or other actor can be easily avoided; such actors can only be 
punished when they themselves have committed a crime. Therefore, the extension of individual 
liability is being explored in both statutory and case law, especially in the area of entrepreneurial 
activity.  
 There are general approaches to criminal liability regarding international environmental 
law: 
(a) Criminal liability for corporate officers may still exist even if they themselves 
did not commit the act, as long as the act occurred within the scope of their control and 
knowledge.  
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(b) A more broad scope of liability occurs if the corporate officer is indirectly 
responsible for the act in question; he may be liable for the failure to adequately 
supervise subordinates. 
(c) In broader cases, even if the officer is not a direct participant in an employee’s 
unlawful behavior, he may still be liable. The officer would have to exercise special care 
to avoid liability by preventing illegal activity.  
International law generally seeks to create a presumption of intent or to change the burden of 
proof per (b) and (c). In many counties, adherence to the traditional principle that criminal 
liability requires personal fault ((a)) is being sacrificed in an effort to secure greater 
environmental protection. 
 2. Once it has been determined that a corporate action constitutes a crime, it is possible to 
punish both the individual and the enterprise itself. Numerous mechanisms are in place to 
accomplish this goal. In the U.S., such sanctions include placing the corporation in the custody 
of the U.S. Marshalls, requiring reforms of operations, financial penalties, and imposing 
substantial sanctions. In cases involving financial penalties, the estimates of illegal gains is 
generally not accepted, but there are nations that have regulations that calculate accordingly. For 
example, in the matter of surcharges in the Japanese Antimonopoly Act, the law can reduce 
illegal gains by imposing payment to the government with a clear numerical formula. There is 
growing consensus towards bringing criminal liability against corporations.  
 However, in countries such as Korea or Japan, the difficulty rests more in determining 
personal fault. For example, both countries provide that a corporate entity is held responsible for 
a crime committed by one of its employees.
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 In order to do this, one must prove that an 
individual acted illegally and violated the regulation. Generally, this individual is difficult to 
locate, particularly when the enterprise is a large company. Once the individual has been located 
and charged, a prosecutor needs proof that the corporation did not uphold its requirement to 
prevent the employee from committing a crime. In response to this problem, the Korean 
Judiciary has adopted a theory of fault presumption, which allows for additional findings against 
perpetrators. This example reflects the difficulty involved in punishing a large corporation. Such 
approaches have been met with criticism because of the doctrine of guilt.  
 Observing corporate liability in the context of international law is rooted in legal 
doctrine. In 1987, the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law recognized corporate liability under 
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international law.
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 Since the formal acknowledgement of corporate responsibility, there has 
been an increased push in holding non state actors criminally liable in the international arena.
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In a recent analysis, scholars have argued that corporations fall under specific laws already 
established within the community of nations such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and the Genocide Convention. Furthermore, “Corporations are already widely regulated by 
international law, whether through economic frameworks and trade agreements or through penal 
provisions governing fraud and money laundering. Indeed, the next step to bring them 
specifically under the rubric of international criminal legal norms is not a far stretch.”276 
 Opponents of liability have made their stand on international covenants such as the 
Genocide Convention. The convention states, “Persons committing genocide or any other acts 
enumerated in Article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rules, 
public officials or private individuals.” 277 The defenders of corporate interests argue that the list 
is fully inclusive of those that are subject to the jurisdiction of the convention, and the list does 
not include legal persons but only real persons. However, there have been no judicial or textual 
distinctions between a legal and non-legal person in reference to this specific international law 
during its creation.
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 Unfortunately, there is still debate as to the meaning and application of 
“persons.” This continues to be an obstacle to the prosecution of corporations. The doctrine of 
vicarious liability serves as another legal mechanism to bring corporations to justice. In recent 
years, more and more nation states have been found liable for individual actors performing duties 
on behalf of their country. This was solidified in 2007 when the International Court of Justice 
rendered a decision making nation states liable for committing genocide.
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 As states are held 
liable for acts done by individuals, the argument scholars propose would effectuate the same 
principle towards corporations. “Modern companies cannot feign innocence by claiming that 
they were unaware that they enable genocide.”280 These measures would ensure that corporations 
create internal systems of self-policing that would control their own directors and members from 
engaging in acts that would be against the corporate interests. However, until we incentivize 
corporations to not engage in these activities through penalties, fines, and penal sanctions, they 
will continue to look at their profits as a driving factor of their agenda.  
V. Transnationalization in Domestic Penal Legislation  
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 Transnational subject matter jurisdiction is less than established, even with well settled 
principles. Conflicts arise when more than one law is applicable to the same issue. Even with the 
assumption that principles of nationalism and territory have attained customary law status, there 
are neither general treaties nor customary legal rules for resolving such conflicts. Significant 
obstacles to providing solutions gain genesis in the uncertainty revolving around conflicting 
authoritative principles and extraterritorial principles under international law.
281
 To overcome 
such obstacles, novel interpretations can be created to observe extraterritorial rules through more 
a more workable prism.  
 A state signatory has jurisdiction within its territorial boundaries, including relevant 
coastal waters and seabed areas (the so called “territorial theory” of jurisdiction).282 To apply 
national law to transboundary cases, the range of territorial theory should be expanded by 
determining the geographic location of a crime. Within the ubiquity principle, the place of 
commission is where the act took place. That extends the principle of ubiquity in connection with 
the principle of territoriality. 
 Broader jurisdiction theories are adopted by certain countries. The “passive personality 
theory” extends jurisdictional prosecutorial powers to where the victim of the offense is a 
domiciliary.
283
 The “protective theory” extends judicial dominion over all violations, including 
those occurring outside domestic boundaries. Such acts could easily be argued as they have been 
done, that they infringe on national security and sovereignty. The “universal jurisdiction theory” 
allows states to exercise in personam jurisdiction over individual when they are within the 
territorial boundaries of the nation state and their violations can be categorized as particularly 
harmful or heinous to mankind.
284
 This concept is generally applicable when an international 
covenant has outlawed or banned the specific conduct that was committed by the violator, and 
the country is a member state to that agreement.
285
  
 There can also be limits that arise when the perpetrator is connected in some manner to 
another country, but the offender does not adhere to foreign administrative requirements. For 
example, the Federal Republic of Germany does penalize actors operating within a foreign 
country who lack proper permits.
286
 Under the ubiquity principle, the location of the offense the 
location of the harm occurred and the act causing such harm differ. However, this is only 
applicable when concrete endangerment is an element of the offense. Abstract dangers that could 
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or could not exist would be outside the bounds of this principle. In these circumstances, 
according to prevailing opinion, the harm itself is not a legal element to the offense. 
 Illegal conduct must be top priority in the country where it exists. Both the United States 
and the United Kingdom insisted on criminal jurisdiction favorable to territoriality. They did not 
acknowledge the idea that a state may apprehend and prosecute actors outside their own 
territorial boundaries. This is in sharp contrast to countries who have adopted the passive 
personality principle, protective theory, and the universal jurisdiction doctrine to protect their 
environment and prosecute criminals. In recent decades, the United States has moved away from 
this possession. 
 Now the U.S. generally relies on what other countries recognize as extravagant 
jurisdiction claims. The criminal provisions in U.S. environmental statutes have been interpreted 
very broadly. These interpretations of legal principles allow the U.S. the reach beyond its borders 
to have an international long arm. The extraterritorial interpretation of American environmental 
laws would expose actors with no personal connections with the U.S., except through their 
business, to criminal liability within the U.S. This is the case regardless of whether the 
irresponsible officer’s corporation was a domiciliary of the U.S. or another country. Whether the 
Americanization of international law enforcement is also applicable within the international 
community should be examined more closely. 
 Numerous nations have adopted laws to protect interests outside their territorial 
boundaries. The most common are laws focused on the protection of the oceans. These laws 
generally ban vessels of the legislating state (or vessels operating within its territorial 
boundaries) from polluting. Many of these regulations were passed in conjunction with the 
implementation of the 1954 London Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil 
and the Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships.
287
  
The passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 was a legislative response by the United 
States Congress to the environmental damage caused by the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill.
288
 This 
act gave the President power to prosecute actors on a criminal level. The Act’s liability 
provisions are ill-defined, as is the issue of applicability to foreign nationals. If it were, new 
interpretations would be required of existing international maritime law. The enforcement of the 
Oil Pollution Act’s criminal provisions within or beyond the territorial sea of the U.S. for spills 
that fail to rise to egregious or willful, would mean that the US would be exercising greater 
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power than that allocated to coastal states under the U.N. Conventions on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS).
289
  
Many provisions of UNCLOS have been accepted as customary international law. In 
light of this, the agreement has been used to guide the marine jurisdiction debate in academic 
circles. The importance of the UNCLOS and its provisions urge U.S. courts to give precedence 
to the Oil Pollution Act over UNCLOS. The MARPOL Convention and its corresponding U.S. 
legislation are based on the necessity of pollution reduction from routine ship movements and 
operations.  
The inability of the Law of the Sea to effectively handle developments in modern life is 
well recognized. However, unilateral actions outside the law’s boundaries are viewed as 
inevitable, which may lead to international conflict. In some academic circles, international law 
is viewed as growing slowly because of its requirement of mutual consent prior to any communal 
action. The use of criminal sanctions to protect the environment recognizes a growing consensus 
that has emerged to govern the international community since the 1982 U.N. Convention on the 
Law of the Sea. That Convention laid a framework that defers to the flag state for compliance 
certification and enforcement action.  
UNCLOS and MARPOL approach this problem by adopting the perspective that the 
“freedom of the seas” should be absolute. The community of nations should seek to comply with 
the provisions of UNCLOS. Its provisions reflect the needs of today’s worlds and will help shape 
it for future generations. The international community should be accepting of rules that support 
the mutual enforcement of rules against environmental crime.    
74 | 
 
Chapter 4 
REGIONAL COOPERATION IN CRIMINALIZING 
ENVIRONMENTALLY HARMFUL ACTIVITIES 
 
I. History of Regionalism 
 
The concept of regionalism has sparked a remarkable interest in the public consciousness 
with its policy considerations. This surge of focus comes in the aftermath of the Cold War, the 
consolidation of Europe, and the creation of several supranational agreements including 
NAFTA.
290
 Because environmental issues arise from ecosystems and geographical features 
rather than political boundaries, domestic and local actions are insufficient, requiring 
international cooperation.
291
 The cohesive facilitation of environmental issues can create a 
common pool of rules, goals, and procedures with the end product of international 
cooperation.
292
  
 The consequences for failing to adequately address environmental crimes are potentially 
disastrous. There exist well-funded criminal organizations that continually profit from exploiting 
the environment. Within the same breadth, corporations continue to play out profit scenarios 
upon which they accept financial gains over damages to the environment.  The Environmental 
Investigation Agency has urged “the international community to wake-up to the menace of 
environmental crime and show the necessary political will to tackle the criminal gangs 
plundering our planet for a quick profit.”293 Enforcement agencies traditionally have chosen to 
place their efforts against classic international crimes such as the trafficking of drugs, weapons, 
people and terrorism.
294
 The focus on these international matters have stymied efforts to regulate 
environmental crimes such as the illegal trading of environmental commodities.
295
  
 The realities of environmental infractions require an appropriately measured response 
that will regulate the field of law in a manner that would protect the lives of wild animals and 
human health.  Similar to traditional crimes, gauging the tolerable level of unregulated 
environmental conduct is often difficult. Regardless of this analysis, sufficient regulatory 
response is required from all parties that aim to police environmental crimes. Attempts to obtain 
this goal have severely fell short in depth and breadth.
296
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 Cooperation on a regional geographic basis has been a builder of alliances since the dawn 
of the history of nations. States, cities, and communities working together have achieved goals 
that have progressed civilized society. With respect to environmental protection however, 
progress has been slow and in many ways nonexistent. A few reasons for this are the delicate 
nature of interests that conflict with neighbors. For example, it may be in the interest of one 
nation to log its natural forests for economic gain, while the flood run off caused by this policy 
may only affect the neighboring nation. Furthermore, even when states have common interests, 
common obstacles remain in achieving their success. The lack of monetary resources, the risk of 
economic harm, political instability, and lack of political will for long term commitment are all 
problem issues that nations face.  
 Strong domestic legislation coupled with international law provides systematic 
engagement on established principles that foster regional cooperation. This can then overcome 
domestic legal differences as long as international commitment is priority within the region. 
Given this premise, it is much easier to create cooperation in the field of environmental legal 
issues in comparison to other fields of law. The main for reasons for this are: 1) the study of 
ecology and the environment is a shared common body of knowledge with a medium that is 
inhabited by all, 2) technological systems that are used by all mankind cause many of the 
contemporary public health issues such as acid rain and urban smog, 3) the advanced nature of 
governments cause commonalities in bureaucracies and their enforcement practices, and 4) 
globalization that has caused the integration of economies, the speed of news, and the low travel 
time between far distances has made it easier for different countries to find common ground in 
the need for environmental protection.
297
 
  
II. Domestic Legislation 
 Often, legislation passed on the domestic level that aims to combat environmental crimes 
has been inadequate in substance and enforcement. This is primarily caused by state’s self-
centered concerns about their economy and security. This focus ignores the environment while 
focuses on short term growth.
298
 Pursuing the goal of regulating environmental crimes is out of 
the possible scope of the individual state.
299
 Due to the glaring weakness of nation-state 
regulations, interstate cooperation is the necessary mechanism to solve the steep crisis of 
environmental crimes. Transnational cooperation has proven to be the correct mechanism to 
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combat similar international challenges in the past.
300
 It has been effective in eliminating cholera 
that had ravaged large populations.
301
 Community based cooperation also oversaw the 
elimination slavery and the increase of the human standard of living. 
 A specialized agency that directs its efforts in exploring and developing a sound 
knowledge base of organized environmental crimes is a rare reality.
302
 The few that are in 
existence are grossly under financed which leads to poor training, and a wholly underdeveloped 
understanding of proper strategies to produce intelligence led enforcement. Unfortunately, this 
setback leads to a poor allocation of resources and a poorly planned approach to organized 
environmental crime.  
 Corruption at the state and corporate level has proven to be the most prominent challenge 
in circumventing environmental crimes.
303
 The root of the problem rests in corruption, anchored 
in bribes and other monetary considerations; this must be addressed by all parties.
304
 Efforts are 
need to push for administrative reform. Corruption prevention is the most effective and 
historically successful way to combat the problem. However, many developed and developing 
nations still face profound problems that adversely affect international and transnational 
progress. Easily accessible technologies that can be adopted with nominal resources are still not 
enacted to provide online auditing capabilities to average citizens.
305
 
 Commentators have noted that there seems to be an unreasonable institutional 
complacency in respects to environmental crime.
306
 There is a certain lack of awareness 
concerning the size of the environmental problem and the efforts needed to curb it which is 
unacceptable. Proper attention must be paid to the clear fact that environmental crimes and their 
resulting harm are time sensitive. This is exemplified by many organizations such as the 
Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality who aim to develop solutions quickly and 
efficiently to solve the problems at hand in the Gulf of Mexico.
307
 
 In attempting to understand the specific domestic legislative schemes that are 
encountered in the West, the United States and the European Union are a prime example for 
comparison. The differences between the two bodies show the strengths and weaknesses of each 
system that can be used to lobby for effective adoption of environmental criminal regimes. Even 
if such adoption cannot be attained by the E.U. or the U.S. alone, their place in their regional 
position in the world allows us to see alternative methods for understanding external pressures 
for domestic adoption of laws.   
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 It is imperative to understand the effects of various legal systems. The differences allow 
us to measure the success of certain legal structures and the deficiencies of others. This can 
translate to not only the substantive nature of the laws themselves, but the enforcement 
mechanism used to put them into practice. The United States has arguably the most advanced 
system of environmental protection laws in the modern world. The only comparable system of 
law is the steadily progressing European Union. This regional government has put into place 
various pieces of legislation that ripples through its member states.  
 In the 1970s, the United States was in an era of drastic social change. One of the many 
popular movements centered on environmental protection occurred during this period. The 
adoption of such laws happened quickly and took place in effective fashion. “[J]ust within a few 
years, Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act, the Clean Air amendments, the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments, the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control 
Act, the Marine Mammal Protection Act, the Noise Control Act, the Coastal Zone Management 
Act, and the Endangered Species Act of 1973.”308 These laws were all passed on the federal 
level, allowing national resources to be used to protect all of these environmental interests. This 
is in contrast to individual states attempting to combat environmental challenges on their own, 
with limited financial means.  
 Although the American system puts large emphasis on the federal government to enforce 
and supervise industries, it does not place the entire burden on Washington. Rather, federal law 
serves only as a minimum requirement, where states can create stricter rules and regulations. For 
environmental rules, states are free to create their own emissions rules and standards that are 
tougher than the federal bar. This of course is limited by the U.S. Constitution. The Supreme 
Court has interpreted the document to not allow States to place an unnecessarily high burden on 
interstate commerce or the interest of other states. This is generally referred to as the “commerce 
clause.” Another instance of states being countermanded by the Supreme Court is when federal 
law occupies the field and preempts the area of law that the state is legislating in. The Supreme 
Court refers to the “supremacy clause” that allows federal law to supersede that of states.  
 The model in the European Union has vast differences. Unlike the federal system in the 
United States, the E.U. binds its nation states together through treaties and other international 
agreements. Therefore, each country is only granted power that has been expressly outlined by 
international covenants. “Despite this principle, the power of the European bureaucracy… has 
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steadily increased and led to a steady shift of environmental regulatory competences to the 
European level.”309 This is because a large amount of domestic policies that are passed by 
individual legislatures are effectively becoming European Law.  
 In the E.U., enforcement is also a crucial component to understanding domestic 
relationships. Member states themselves are charged with the enforcement of European 
Commission environmental law.
310
  This has in turn pushed nation states to adopt in large part 
rules and regulations that are used by the E.U. collective. “For example, sixty-six present of 
environmental law in the Netherlands is based on European directives and regulations.”311 In 
addition to this, the European Court of Justice has “held that under certain circumstances, 
citizens who have suffered damage as a result of a lack of implementation by a Member State 
can be entitled to compensation….”312  
Another principle adopted in Europe allows an individual citizen to invoke supranational 
law to challenge policies of their own state. This is another mechanism that allows individuals to 
hold their own domestic systems accountable by using international law that binds signatory 
countries. A prime example is an ECJ decision that imposed financial penalties on Greece for not 
complying with an earlier judgment from 1992.
313
 This shows a clear support from the entire 
European Community to hold those responsible for infractions against the environment and its 
unified principles. 
The main difference between both the U.S. system and the E.U. system rests in the E.U.’s 
inability to hold citizens or enterprises liable. E.U. law is focused mainly on the nation states that 
have signed on to its treaties. The member states themselves are responsible for prosecuting 
citizens and enterprises that have offended principles of law. In understanding both of these 
systems, one can observe positives of federal system that has great effectiveness in handling 
matters on a domestic level. It can also not be overlooked that a supranational body like the E.U. 
can hold many nations accountable at once through its own checks and balances; a power 
unavailable to the U.S.  
 To maintain the balance, the world must come to the general consensus that 
environmental crimes demand a sustained response from the community of nations. These efforts 
must be undertaken before attempts to cure the problem is moot due to temporal inactivity. The 
success of this initiative requires proper regional cooperation between all interested parties. 
There have been a few global mechanisms, both governmental and non-governmental that have 
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achieved solid results. These approaches have pushed forward this task in an attempt to connect 
groups and help to create regional cooperation. 
314
 
 Regionally located organizations seem to be better equipped than global institutions, both 
in efficiency and execution when dealing with the challenge of implementing effective 
environmental policies.
315
 This is generally the case because regional treaties are able to 
encompass a larger number of parties than a single global treaty, assuming that the cost of 
cooperation is the same within both types of regimes. This results in regional cooperation being 
more effective in policing and regulating environmental crimes.
316
 Generally, local organizations 
have more accessible means to gather information, and it is simply easier to create cooperation 
among regional parties with similar cultures and ecological systems.
317
  
III. Variability in the Application of Domestic Law 
 
 Individual countries with commitments to regional agreements have varying 
circumstances that often this lead to exceptions and exemptions being applied to that party. Such 
exceptions often remain the steadfast rule. For example, Eastern European countries, with their 
lower environmental living conditions and nearly non-existent regulations, have ties with the 
European Commission (EC). The environmental objectives are defined in Article 4 of the Water 
Framework Directive.
318
 The purpose of this article is to provide continued access to sustainable 
water while emphasizing a high level of environmental protection. 
 Article 4.1 defined the Water Framework Directive’s general objective to be prevalent in 
all surface and groundwater bodies, namely, a positive status mark by 2015, and the introduction 
of principles that help to prevent any further crippling of that status. Within the short term 
however, there are a number of exemptions to the general objectives that allow for less stringent 
requirements. For example, the article allows the extending of the deadline beyond 2015 for the 
implementation of new projects, provided a set of conditions are fulfilled.
319
 The result is that the 
interpretation of regional instruments will generally remain inconsistent, possibly for a long 
period of time due to the nature of the exemptions and the likelihood that there will be a breach 
by the subject state.  
 Poorer countries joining regional organizations are expected to develop their industry 
fully respecting and adhering to environmental laws. Economic exemptions and incentives that 
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allow these particular nations to take calculated precautions against pollution and gradually attain 
pollution controls are on par with industrialized nations.
320
  
Exemptions that are practiced domestically vary in scope. An example of this incentive 
based exemption system was passed into law to form a successful U.S. based mechanism. The 
system was designed to control acid.  Title IV in 1990-The Clean Air Act was passed to allow 
tradable emission allowances for sulfur dioxide. The system allowed for the electric power 
industry in the eastern part of the county to be allowed a fixed number of allowances, and the 
rules allowed the banking, buying and selling of these allowances.
321
  The theory revolves 
around the idea that countries are allowed certain privileges to help better strike the balance 
between economic prosperity and complying with environmental laws. These incentives are 
designed avoid social and political instability that result in the shifting values countries place on 
pollution control. Such changes in perspective can be due to their individual environments and 
political climate.  
Another example stems from the Baltic Sea region. Surround this geographic location are 
14 countries at the drainage basin of the Baltic Sea; Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Germany, Denmark, Belarus, Norway, Slovakia, and Czech. Since these nations vary in 
development, the amount each nation contributes to pollution in the region can be divided into 
two categories.  In developed nations such as Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Germany, 
pollution stems from paper manufacturing and the fertilization of agriculture.
322
 
Proponents of “regional cooperation” as a tool to protect the environment, which utilizes 
criminal penalties, adopts and concedes that the differences between nations legislative structures 
are roadblocks that hinder the success of environmental protection agreements.
323
 It is at this 
junction that international law helps clear the murky waters. Standard conflict-of-law doctrines 
are not sufficient to handle the existing challenges.
324
 However, participation must be voluntary 
and by national will rather than international criticism and penalties. Nations who are pushed to 
agreement by unsolicited pressure are less likely to keep their commitments.
325
  
IV. Environmental Standards in Individual Nations 
 
 The burden of determining environmental standards that should be controlling for each 
developing country is often a difficult task. Applying general principles of international 
environmental law to the various issues in these nations are not realistic.
326
 The principle of 
81 | 
 
“Sustainable Development,” which formulates the idea that safeguarding the environment and 
economic development are intertwined practices, has increased international environmental 
cooperation.
327
 However, the principle of national sovereignty remains a significant obstacle to 
full international cooperation. Many countries are stern in their demands and in their practice of 
exploiting their native natural resources pursuant to their own political and economic policies.
328
  
 Nations often use the sovereignty argument as a shield to protect against rising social 
costs and keep the contradicting benefits that go along with pollution control.
329
 These countries 
feel that their privilege as sovereign nations allows them to use all available means to attain 
economic success on plane with those enjoyed by the developed countries. This notion comes in 
light of the plausible argument that these now-developed countries did not have to succumb to 
any rigid environmental restraints, and they have achieved economic prosperity because of the 
lack of restraints. 
 Before 1970 for example, environmental laws in the U.S were virtually non-existent. A 
few states did attempt to establish limited controls. There were common law property and tort 
principles that were invoked on behalf of environmental concerns in certain lawsuits. These 
restraints were extremely limited, and there was no legislation in place that regulated pollution of 
the air, water, or land. The U.S. had no national clean air legislation, no federal clean water act, 
and no hazardous waste or toxic substance laws. Prior to 1970, the Environmental Protection 
Agency was nonexistent. Mechanisms that did exist were only granted limited powers under 
statutory definitions, most of which only allowed for some basic assistance to local and state 
governments.
330
 Nevertheless, the sovereignty shield has been pierced now that nations realize 
that international interests are most important in sustainable development.
331
 
 Other less discussed nations from Southeast Asia also illuminate the diversity of domestic 
laws, and the deep history that accompanies legislation. In Indonesia for example, the “natural 
resource management after the Suharto regime’s demise in 1998 is heavily influenced by the 
ongoing process of decentralization of power to the regions.”332 This has led to a failure of 
government in attempting to balance the interests of local provinces with those of the central 
government in reference to national resources. Indonesia’s forest management effort has been 
struck by a massive dysfunction as local leaders no longer comply with demands from the 
centralized government.
333
 “Overall, the institutional governance of natural resources and the 
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environment in Indonesia continues to be fractured, with problems of corruption and lack of co-
ordination becoming even more pronounced than during the Suharto era.”334 
 Thailand offers a more optimistic perspective, where efforts have been bolstered by the 
new Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MNRE). The agency faces its toughest 
competition not from outside special interests, but other government agencies, such as the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives.
335
 Although the new agency has seen setbacks after 
its genesis, there is confidence that the governmental body will be able to regulate environmental 
exploitation within Thailand’s borders. Malaysia has also taken the same approach by 
establishing its own MNRE. Experts have noted however that “there are worrying signs that the 
[Malaysian] MNRE is perpetuating the traditional emphasis on exploitation and wealth creation, 
as evidence by the new Minister’s recent assertion that land and forests are national assets which 
must not be left dormant.”336 
 Vietnam is another Southeast Asian country that has implemented an MNRE to regulate 
natural resources. It too “faces challenges in reconciling the policies of its central and provincial 
governments.”337 
 The common problem between these countries and other Southeast Asian nations 
revolves around their inability to manage the interests between the central and provincial 
governments. This is “exemplified by Indonesia and Vietnam [as] many of the laws enacted are 
typically initiated by sectoral ministries interested only in the specific range of activities that fall 
within their mandate.”338 This is in stark contrast to the United States that has a functioning 
republican government with both a state and federal governments. The E.U. boasts strong 
supranational policies with nation states enforcing international policy on the domestic scale 
without great conflict. With every unique nation, there comes a delicate balance of government 
that interplays with environmental policy and enforcement. Southeast Asia serves as a small test 
site for the rest of the world. It provides a survey of how international law and domestic lobbying 
for environmental legislation will be received by a diverse pool of countries.  
 
V. Regional Regimes 
 
 Regional regimes have developed to connect and reinforce the common interests of 
different areas of the world. These systems are designed to help nations in their efforts to 
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implement sound environmental laws.
339
 Local institutions include, among others, the Council of 
Europe, the Asian Regional Partners Forum on Combating Environmental Crime (ARPEC), and 
the environmental security regime established for the Baltic Sea region. 
ARPEC consists of numerous nations that have made environmental protection a main 
domestic priority.
340
 The illegal trade of commodities led to the creation of this forum. For 
example, the increase in the trade of wild flora and fauna, hazardous waste, ozone depleting 
chemicals, and other items initiated international concern and action. The continued patronage 
and existence of these black markets contradicts the efforts of environmental conservationists as 
well as the various agreements nation states have signed in an effort to protect wildlife.
341
 
 It is an implied reality that a more specialized regional legislation would be more 
effective in providing specific solutions as problems arise. Other international bodies of law and 
agencies do not possess regional character, therefore may not be able to effectively meet many 
challenges.
342
 An example of a regional problem that required a more centralized effort can be 
illustrated through a case in the People’s Republic of China and its neighboring countries.  China 
has a serious problem with environmental crime as it is the target for dumping a large amount of 
hazardous waste. Over 85,000 tons of illegal waste shipments have been seized since 2000, and 
the source of most of the ozone depletion substances (ODS) on the global market.
343
 
Transnational exportation of waste in and out of China continues to plague the country. 
This continues after years of difficulties with illegal international shipments of waste for disposal 
within their borders and the attached human and environmental harms resulting from these 
crimes. The NGO report, “Exporting Harm: The High-Tech Trashing of Asia,” is an early 
example of a citizen group’s outcry resulting from such issues. The fingers point to the general 
perception that China has a weak enforcement of their existing dumping laws.
344
 Citizen groups 
continue to campaign against environmental harms resulting from electronic waste dumping and 
disassembly.
345
 The Sky Hole Patching Project was launched in 2006 to help solve this problem. 
The purpose behind Project Sky Hole Patching is to push forward the agenda of stamping out 
illegal trade in ODS and other dangerous materials as set forth in the Montreal Protocol and the 
Basal Convention in the Asia Pacific region.
346
 
A. Asian Regional Partners Forum on Combating Environmental Crime (APREC) 
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ARPEC was created in 2005 with the efforts of regional cooperation to help fight 
environmental crimes in Asia. The principal goal was to create an operative mechanism that 
allowed the free flow of information coupled with technical cooperation and coordination 
activities among NGO’s and international associations.347 
Through mutual cooperation, opportunities have arisen for these groups to enrich 
themselves through educational workshops and through an established forum to share vital 
information that they possess. Several regional organizations have formed as well. They include 
Project Sky Hole Patching (aims to fight against illegal trade of ozone depleting substances) and 
the Partnership against Transnational Crime through Regional Organized Law Enforcement. 
Members of ARPEC include most notably, The Environmental Investigation Agency, The 
International Union for Conservation of Nature, The World Bank, The Wildlife Conservation 
Society, and The Ministry of Industry of Thailand.
348
 These forums are informal and 
membership is open to other organizations.
349
 
 In July of 2011, several national government, NGO’s and international associations, 
gathered to debate and share information regarding the illegal trade of flora and fauna. These 
debates occurred at the 11
th
 ARPEC meeting. This event was organized by the Regional Centre 
organ of the UN Office of Drugs and Crime under the direction of UNEP.
350
 
 The participating groups at the ARPEC meeting discussed the importance of sharing 
knowledge relevant to their goals. Conversation also revolved around how media management 
can aid in the fight against organized environmental crime in target Asian countries. Emphasis 
was placed on developing a forum of knowledge sharing among environmental law enforcers 
from a global perspective. This theme is seen as an important key to defeating crimes against the 
environment.
351
 
 Other tactics employed against environmental crimes were debated at length during this 
meeting. They included the pressing need to push forward strict environmental legislation that 
was not only simpler in its application but more effective. Combining this with the free flow of 
intelligence sharing between enforcement agencies seems to be the main muscle that will be 
flexed when trying to successfully prosecute environmental crimes. The hope is this will lead to 
the development of better targeted penalties for environmental offenses.
352
 
 There have been a series of expositions on the importance of sharing knowledge and 
intelligence by key actors.
353
 These have been pushed by several groups urging that the pertinent 
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priority be the sharing of criminal intelligence. The Wildlife Conservation Society and other 
similar actors accentuated their positive experiences by broadcasting their coverage of 
environmental criminal acts in hopes of raising public awareness of the severity of such crimes 
and their harm against humans, animals, and the environment. This meeting laid groundwork for 
the introduction of a collaborative effort between the International Consortium on Combating 
Wildlife Crime (ICCWC), the Secretariat of the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), INTERPOL, UNODC, the World Bank 
and the World Customs Organization (WCO).
354
 
 Project Sky-Hole Patching was the original project that operated in the fight against 
environmental crime in Asia.
355
 The initiative was a watershed effort by the Regional 
Intelligence Liaison Office-Asia and Pacific (RILO/AP) that aimed to target and regulate the 
smuggling of hazardous wastes and ozone depleting substances.
356 
Project Sky-Hole Patching 
aimed to forge the intelligence gathering capacity and knowledge matrixes to intercept shipments 
of illegal ODS and toxic waste, using the sources from customs authorities in 20 of the Asian-
Pacific countries. The first phase of the project focused on ODS, and the second broadened its 
reach to include hazardous waste. Since 2007, the project has been transformed into a standard 
operation, employing numerous customs agents.
357
   Since then, over 100 tons of illegal ODS and 
1,000 tons of illicit waste was seized.
358
 This project clearly raises the awareness of ODS, toxic 
waste dumping, and smuggling among custom groups throughout the region. This has led to 
positive cooperation even beyond the original target region, with RILO AP now allying 
themselves with the European Union Network.
359
  
 
B. The European Union and the Brief History of Criminal Environmental Cooperation in Europe 
 
The European Union (EU) has been frequently cited as an example of strong regional 
organization that has enjoyed success in combating environmental crimes.
360
 The E.U. was 
originally established as a mechanism to facilitate economic prosperity and political stability 
throughout Europe. This pathway to economic unification was laid out before the Summit in 
Paris in 1972 which waded into the area of environmental protection as a component of 
economic prosperity.
361
 The newly adopted Article 6 stands at the forefront of the Treaty. The 
clause beckoned for the protection of environmental interests to be placed into the application 
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and meaning of other policies.  This article also stated that integration is one avenue of 
promoting sustainable development. 
 This new article is seen to be complimentary with the Declaration on Environmental 
Impact Assessment, annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference which drafted 
the Treaty of Amsterdam.
362
  Environmental assessment compilations are prepared when the 
Commission of this Declaration suggests initiatives that may have profound environmental 
implications.
363
  
On November 4, 1998 the Council of Europe passed the Convention on the Protection of 
the Environment through Criminal Law.
364
 This Convention focused on advancing the substance 
behind criminal law as a tool for transnational advancement in the area of international 
environmental crimes.
365
 The preamble states the point of the Council of Europe is to create 
unity between members. Its provisions include mandates for parties to “adopt legislation on the 
national level.”366 The offenses that it lists include intentional offenses, negligent offenses, and 
criminal or administrative offenses. The offenses listed are “…obligatory and the parties are 
instructed to adopt the appropriate measures necessary in order to establish the criminal 
[offenses] in their domestic law.”367 In addition to outline the offenses, the Convention requires 
parties to establish jurisdiction to prosecute crimes within its territorial borders. 
The Council of Europe, formed in the aftermath of World War II, in the prevalent 
criminal law arena. This Council is known for its 21 Conventions and 70 some 
recommendations.
368
 Due to post Cold War geographic changes in the Eastern part of Europe, it 
has 47 members.
369
The Council has shown its dedication to environmental matters, with most of 
its focus on environmental crime.
370
 Several resolutions for this purpose have been passed based 
on the conclusion of the 7
th
 Conference of European Ministers of Justice in Basel, 1972. In 1977 
the Council of Europe adopted its Resolution 28 on the Contribution of Criminal Law to the 
Protection of the Environment. Further, the 17
th
 Conference of European Ministers of Justice in 
Istanbul passed the Resolution No.1 on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal law. 
These resolutions articulate appropriate regulations that the nation’s governments should 
undertake. 
The Single European Act (1986), which is another example of regional enforcement, 
provides clear authority for the European Community (EC) on environmental and natural 
resource concerns.
371
 The goals of the European Community are to provide direction and suggest 
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regulations aimed at controlling pollution and safeguarding the environment. This is coupled 
with future plans for higher protection. The European Court of Justice has appointed itself as the 
principal chair that will seek to ensure that regulations adopted by the nations comply with the 
outlined provisions. Pursuant to E.C. law, the burden of enforcement has been transferred from 
inter-state and placed under the jurisdiction of the European Commission and the European 
Court of Justice. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty was the genesis of providing financial penalties 
upon signatory states that shirked from their responsibility in complying with community law.
372
 
Despite the importance allocated to the doctrines incorporated in the Maastricht Treaty, it is 
unclear if the European Community will hold a tight grip on control in the environmental field. It 
seems that the European Union’s views of environmental law and its method of enforcement are 
one of its more popular activities in Europe.
373
  
Chapter 7 of this thesis discusses in detail the European Union’s environmental 
protection mechanisms and its suitability as a model for a global union with respect to 
environmental protection, specifically through criminal law.   
 
C. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) 
   
 Mexico agreed to strengthen its domestic environmental laws in order to encourage the 
United States to politically support the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
374
 
During NAFTA negotiations, many groups warned of the pending consequences from increased 
transnational pollution which had already begun to develop. The increase in pollution began to 
occur when corporations began moving their plants to Mexico; the  quasi-merger of bi-national 
economies lead to  symmetry within the countries’ environmental laws and a net decrease in the 
United States’ strict environmental regulations. Furthermore, under-regulated Mexican imports 
that posed health risks from the mishandling of harmful pesticides found a boon in this 
agreement. 
 These important issues were silenced with the formation of the North American 
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), which is a supplemental environmental 
agreement attached to NAFTA.
375
 Because the NAAEC does not provide any substantial 
remedies to harmed individuals, it offers very little to parties of NAFTA in terms of incentivizing 
their actions toward effective environmental regulation. 
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 Subsequent to Mexico’s adoption of NAFTA, the rate of environmental inspections 
dropped drastically. This has led to reasonable speculation as to what the true motives were 
behind this substantial thrust towards environmental protection.
376
 As late as 1999, Mexico’s 
GDP was growing around 10-14% annually. Curiously, only 0.6% of the GDP was being 
invested into the pressing needs of environmental protection.
377
 Mexico has not made any 
substantial achievements in incentivizing industries to comply with environmental rules.
378
 It 
seems that the majority of the maquila industry is missing the proper structures to battle the 
grave environmental harm caused by the voluminous trade along the border.
379
 Between 1985 
and 1999 commentators calculated that Mexico suffered substantial increases in environmental 
harm. This includes the growth of rural soil erosion by nearly 90%, municipal solid waste by 
108%, water pollution by 29%, air pollution by 97%, and other environmental harms.
380
 
 The aim of NAFTA’s Environmental Side centers on the domestic enforcement of 
environmental law, including its establishment and maintenance. The agreements encourage a 
forum of public participation in the legislative and policing processes. They also provide for 
nation to nation conflict settlement for repetitive failures of effective enforcement of national 
environmental regulations, and the establishment of a structure for cooperation between the 
NAFTA parties. The Agreement provides persons or groups within any NAFTA territory can file 
a submission with a tri-national secretariat. This filing will adjudicate allegations that a bound 
party has failed to enforce its environmental regulations. The submission must comply with 
certain established criteria (e.g., provide sufficient information regarding the allegation and it 
aims for proper enforcement) that the Secretariat will determine. 
 Part Five of the Agreements lays out the mechanism for obtaining a chance to formally 
dispute and settle when evidence of repetitive failure of a party to enforce their environmental 
laws is present.
381
 If the incumbent dispute settlement panel does come to the conclusion that a 
persistent pattern of failure as outlined by the Agreement exists, they will execute a thorough 
plan to cure the problem.
382
 The sanctions against a party that fails to implement the proposed 
action plan can include monetary assessment.
383
 If a party fails to pay the proposed monetary 
assessments, as between the United States and Mexico, trade sanctions can subsequently be 
imposed. The complaining party is required to first seek termination benefits in the same matrix 
where the repetitive failure has been seen. As per the Agreement with Canada, the Commission 
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for Environmental Cooperation, which was established under the Agreement, generally applies 
to a court order to enforce the assessment. 
 Through regional coordination, countries continue to slowly but surely use their joint 
resources and common available neutral facilitators to enhance cooperation. This is done to 
support international decision-making and to ensure environmental threats are effectively 
addressed.
384
 Such endeavors can be achieved through supporting political and programmatic 
cooperation with a broad and diverse spectrum of major groups and stakeholders. Such 
collaboration not only provides dates and information that is critical to crafting effective policy 
solutions, but it produces and communicates this information, helping to connect scientific 
networks to national governments.  
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 Chapter 5 
 INTERNATIONAL NATURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES 
 
This chapter aims to examine the International Nature of Environmental Crimes, with a 
focus on both the limitations and arguments for the criminalization of such breaches.  Issues shall 
be examined that center on the penal doctrines of certain environmental harms, while exploring 
the mens rea requirement when defining corporate and individual liability.  This chapter will 
conclude with the idea of Internalization. It is a concept that seeks to incorporate international 
law and international environmental protection into one mechanism with a functioning 
enforcement scheme.   
I. Transboundary Character 
 
 International environmental criminal law takes root in certain conceptual categories that 
define its inherit basis as an area of legal philosophy infused with transboundary characteristics.  
The legal apparatus that covers this form of illegal conduct focuses in on the international and 
penal aspects of punishment.
385
 Defining environmental crime requires acknowledging that 
certain specific acts or omissions have occurred. This is relevant to discussing the environmental 
aspect in a transnational forum.  Putting into the focus the global nature of environmental crimes 
is the subject of this dissertation, and the definition reads as followed:   
Transnational environmental crimes, as defined in legal terms, refers to: (1) unauthorized 
acts or omissions that are against the law and therefore subject to criminal sanctions; (2) 
crimes related to pollution (air, water and land) and crimes against wildlife; and (3) 
crimes that involve a form of cross border transference and an international or global 
dimension. The third prong of the definition helps to lay the basic framework of the 
transnational character that embodies the environmental crimes in this dissertation.   
 Shaping and defining the international element of environmental crimes has been the 
work of many international protocols and conventions that deal with such matters. The discourse 
has been brought to the forefront of international psyche as illegal trade in ozone depleting 
substances, trade in chemicals, dumping in toxic wastes on land and sea, and the transportation 
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of these materials increases.
386
  There are numerous international initiatives that have expressly 
recognized the transnational character of certain environmental crimes by attempting to define 
certain offenses.
387
 
 Examining the geographic locations of various environmental crimes reinforces the sound 
notion that this form of conduct breaches multiple international boundaries. This analysis might 
include a closer look into the production of toxic materials, illegal trade at sea and land, 
trafficking in high threat regions, and terminal end points where these substances are illegally 
abandoned.  Mapping such harmful practices can serve us by providing useful insights into how 
environmental harm is transferred around the globe, and by identifying who the responsible 
parties of these violations are.   
 Viewed from a global perspective, transnational environmental crimes can be four 
intertwined processes, each affecting the nature of world ecology.
388
  These categories are 
resource depletion, disposal problems, corporate colonization of nature, and species decline. The 
four layers of analysis illuminate some of the issues that threaten specific types of transnational 
environmental crimes.   
 The existence of these environmental infractions are partly determined through the 
complex processes of transference.
389
  Harm can move from one area to another.  The difficulty 
in ascertaining the origin and dumping grounds of toxic hazards stems from externalizers that 
can make pollutants disappear from sight and record. The call for an international body to 
criminalize international environmental harm will provide the incentive for transparency in 
avoiding such loopholes. The illegal dumping of toxic wastes in developing countries constitute 
some of the worst aspects of the “not in my backyard” syndrome. The result is a massive 
movement of environmentally harmful wastes to the most vulnerable places and most exploited 
peoples of the world.
390
  This is an example of rampant violations in a small area that could be 
stymied by international law.   
 Environmental degradation at the transnational level is not only concerned with the harm 
being done at the national level, but it focuses more importantly on the issue of pollution. This is 
illustrated by the transfer of flora and fauna across various borders and into new ecological 
habitats.  Tracking the movement of these types of harms are important in the development of 
remedies that can be applied through criminal sanctions.  The Southern Ocean is prime example 
to illustrate the harm that can be avoided by a system of tracking and categorizing. This location 
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has become the slaughterhouse for whale meat to satisfy the Japanese black market.  When the 
Japanese can no longer whale in their own national waters, then transnational space is where the 
whaling will now occur.   
 The global forum continues to provide cutting edge information on the emergence of new 
environmental crimes. For instance, the decline of fisheries off the coast of Somalia due to 
overfishing, has robbed the local inhabitants of their livelihood.  A consequence of this reckless 
disregard for sustainable fishing is illustrated by the common fisherman entering a new line of 
work – most notably piracy. Environmental harm, legal or otherwise, can have spin off 
consequences that is felt across the borders of several states. 
 
  II.      Limitations and Obstacles to the Emergence of International Environmental 
Crimes 
 
 This section of the chapter will examine the limitations of a fully functioning mechanism 
of international criminal law, applicable to the environment from an analytical perspective. Such 
international legislation and agreements are lacking in large part due to the separate doctrines of 
penal responsibility and environmental law.
391
 States are continuously argued to consider the 
importance of punishing the most serious environmental crimes by international coalitions.
392
 
Unfortunately, reactions to these calls have remained relatively dormant. Recommendations have 
been made to provide for a supranational authority to be equipped with a wide array of remedies 
and criminal sanctions. This would support efforts in ensuring compliance with environmental 
protection laws by allowing academic recommendations for penal codes to be applied to 
environmental actions.
393
 
 Though these proposals aim to address severe international environmental crimes, they 
are quite limited in scope and purpose.  For example, a Protocol I Prohibition centers more on 
regulating war rather than protecting the environment.
394
  In reference to environmental 
protection, UN efforts have not amounted to significant progress, and the Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime eventually omitted any reference to the environment.  None of 
these conventions attempt to deal with the growing global environmental threat.
395
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 State sovereignty continues to be a limit on the international criminalization of harm to 
the environment. Sovereignty arguments have been used to undermine efforts for protecting the 
environment on a transnational level. The interplay between states interest in the development of 
their own lands, and the use of their natural resources, has cause many nations to fall back on this 
legal stance to protect self-interest.
396
 Sovereign states and their domestic laws have traditionally 
provided the legal mechanisms for regulating environmental issues.  This has marginalized 
efforts of non-state actors hoping to regulate international environmental criminal law.  
 Sovereignty and adherence to this principle severely interferes with the ability of nation 
states to prosecute violators of environmental integrity. The continued resilience of the 
international legal order serves as a paramount obstacle to those who would lobby for stronger 
environmental protection.
397
  
 In the case of sovereign crimes, where the matter of “impunity” has taken center stage, 
hesitation in enforcing current criminal offenses has to do with traditional assertions of 
sovereignty. In many cases, the state that is attempting to enforce criminal law may be 
influenced by actors committing the offense. Interstate crimes are caught in between the 
intersection of competing state interests, which can stagnate efforts to penalize conduct. Nations 
may overall be keener on repressing transnational offenses, but the various locations in which the 
crimes are committed may make jurisdictional reach difficult.  
There is an ongoing tendency for decision makers to ‘fit’ environmental crimes within 
existing penal definitions enumerated by the ICC’s jurisdiction. This is done often in order to 
bring strength to enforcement mechanisms so polluters may be criminally sanctioned.  Such an 
approach severely restricts the application of criminal laws to perpetrators. The problem with 
observing harms against the environment under the existing framework is the fluid nature of the 
infractions and criminals who commit them. Environmental law can be more effective if it is 
buttressed to genocide, crimes against humanity, aggression, and war crimes. Only a very small 
proportion of environmental harms, even among those that sow devastation among human 
beings, overlap substantially with “core” international crimes. Moreover, these crimes typically 
require proof of complex elements that do relate with environmental degradation. Linking these 
two separate fields of protective law may reduce prosecutions. Waiting for environmental 
degradation to be genocidal, defeats the purpose of using criminal law as a first line of 
deterrence. 
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 In addition to the difficulties linked with the limitations of international law based on 
ideas of sovereignty, a would-be international environmental criminal law must also face the 
challenges of a complex subject, the environment. Harm against the environment creates a 
problem of its own that is not primarily interstate or political in the narrow sense.  Prosecuting 
environmental offenses that stir international harm may create novel problems of potential 
interference within the domestic affairs of nations. It also becomes very difficult to determine 
where responsibilities lie for prosecuting criminals. Failing to implement strong international 
laws to protect the environment is best analyzed as a specific manifestation of a broader lacking 
system to protect the global commons. This has been described and analyzed in this dissertation 
as the tragedy of the commons.
398
   
 Contrary to their best long term interests, states are sometimes blind to the decisions they 
have routinely made. These decisions include overlooking certain parties to prosecute. These 
failures may be incentivized by not wanting to be the dissident who seeks to repress certain 
parties.  
The threat of criminal sanctions may deter countries and companies from participating in 
certain economically worthwhile activities that now fall under the criminal prohibition. This is 
due to the immediate prosecutorial costs, and more generally, because serious criminal 
legislation is likely to have substantial political and economic expenses. This takes place in a 
situation where nations will most likely not consider themselves bound by the international 
criminal legislation, and in turn, they reap the benefits of not subjecting themselves to the rules 
that apply to others. This is a classic free rider problem. 
 Theoretically, international criminal law could impede its own progress by creating a 
market that shirks responsibilities. If there is to be a penal code and a significant enforcement 
mechanism, it would most likely require a large global administration, possibly much broader 
and more powerful than the ICC.  Some international environmental lawyers have even 
advocated that rooting sanctions in a criminal code will do more harm than good by alienating 
and polarizing member states.
399
 
 There are several characteristics of criminal law that can be viewed as imposing limits on 
the development of a strong international mechanism that serves to protect the environment. A 
basic blueprint of criminal law is to sanction acts that are wholly undesirable to society, but the 
environmental harms that are to be penalized cost society by generating alternative benefits.
400
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There are acts that cause the environment to suffer which are illegal versions of otherwise 
legal acts.
401
 Unlike traditional criminal acts such as theft or murder, which are rooted in 
common law and defined within jurisprudence, environmental law has troubling drawing a 
distinction between legal and illegal conduct.  This difficulty may make environmental criminal 
law seem like a balancing act that weighs the costs and benefits of each activity. When it comes 
to environmental crime, profit-making is made possible through the overlapping relationship 
between licit and illicit markets and the close connection between legal and illegal practices. The 
link between vested private interests (corporations profit maximizing), state interests and 
environmental harm is of great concern. This troubling aspect of defining and then punishing 
environmental criminal law might be an impediment to forming a governing transnational 
mechanism that addresses international crimes against the environment.   
 Another aspect of criminal law that is challenged in relating to international crimes 
against the environment is the preciseness of the harm itself. Environmental harm in its entirety 
is very damaging and is considered a crime in the totality of the circumstances.  The troubling 
aspect is each step towards defining a level of serious environmental damage is usually 
unrecognizable and at worst negligible.
402
 Traditional criminal law relies on clearly defined and 
immediate damage (murder, theft, property damage), and environmental crimes are unlike that in 
nature.   
 The scope of environmental crimes may over include those who are not the true 
perpetrators in any particular case. If an international body of law were to govern crimes against 
the environment, casual and proximate relationships to the environmental crime would surely be 
an issue. The further in time one stretches the horizon of harm, the more a particular result may 
turn out to be the acts of a great many individuals. If this governing body extends the range of 
liability and responsibility to everyone who has had some casual role in producing a certain 
environmental harm, the end result may be a concept of criminal liability that is so over 
inclusive, it would defeat the point of criminal law. 
 Many principles of environmental law are vague and unpredictable. They are 
intentionally designed to allow countries to define the demands and boundaries of criminal 
justice. Transnational environmental provisions typically rely on both soft law and customary 
international law instruments.
403
 This may raise concerns about the respect for the legality 
principle.
404
 Furthermore, both domestic and international versions of environmental law will 
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rely on certain agencies to enforce sanctions in a way that can raise serious concerns about the 
predictability of regulations.
405
  
III. Arguments for International Environmental Criminal Law 
 
 When it comes to deliberate and egregious environmental damage, most criminal law 
theorists have agreed that additional steps need to be taken. Domestically, it has been noted that 
civil penalties lack the enforcement capabilities to deter fundamentally egregious environmental 
crimes.
406
 The strength of criminal law and its sanctions serve as an enforcer of certain 
international norms that would not otherwise be abided. Criminal prosecutions for polluters have 
been understood to work well, having a “very substantial effect” in regards to deterrence and 
compliance.
407
 
 The tragedy of the commons may make it difficult to set up a system of international 
criminal law (because such a system may only be effective if a very large number of states join 
it). In turn however, criminal law may be the answer out of the tragedy.
408
 Many attacks on the 
environment are decided in a cold calculated way, on the basis of perceived benefits. For 
example, corporations make conscious decisions to pollute in an effort to save on production 
costs.  Criminalizing their conduct and prosecuting these companies may be the optimal way to 
deal with environmental crimes in this particular context.
409
 
 International criminal law sanctions will not only be enforceable against traditional 
polluters (state and corporate actors) but also targeted individuals.  The modern reasoning behind 
this policy is because environmental crimes are often committed by individuals and not abstract 
entities. International criminal law is ideal for deterring illegal conduct done by non-state 
actors,
410
 especially if states come to see themselves as the protectors of a certain transnational 
interest against the power of corporations.  
 Efforts towards greater criminal sanctions could lean on an increasingly strong 
connection between the international public order and the global environment. The protection of 
the environment on the global scale has been tied strongly to a plethora of other values inherent 
in the international system. This ultimately raises the legitimacy of its efforts. Governmental 
bodies like the United Nations Security Council enumerate expressly that the environment is 
connected to the protection of human life and some basic human values.
411
 It is also noted by 
such organizations that aggressive acts against the environment effect peace and security.
412
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Further, there is a clear correlation between a damaged environment and poverty.
413
 Attention 
seems to be gathering at the fact that there is a connection between the basic conditions of human 
life and the health of the environment. This will hopefully put in place regime that makes it a 
goal to connect the two in the future. This would produce a work public order that advocates for 
those rights.  
 Hungary serves as a tragic illustration of the consequences of environmental crimes. In 
early October 2010, “a thick red torrent of sludge [began to gush] from a reservoir at the metals 
plant 100 kilometers south of Budapest….”414 During the tragedy, nine people lost their lives 
from the surge, and hundreds more were physically harmed by the toxic sludge as it penetrated 
the local communities. “The toxic sludge reached the Danube River several days later, from 
where it could flow into six other European countries before reaching the Black Sea: Croatia, 
Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine and Moldova.”415 In one environmental tragedy, numerous 
lives, indigenous species, and countries were affected.  
 Another indirect result of environmental crimes is green-house gas emissions. The 
unrestrained emissions of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere have been linked to global climate 
change. Studies have shown that higher temperatures impact power generation, water reserves 
for local and national populations, national security, and food production. “For example, in a 
single year in 2003, melting reduced the mass of Alpine glaciers in Europe by one-tenth, and tens 
of thousands of people died due to the severe health wave (European Environment Agency, 
2010).”416 Furthermore, the change in climate will intensify and accelerate natural disasters that 
we have seen in recent years. These hurricanes, cyclones, mudslides, floods, and severe droughts 
will create a massive humanitarian issue that will require global parties to find solutions in the 
immediate. Whether solutions can be found once the climate reaches a tipping point is still to be 
seen.  
 Increasingly, the environment has been presented as an asset whose ruin constitutes a 
violation of criminal provisions. The Articles on State Responsibility included a notion of 
international environmental crimes that aimed to safeguard the human environment. It expressly 
prohibited against mass pollution of the seas and atmosphere.
417
 Supporters of this type of 
regime have argued that there are concrete obligations that flow from the international 
community into the general public. This should be done with the inalienable intent to protect the 
environment.
418
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 Currently, the existing legal infrastructure is not designed to bring environmental 
violations under criminal law. However, in light of recent events including the changing climate, 
more scholars have proposed and are vouching for such developments. As discussed supra, Polly 
Higgins has defined Ecocide and has made the term an effective criminal definition to bring 
violators to justice. “However, the likelihood that the United Nations, dominated by the carbon 
dependent and carbon profiting nations of the global North, would establish ecocide as an 
international crime is slim.”419 
 Moral consistency is also a factor that plays into the support of the criminalization. 
International criminal law already sanctions acts that cause widespread and severe damage to the 
environment during wartime. It seems difficult that the same policy should not apply during 
peace.
420
 Environmental crimes are more akin to crimes against humanity, which would fit nicely 
into the international criminal category enumerated by many international law theorists. This 
category elaborates on illegal acts that are known widely across the community of nations as 
crimes against humanity.
421
 The argument flows naturally that grave crimes against the 
environment, because of their perverse nature, are in fact a crime against humanity. Therefore, 
parties should be punished as such and by the regimes that are in place to punish the existing 
articulated humanitarian crimes.    
 As the introduction of an international criminal law and its application to the environment 
develops, there will be discussions to address the details of what actions should be illegal, and 
the specific circumstances of enumerated degrees. There is a base for setting up a matrix because 
there is already a scheme of legal and illegal uses of the environment (as seen in treaties such as 
Protocol I and in domestic law statutes). A reasonable concern is the articulation and prosecution 
of long term impacts of environmental damage, but these can be addressed by models that 
already exist. 
 Finally, the character of international environmental law need only be a concern in 
respect to the principles of legality and the definition of categories for prosecution. It is noted 
that much of the existing international criminal law relies on broad standards contained in 
treaties. These articulate what an international offense is, and the standards that have been 
successfully illustrated and implemented. At worse, the vagueness of international environmental 
crimes is a result of its infancy. 
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IV. Criminalization 
A. Nature of the harm 
 
International environmental law touches upon various issues. They include clean air, 
water, regulation, and the management of toxic substances and waste. Environmental treaties are 
layered upon common law and international norms that have led to modern day approaches to 
environmental protection. Over the last 30 years, this area of law has further developed.
422
 Most 
treaties and international conventions have established broad regulatory goals. These agreements 
then leave detailed regulation to the individual states and agencies.
423
 The agreed upon treaties, 
convention provisions, and its accompanying regulations, coupled with land use regulations and 
tort law, attempt to reduce environmental damage in the aggregate. 
 International environmental law focuses primarily on damage to nature and its human 
rights implications.  This particular method shows the various harms that might bring claims 
against the criminal actor. The law should investigate the consequences of environmental harm 
by analyzing duration, severity and geographic scope.  
i. Geographic Scope 
 
 The geographic reach of environmental damage varies greatly. The greater the area of the 
geographic scope of damage, the more likely it has negative impact on humans who are in the 
vicinity of the harm. For example, in Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, “Freeport-McMoran's 
mining operations in the Irian Jaya region of Indonesia destroyed 15.4 square miles of rainforest, 
poisoned a lake, and noticeably impacted people living within three hundred kilometers of the 
mine.”424 There is a great probability that a swath of destruction, similar to that seen in Indonesia, 
will have important human repercussions. 
 Geographic scope also engulfs the location of the damage and defines the total nature of 
that harm. The significant concern surrounding the Three Mile Island incident was is geographic 
proximity to New York City.
425
 Chernobyl's location near the Ukrainian capital of Kiev played a 
significant role in that tragedy’s human costs.426 When international environmental harm occurs 
close to highly populated areas, the probability that humans are harmed, either directly or 
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collaterally, increases significantly. This is especially true when the local population lives 
directly of the land.
427
 
ii. Severity  
 
 The severity of harm is central to the question of whether the harm its self qualifies as an 
international violation of environmental law.  Contemporary waste treatment plants that operate 
within normal pollution standards generally produce less waste than oil spills and open pits. A 
nuclear incident of course overshadows all any of these forms of pollution. As the risk of 
activities increase, so should the precautions. Unfortunately, when extra steps for safety are not 
taken, the likelihood of harm increases to the environment and human populations. Simply 
stated, low-level environmental pollution pales in comparison to larger scale violations. 
 The pattern of the damage should also instruct international organizations that are 
assessing the severity of the damage. Currently, there are numerous ongoing violations that are 
harming the environment. When oil spills, openly stored toxic waste, and dangerous gas flares 
occur together, as they did in the Social Rights Action Center for Economic and Social Rights v. 
Nigeria,
428
 a stronger claim for abuse under general environmental obligations is appropriate. 
iii. Duration 
 
 The extent of time that environmental damage is ongoing, directly affects the severity of 
the harm.  Duration touches not only to the time span of the illegal conduct, but also to the 
amount of time that the negative impact can be seen on the affected people who have been 
harmed by the environmental damage. “Some problems, such as the destruction of forest and 
farmlands through persistent acid rain, have minimal immediate impacts but massive long-term 
ones. Other problems may constitute both a short-term nuisance and have long-term health 
impacts.”429  “Flaring gas and improper toxic waste storage, similar to Shell's oil production 
process in Nigeria, create air and water pollution that not only impacts people at the time of 
exposure, but it also poses health risks over time.”430 
 Bhopal, India provides an example of how a gas leak over time seeped in to the water 
supply and contaminated ground water.
431
 Ultimately, a great many more people were injured by 
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the contaminated water than the original gas leak.
432
 The damage is generally greater when the 
environmental harm continues to linger and magnify.  
B. Mens Rea 
 
 As a group, major environmental treaties criminalize virtually every known violation of 
regulations, including operating without a permit when one is required, violating any substantive 
regulatory requirement, and violating recording and reporting measures. This “knowing” 
requirement creates a broad criminal net, which piggybacks on a full range of environmental 
regulations. This places a heavy burden on the “knowing” requirement in assessing transnational 
environmental crimes.   
 To “know” ones conduct has been interpreted and debated by the courts. It does little to 
differentiate between the civil and criminal spheres of the environmental statutes. This 
interpretation has been explicated and debated elsewhere at length.
433 
Though it is frequently 
suggests that we eliminate mens rea from environmental criminal statutes, a more careful 
examination of the “knowing violation” doctrine indicates that it is helpful in providing the basis 
for what little separation there is between civil and criminal environmental violations.  
 A similar view mens rea requirement comes from the public welfare doctrine; criminal 
liability's usual requirement of proof of evil intent
 
is relaxed in the context of regulatory offenses 
designed to protect public health and safety.
 
The rationale behind the public welfare doctrine is 
twofold. First, the public does not have the means to protect itself from the harm the regulations 
it seeks to avoid. Second, the offender is dealing with a dangerous substance and should know 
that his activities are heavily regulated. In other words, the defendant must be aware of the 
criminalized actions and know all of the relevant facts that make his activity criminal. However, 
the defendant need not know the law criminalizes his behavior. As a result, “innocent” 
defendants, to the extent that they are ignorant of the illegality of their actions, may be reached 
by the criminal statutes. 
 The application of the “knowing” distinction to the material facts that constitute the 
violation of an international treaty or convention is both slippery and controversial. It is clear that 
the defendant need not know that she is violating a regulation or permit, but the question remains 
how much she should know concerning the facts that make her actions a violation. Instructive to 
this inquiry may be holdings by the courts in the United States.  
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In Weitzenhoff, the Ninth Circuit required proof that the sewage treatment plant 
managers were aware that they were discharging pollutants. They did not know that they were 
discharging six percent more pollutants than the permit allowed.
434
 According to the applicable 
regulations, the legal permit level is a law where knowledge of the element involved in the 
offense is not required. In United States v. Hopkins, the Second Circuit reached the same result. 
It held that the defendant need not be aware of the regulatory “proscription,” just the acts that 
were “proscribed.”435 Rather than holding that knowledge of the proscription was not an element 
of the offense, the Second Circuit held that it could be presumed, given the obviousness of 
stringent government regulation in this area and the fact that the defendant was issued a 
permit.
436
 
In two situations however, the “knowing” requirement as it pertains to material facts still 
has real enforcement powers. First, it creates a mistake of fact defense for those who innocently 
and truly believe that they are engaged in conduct other than prohibited illegal activity. Second, 
it creates a more technical defense based on either mistake of fact or lack of awareness of the 
ancillary elements of the complex criminal provisions. Both situations provide minimal 
separation between the criminal and civil regimes under the environmental criminal treaties. The 
mistake of fact principle is firmly accepted within criminal law. It is the counterpart to the 
excluded mistake of law excuse. Though the distinction between these two is fine and can 
become confusing,
437
 it is the kind of determination the courts can be relied on to particularize 
and make concrete through the exercise of the tools of international criminal law adjudication. 
The Rome Statute defines its mental requirements under Article 30 to be intent or 
knowledge. Under Article 28 (2)(a), the concept of command responsibility includes 
recklessness. The requirement of reckless takes away the burden of prosecutors that must 
normally show the violating party had actual knowledge or should have had knowledge of their 
illegal acts. Rather, they must only show that their conduct was reckless, and this recklessness 
was the proximate and actual cause of the violation. The most serious crimes in both war and 
peace should have the requirement of recklessness as the state of mind standard to put a lower 
burden on prosecutors, and increase the reasonability taken by individual corporate officers.  
IV. Corporate Liability and Responsible Corporate Officer Liability 
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A. Corporate Liability 
Corporations are generally accepted as part of the definition of “persons” used in 
international environmental law treaties. As persons, they should be prosecuted for violations of 
international environmental laws.
 Corporate liability for environmental crimes is “based on the 
imputation of agents' [or employees'] conduct to a corporation, usually through the application of 
the doctrine of respondeat superior.”438  Liability can also exist for corporations, their 
subsidiaries or predecessors even though criminal liability has not been found. Rather than 
attempting to attach criminal liability to the corporation itself, the common trend has bucked this 
notion and began to attach penalties to the corporate officers.  
 Using American judicial interpretation as instructive, under certain circumstances the acts 
of a corporation's predecessors can create liability for the corporation. “A corporation is not 
responsible for the liabilities of its predecessor unless one of four exceptions applies: (1) the 
successor expressly or impliedly agrees to assume the liabilities of the predecessor; (2) the 
transaction may be considered a de facto merger; (3) the successor may be considered a “mere 
continuation” of the predecessor; or (4) the transaction is an effort to fraudulently evade 
liability.”439 It seems to show that corporations can be wholly, severally, or jointly liable for its 
and their employees criminal infractions that result in a violation of international environmental 
treaties. 
 As discussed supra, current existing self-regulation schemes are unable to effectively 
combat violators of international law. The urgency for remedying such conduct is widely 
apparent. The Stockholm Declaration signified the need to international cooperation in order to 
create and put in place novel solutions. In light of this analysis, and in line with contemporary 
activist movements, scholars have argued that international criminal law should be used as 
ultimo ratio to sanction violators, and end the international corporation’s ability to evade 
prosecution.
440
 
 When observing existing criminal law, it is plain to state that the law itself is designed to 
identify, associate, and punish blameworthy human behavior. Corporations however have been 
able to evade this identification and punishment process because of their quasi-personhood 
status. There are some international agreements however, such as the Basel Convention on 
Hazardous Waters that create criminal liability for corporate entities. The international 
community should not by itself be charged with holding corporations responsible. In a day and 
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age of the internet and mass communication, the social importance of corporations is booming. 
Private citizens and the corporations themselves should understand the social impact of violating 
environmental integrity.  
Criminal law has the potential to imprison and remove the freedom of certain violators. 
This is a major benefit over strict civil penalties that are confined to monetary fines. A criminal 
conviction of a multinational corporation would be a significant step shifting the status qou of 
corporate business. This shifts the ability of corporations from doing a simple cost benefit 
analysis when harming the environment, to an analysis of fear of imprisonment for failing to 
follow the law.  This will make it more likely that corporations follow the law rather than 
circumvent it or blatantly violate the rules.  
B.  Piercing the Corporate Veil  
 
 The legal doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil (PCV) allows for victims of corporate 
wrong doing to attach directors and shareholders to civil proceedings for damages, effectively 
merging the individuals who own and operate the corporation with the company itself. 
Throughout the world, this doctrine has developed differently, and this dissertation gives a brief 
overview of how PCV is observed in legal systems in Europe, the United States and China. In 
the context of environmental crimes, PCV sets the stage of understanding how individuals can be 
liable for actions of the corporation (or themselves). There are two instances when this is 
applicable, 1. When the corporation commits an offense and a director/parent or subsidiary 
company is held liable for the breach, or 2. When the director/parent or subsidiary company 
commits an offense and the corporation serves as a shield for the actor’s wrongdoing. In both 
instances, PCV in civil matters lends perspective on how to implement penal mechanisms for 
corporate actors.  
 Under U.S. law, the PCV doctrine varies as one shifts through contract and tort actions. 
“Generally, the corporate veil will not be pierced unless: 1) the corporate shareholder dominates 
the corporate subsidiary, and 2) the corporate shareholder has engaged in fraudulent or illegal 
conduct or other ‘improper conduct’ which has generated an injustice.”441 Under the American 
system, courts generally do not allow for piercing unless there is an exceptional circumstance 
where the “separate corporate entity is used to evade an obligation or statute, to perpetrate a 
fraud, or to commit a crime.”442 The State of Delaware, a leading state in the creation of 
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competent corporate law in the U.S., only allows PCV when it is in the “interest of justice, upon 
the showing of fraud, contravention of law or contract, public wrong, or where equitable 
considerations among members of the corporate require it.”443  
 The German system has a specific statutory regime to regulate corporations and parent 
companies. These corporations, unlike their American but like their British counterparts, must 
annually disclose financial information. They must also satisfy a minimum capital 
requirement.
444
 Furthermore, the standard of care that each director must apply is stringent. “The 
standard is absolute, and even slight negligence may result in liability. This strict standard 
contrasts with the lower negligence standards and the business judgment rule found under both 
U.S. and U.K. law.”445 The German system provides a better model to set up a legal system that 
allows for individuals to be held liable under corporate law for their own wrongdoing.  
 PCV in the U.K. is very similar to the U.S. because both nations’ laws are “premised 
upon the principle that the corporation is a separate entity, subject only to exceptions in unusual 
cases.”446 The legal philosophy places a corporation as a stand-alone subject that must have some 
extra level of control that is exerted upon it to create liability. English law has also been defined 
by judges under its common law that outlines certain situations where the veil maybe pierced. 
This includes occasions of fraud, criminal activity, the avoidance of debts, and a specific matter 
when “a suit [is initiated] for damages arising from an individual shareholder’s use of corporate 
funds to obtain control of a public corporation.”447 
 China officially introduced the doctrine of PCV in 2005 when it enacted a company law 
overhaul. Unlike its western counterparts, China has explicitly codified its veil piercing laws. 
The central provision states, “Where the shareholder of a company abuses the independent status 
of the company as a legal person or the limited liability of shareholders, evades debts and thus 
seriously damages the interests of the creditors of the company, he shall bear joint liability for 
the debts of the company.” 448 Under the jurisdiction of Chinese courts, three main elements 
must be satisfied before the PCV doctrine can prevail. They are, 1. Misconduct, 2. Intent, and 3. 
Consequence.
449
 An instance where Chinese Law differs from other nations is that it only allows 
creditors to pierce.
450
 
 Countries across the world each use their own method of common law and statutes to 
allow government entities or individual parties to pierce the corporate veil. The method of doing 
so is relevant for measuring the liability of those who have broken environmental criminal law. 
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When a director or group of shareholder commit illegal acts that further corporate interest, while 
degrading natural public resources, enforcement mechanisms should have a clear cut picture of 
who they can prosecute. It is possible to merge western legal doctrine that allows for PCV when 
the actor has committed fraud or an illegal act, with the codified structure of the Chinese. This 
could bring greater clarification to an international body charged with bringing corporate 
criminals to justice, especially for environmental crimes.  
C. Corporate Officer Liability  
 
 The Doctrine of Responsible Corporate Officer (RCO) lends itself very well to the notion 
of corporations who violate international environmental crimes, and the theory that the corporate 
officer in charge shall be held criminally responsible for those environmental harms. Under the 
environmental statutes, most criminal sanctions apply to any “person” who violates a regulation. 
The RCO doctrine generally changes the scheme of liability from that of the corporation to the 
individual officer. The doctrine does not require the government to pierce the corporate veil or 
show that the officer personally perpetrated or otherwise participated in the wrongful act.
 
If the 
government proves that the defendant was a corporate officer who failed to use his or her 
authority to assure that the corporation complied with laws and regulations, the government may 
hold the defendant individually responsible under the RCO doctrine as an alternative theory of 
liability. 
 Imposing personal liability on corporate officers is an important means of achieving 
deterrence. This allows a greater the number of avenues for finding personal liability. It is 
significant that courts and other administrative agencies are beginning to distinguish the RCO 
doctrine from other theories of liability. By making this distinction courts and agencies added a 
new tool to the enforcement arsenal by providing another vehicle for holding corporate officers 
responsible for environmental violations. That is, the RCO doctrine can be applied where other 
theories of personal corporate liability may fail. 
 The application of the RCO doctrine will encourage environmentally compliant behavior, 
facilitate the intent of the primary international environmental treaties, and eliminate inconsistent 
enforcement of those treaties. Furthermore, the majority of the international legal communities’ 
resources that are dedicated to environmental enforcement are spent in the civil arena (for 
injunctive relief and penalties). Unfortunately, this financial backing does not support the 
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prosecution of the most egregious, and far less common, “knowing” criminal offenses. The 
philosophy of the RCO doctrine is to hold individuals responsible for civil penalties and 
necessary criminal sanction when avoidable violations occur. 
 VI. Internalization  
 The current status of the internalization of environmental criminal law can be found in 
many treaties. They provide transnational guidelines for crimes to be drawn and the burden to be 
placed on individual states to enforce these provisions. The thought is that by and large, 
enforcement of these provisions are not suited for the international community to proctor.
451
  
 Academic observers of both international environmental protection and international law 
warn against entrusting individual states with too much responsibility when it comes to enforcing 
provisions and sanctions. Internalization of these provisions is presented as paramount to the 
administrative necessity. This is due to the lack of incentives states have to launch their own 
criminal statutes and protect the environment; this includes a lack of willingness to enforce 
provisions.
452
 Left to their own sovereignty, states will either fail to criminalize or do so in a way 
that cherry picks the harms that do not sufficiently provide justice to those who have sought 
relief.  
 Further, even if states do criminalize independently, the fact that there are varying 
environmental regimes still creates incentives for environmental “dumping.”  
The international nature of many environmental crimes increases the risks of competing 
jurisdictions. This arises when one state exercises jurisdiction frustrating the protection of the 
public order of another. It can also lead to a waste in prosecutorial resources.  
The creation of common international environmental offenses would at least have the 
merit of reinforcing the cooperation of judicial bodies. The lack of supranational offenses 
designed to protect the environment create conditions for the assertion of “creeping” domestic 
jurisdiction, where states take advantage of the void that festers a lack of regulation. For 
example, “the U.S.’s Oil Pollution Act criminalizes pollution in the High Seas in a way that is 
not normally contemplated by UNCLOS” (which the US has not signed).453 The delicate balance 
exists between the freedom of the seas the protection of the marine environment.  
Legitimacy of international law has certainly flowed from a perception that it was dealing 
with problems that were inherently “international.” Typically, the argument is that when “there is 
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something involved that is too serious or important for the international community, the matter to 
be entirely delegated to states and domestic law – even if domestic systems might conceivably be 
up to the task.”454 It is important to acknowledge that there are symbolic factors at work. 
First, there are notable historical antecedents to global crimes, and international 
environmental crimes are slowly being considered part of this penal category. Inflicting grave 
harm on the environment might be the modern-day equivalent of piracy; either because it 
actually occurs on the High Seas or
455
 it occurs concretely on the territory of a particular state. 
Second, some parts of international criminal law seem to already have evidence of a new 
“global” approach. This pathway is still being matured and has not received much attention. 
UNCAC for example, does not go as far as to describe the various crimes it creates as 
“international crimes.” It does however mandate states to criminalize a vast field of infractions 
that contradict the principles of global communal life (corruption, bribery, money laundering, 
etc).  These provisions would undoubtedly support the global interest by undermining forms of 
exploitation, oppression and violence which would undermine the minimally functioning 
domestic international order.  
Lastly, the broad evolution of international environmental law has clearly been moved in 
the direction of tackling threats to the global environment, rather than domestic harms. The 
argument might be that a number of phenomena analyzed domestically do not by themselves 
suffice to constitute a crime, and that it is only by seeing them in their aggregate dimension that 
one can take in their full significance. It is argued since environmental problems are inherently of 
a global nature, so should be their regulation.  In turn, it would seem to make sense that 
international environmental criminal law should ultimately follow the preferred route of its 
subject matter, rather than international criminal law’s own logic. 
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CHAPTER 6   
ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
COURTE  
 
I. Necessity of an International Environmental Court 
 
 The Rome Statute sets out grave crimes for the International Criminal Court as “crimes 
that threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world” and “atrocities that deeply shock 
the conscience of humanity.”456 Over the past six decades, the international community has 
established fundamental treaties that have shaped international customary law in the areas of war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, water rights, and enforcement. However, it must be 
noted that with few exceptions, international crime “violations of civil and political rights and do 
not cover the serious violations of international economic, social, and cultural rights and 
international environmental law that are of direct relevance to sustainable development.”457 The 
current context of environmental crime is limited to war based crimes that prohibit certain acts 
and degrees of violence. For example, genocide, the usage of chemical and biological weapons, 
and the treatment of civilians and prisoners during conflict have all been addressed through 
international agreement.  
In light of recent political and historical incidents, the international focus on crimes of 
war and mechanism of peace are understandable. However, the exclusion of other violations of 
international law has had severe consequences for the victims of such acts. This problem is 
captured for illustration when we observe that current law punishes long-term damage to the 
environment through acts of warfare; however when the environmental damage itself is caused 
with no relation to acts of war, no criminal statute is invoked to challenge the perpetrator. As 
discussed below, international violations of ICESCR such as the right to not be medically 
experimented on during war time, or be starved, are acts that can also be achieved outside the 
context of war. In this situation, violations against health and food supplies would not violate 
international law. This proves to show that violations of existing criminal law schemes remain 
deficient and parties may still violate with impunity on an entire range of conduct that attacks the 
pillars of sustainable development.  
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These gaps in the international enforcement of cultural, social, and economic rights are 
difficult to close with the powerful interests such as corporations who are invested in combating 
such implementation. “As noted by the U.N. Special Rapporteur for Business and Human Rights, 
a patchwork of weak, non-existent, or inadequately enforced laws in both developed and 
developing states has resulted in gaps in the governance of transnational corporations operating 
in developing countries.”458 These loopholes have allowed corporations to proliferate their 
profits as they target and expand the lack of regulation.  
The lack of ability to penalize violators of these gaps has pushed governments to install 
legislation that holds parties civilly liable for infractions. However, even this mechanism falls 
short. As illustrated by the Chevron-Texaco case, civil enforcement can be greatly perverted to 
meet the needs of the corporation. The costs placed on the judicial authorities charged with 
hearing the cases, the costs placed on private parties bringing suit against violators, and the 
easily corruptible authorities in certain nations all make this form of enforcement weak in form 
and execution. Most importantly, civil liability does not capture the gravity or the moral 
blameworthiness associated with crimes against the environment.  
This Chapter argues that a court of universal jurisdiction over environmental crimes is 
necessary. After numerous disasters created by corporate and individual actors, it has become 
apparent that national law enforcement has been ineffective in deterring the degradation of the 
environment.
459
 An International Environmental Court (IEC) must be established in order to 
combat the widespread harm caused to the environment that is not only unpunished but 
supported.
460
 The call for an IEC presiding over environmental crimes finds its base in the 
fundamental connection between the preservation of life and environmental damage, between 
human rights and the human environment.  
The argument logically follows that environmental rights and protection are a part of 
fundamental privileges enumerated by several international bodies that aim to prevent and 
sanction abuses of core human rights.
461
 There has been an increased awareness generated by 
major environmental disasters, along with a growing international economy and global 
communication. This has caused an increase in the belief that states and private parties should 
have an obligation not to harm the environment in a way that is so severe that is causes grave 
risks to the life and well-being of humans.   
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Even in light of these facts, it is only within the last quarter century that the International 
Community has begun to realize that an IEC is the correct forum to address the need for 
universal environmental protection.
462
 With this realization, an analysis is warranted to evaluate 
and argue the appropriateness of the establishment of an IEC to serve as a forum for sanctioning 
grave environmental damage.  
II. Environmental Destruction Is a Fundamental Human Right 
 
 Awareness generated by major environmental disasters has caused an increase in the 
belief that states and private parties should have an obligation not to harm the environment in a 
way that is so severe that is causes grave risks to the life and well-being of humans. It is still true 
that the exact moment at which environmental harm crosses the threshold of a human rights 
violation remains uncertain.
463 
Furthermore, it remains very difficult to identify boundaries 
between illegal conduct which qualifies as a violation of a fundamental human rights and its 
relation to an environmental breach of duty.   
 Customary international law has been defined as a legal body of accepted norms that 
branch from general practices of states that owe each other a uniform legal obligation. This 
obligation cultivates the formation of customary law over an extended period of time. The state 
practice of following these norms has, now developed into jus cogens. The International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) has held, “Multilateral conventions may have an important role to play in recording 
and defining rules deriving from custom, or indeed in developing them.”464 Unanimous 
conformity with a universal norm is not required for it to be defined as an obligatory custom. The 
ICJ has stated it is “sufficient that the conduct of States should, in general, be consistent with 
such rules, and that instances of State conduct inconsistent with a given rule should generally 
have been treated as breaches of that rule.”465 The natural environment is essential to life,466 and 
this right to life is the most fundamental principle within jus cogens, without which no other 
right can be exercised.
467
 It is well established that customary international law requires the basic 
minimum standard that grave environmental harm, threatening the life and nature, is not 
acceptable.  
 Recently, there have been numerous conventions, and agreements established 
international tribunals that have reinforced the conclusion that grave environmental harms 
constitutes a basic violation of customary international law. The repetitive practice of states, 
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through the mechanisms of international and state law, illustrates a clear modis operandi in being 
bound to customary legal obligations. States have adopted over 1000 bilateral agreements 
designed to protect the environment.
468
 Over 50 nations have memorialized, in their national 
constitutions, an affirmative obligation to protect the environment.
469
 Furthermore, over 100 
states that attended the World Conference on Human Rights, declared that the illegal dumping of 
toxic waste threatens the right to life, a fundamental human right.
470
 The practice of the 
International community has been to apply local law to civil and/or criminal liability on 
perpetrators for the most severe environmental crimes.
471
 
 The duty not to cause grave environmental harm has been witnessed in adjudications by 
many international tribunals. These bodies have recognized that environmental dangers that pose 
a severe risk to the health humans is forbidden, and they have penalized the act of causing such 
danger under customary international law.  
The first of all cases to observe this concept of international environmental law is The 
Trail Smelter case, which expressly recognized that international liability may stem from 
supranational actions that cause grave environmental harm.
472
 In another case, the U.N. Human 
Rights Committee handed down a ruling that dumping of nuclear waste on a large scale is 
grounds for a prima facie showing that a violation of the right to life has occurred in Article 6(1) 
of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights.
473
 That Committee further noted that 
the scope of any state’s autonomy to achieve economic prosperity was limited by the direct 
obligation to maintain human rights protections under international law.
474
  
 Beginning in the late 1970s, the International Law Commission decided that a state’s 
“serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for the safeguarding and 
preservation of the human environment” violates principles that “have become particularly 
essential rules of general international law.”475 The breadth of scholarly opinion, together with 
judicial authority in this field, supports the proposition that the duty to prevent the most serious 
forms of environmental harm, in particular harm that is transboundary in nature, has attained the 
status of custom. It has become a part of the group of fundamental human rights that are to be 
protected by customary international law.
476
 
III. The History, Failure, and Need for an International Environmental Court 
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A. The History of Proposed International Environmental Courts 
 
The first expression of an International Environmental Court was first suggested in the 
late 1980s. This came to the forefront of discussion in Rome by the International Court of the 
Environment Foundation. 
477
There was a suggestion that urged for a new administrative 
authority within the appropriate UN organ. This suggestion was proposed during the Hague 
Declaration on the Environment. It called for an administration with the sole purpose of 
confronting global warming concerns. Furthermore, the enforcement mechanism argued for 
would be armed with the right to make decisions concerning the cases it held jurisdiction over.
478
   
In the late 1980s, the Congress on a More Efficient International Law on the 
Environment and Setting Up an International Court for the Environment Within the United 
Nations urged for a tribunal to establish an inherent right to a clean and flourishing environment. 
It further requested that a stable world administration be enacted to inspect and sanction crimes 
against this inherent right.
479
 Further conventions on an IEC were held in the early 1990s. There 
was a particular meeting in Florence where procedural rules of an IEC were debated.
480
 In the 
late 1990s, there were advocates of an IEC but their calls were squarely rejected by the heads of 
UNEP.
481
 The articulated reason for rejecting the IEC revolved around a concern over the 
authority that the court would have in regulating penalties against states that did not comply with 
environmental statutes, as well as private corporations that disregarded these environmental 
laws.
482
 
 Possibly the most detailed proposal for an International Environmental Court came at the 
National Academy in Lincei in the late 1980s.
483
 The IEC proposed during this meeting would be 
controlled by an administration that centered its principles on human and environmental rights, 
in which an inherent right for each individual was attached to a safe and healthy environment.
484
 
This meeting led to a draft completed in 1992. It explained that states are to be legally liable to 
the entire international community for harm to the environment that is caused within their own 
borders. They must further take every possible measure to circumvent this damage.
485
  Rights 
under this provision include in relevant part: 
(a) the fundamental right to the environment; (b) the right of access to environmental 
information, along with the duty to provide such information; (c) the right to participate 
in procedures involving the environment; and (d) the right of the private sector . . . to take 
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legal action in order to prevent activities that are harmful to the environment and to seek 
compensation for any environmental damage.
 486
 
B. Failures of Previously Proposed IEC’s and the Glaring Need For A Functional IEC 
 
There does not exist any functioning judicial tribunal with explicit mandatory 
jurisdiction, right to monitor and observe, or legally-bind parties to enforce or sanction globally 
corporations and nation-states. There exist only a few treaties that allow for the monitoring of 
parties who do not comply with international law.
487
 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
technically has power to exercise jurisdiction over international environmental cases, but has not 
exercised this power in nearly 40 years. Furthermore, this unused jurisdictional power is 
expressly limited to conflicts between state parties. This implicitly secludes private citizens, 
corporations and NGO’s from procuring legal standing in these types of cases.488  
 In the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case,
489
 which concerned environmental harm, the ICJ 
shirked from its jurisdictional power and did not rule on the environmental dispute. Instead, it 
deferred to a previous agreement to control the outcome of the case. The European Court of 
Justice (ECJ), the European Court of Human Rights, and the Council of Europe have been 
forward thinking in regards to enacting international environmental laws that are capable of 
facilitating proper resolution of disputes in regional forums. The ECJ will generally grant 
standing to NGO’s and private citizens in matters that concern the application of the European 
Union’s regulations pertaining to the environment.490 The European Court of Human Rights has 
utilized international human rights to increase the view of environmental protection, but it has 
failed to extend the thrust of its jurisprudence in subsequent cases.
491
 
 At the Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to 
the Environment,
492
 The Council of Europe submitted for signature a Convention on the 
Protection of the Environment Through Criminal Law. This agreement asked member states to 
enact domestic statutes to establish crimes specified as environmentally harmful, without regard 
to the accompanying mens rea requirement for illegal conduct.
493
 Nevertheless, the depth of 
these efforts remain regional. The regulations have limited reach; their purpose remains 
incomplete and insufficient from the perspective of proponents who are promoting 
comprehensive international protection of the environment.  
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 In the international forum of criminal law, the Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC), which has expressly defined its jurisdiction over the gravest international concerns, does 
not expressly confront the issue of its jurisdictional power to prosecute environmental crimes. In 
Article 22 of the Statute of the ICC, the provision ensures that jurisdiction over environmental 
crimes by the ICC would need amendment of the Statute.
494
 This absence of power from the 
ICC’s jurisdiction is a cause for concern in light of the language in Article 19(d) of the 
International Law Commission's Draft Articles on State Responsibility. It states that “a serious 
breach of an international obligation of essential importance for the safeguarding and 
preservation of the human environment” shall constitute an international crime.495 
 Evident from the lack of compliance with these international conventions that national 
courts have instituted in adjudicating crimes against the environment, there is strong advocacy 
for an international court to exercise universal jurisdiction over such cases. The need is ripe for a 
world-wide coordination of these existing international courts and tribunals. This could be 
accomplished by International Environmental Court.
496
  
 International treaties addressing the enforcement of penal provisions against international 
environmental crimes and their progeny are insufficient to handle the depth of environmental 
crises.
497
 The inherent problem that seems to be incurable is that the treaty process that is 
insufficient and unable to be an effective channel for curing the rapidly increasing environmental 
harms. This is a consequence of the current system as treaties take an unduly amount of time to 
be effective and reach their enumerated goals. The 1992 United Nations Convention on the Rio 
Declaration of Environment and Development is instructive for the inherent problems of treaty 
implementation. In the aggregate, this treaty moves the international environmental criminal law 
systems in the right direction, but a learned analysis of the treaty uncovers that there are 
extremely vague doctrines. Additionally, the regulations imposed in the treaty are not accepted 
by all states. The United States has taken direct reservation to many of the principles that 
provided the true enforcement powers of a treaty in combating grave environmental harms.
498
  
This is an example of the typical ineffectiveness of international environmental criminal treaties, 
and it only supports further the need for an IEC.  
C.  Expansion of Existing Courts  
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 Another method of achieving the same goals as International Environmental Criminal 
Courts is expanding currently existing regional courts to administer the same jurisprudence. A 
prime example of this would be the African Court of Justice and Human Rights which is 
currently seeking to expand its jurisdiction and judicial power. Similar to the European Court of 
Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human rights, the African counterpart’s purpose 
is to “hold accountable states whose action or inaction violates their residents’ human rights in 
contravention of states’ treaty obligations.”499 There are additional courts that are forming to 
achieve the same purpose “such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.”500  
 The earliest regional courts used a method which can be implemented in early levels of 
expansion. The doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction allows “at any stage of the procedure, the 
International Tribunal [to] formally request national courts to defer to the competence of the 
International Tribunal in accordance with the present Statute and the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence of the International Tribunal.”501 This in turn grants jurisdictional power to the 
international body over matters of criminal concern. In relation to existing international courts, 
this serves a method for them to establish their integrity as a judicial body. This is in contrast to 
the ICC’s complementary jurisdiction scheme where the court exerts its purview when a 
domestic court is unwilling or unable to commit to investigation, prosecution and sentencing.
502
 
 Placing appropriate importance on regional courts is crucial in understanding the larger 
picture of international jurisprudence. As this dissertation approaches the ICC as a model, a large 
international tribunal is not the only method to achieve successes in prosecuting environmental 
crime. There are regional bodies that are capable and willing to investigate and prosecute 
environmental criminals. As they grow, they can seek to implement the concurrent method of 
jurisdiction. This will allow greater cooperation from the regional tribunal, without them 
impeding on sovereignty of nation states.  
IV. The International Criminal Court as a Model for an International 
Environmental Court 
 
  The United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of 
an International Criminal Court adopted the final statute for what became the world's first 
International Criminal Court.
503
 The Rome Statute created a court with “jurisdiction over the 
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most serious crimes of concern to the international community . . . .”504 This Statute gave the 
International Criminal Court jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, war crimes, the crime of 
genocide, and the crime of aggression.
505
  
The primary principle of this Court is to address human rights abuses without expressly 
extending its jurisdiction over grave environmental crimes that deeply deprive humans of safe 
and healthy environments. The only express mention of environmental sanctions in the Rome 
Statute states, that it is a war crime to “intentionally launch an attack in the knowledge that such 
attack will cause... long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which would be 
clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.”506  
Advocates of an IEC assert that there are many challenges that have stymied existing 
transnational courts. These obstacles can be solved by creating or granting power to an 
international judicial body. The ICC has taken many steps to define and prosecute the core 
crimes enumerated in its governing statute and under its jurisdiction. Similarly, the advocates of 
an IEC recognize the same care needs to be taken for a network of independent nations in the 
international environmental community. This will allow individual states greater ability to 
submit jurisdiction and police power to an IEC.    
Section A below will argue that the ICC already has the power to exercise jurisdiction 
over grave environmental crimes. This stems from the understanding that serious crimes against 
the environment automatically endanger the right to life. 
Section B will examine the enhanced progress the ICC has made while being the primer 
Court that prosecutes international environmental crimes by extending its jurisdiction over grave 
environmental crimes.  
A. The ICC’s Jurisdiction over Crimes Against Humanity Inherently Includes Grave Crimes Against 
the Environment   
 
Though not expressly articulated as within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
Court, the inclusion of environmental crimes is not only legally proper, but it is necessary to the 
spirit of the definition of the core crimes as defined in the Rome Statute. For the International 
Criminal Court to have the power to properly address the violation of the “most serious crimes of 
international concern,”507 it must have the power to prosecute crimes that gravely harm the 
environment. This can be allowed under firm legal arguments illustrating that the perverse nature 
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of  environmental harms are inherent to the core crimes enumerated by the Statute. To put this 
simply, grave environmental harm is inherently inseparable from the Rome Statute’s core crimes.  
 
Each core crime enumerated in the Rome Statute and their connection with 
environmental harm will be discussed in turn below. 
i. Crimes Against Humanity 
 
 Serious environmental crimes match many of the criteria for crimes against humanity. 
The Rome Statute is the first action by a supranational administration to articulate precisely what 
is known as crimes against humanity. The topic of crimes against humanity was debated during 
this conference. The question arose to whether the Statute would define acts committed as part of 
a “widespread or systematic” attack against a civilian population, or more simply just acts that 
are “widespread and systematic” attacks.508 Many states were concerned that if the threshold 
were too low, “common crimes such as mass murder would fall within the jurisdiction of the 
Court.”509 The final language defined crimes against humanity as: 
 
[A]ny of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: (a) Murder; (b) 
Extermination; (c) Enslavement; (d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population; (e) 
Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental 
rules of international law; (f) Torture; (g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, 
forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of *237 
comparable gravity; (h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity . . .; (i) 
Enforced disappearance of persons; (j) The crime of apartheid; (k) Other inhumane acts 
of similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to 
mental or physical health.  
There are two further definitions enumerated within the language of the Rome Statute 
that are instructive and strengthen the argument of this Chapter. The Statute states that 
“[d]eportation or forcible transfer of population” means in its actual application , “forced 
displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in 
which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under international law.”510 The term 
119 | 
 
“extermination” is defined to encompass “the intentional infliction of conditions of life, inter alia 
the deprivation of access to food and medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction of part 
of a population.”511 
The ongoing environmental issues that include international corporations conducting oil 
drilling in the greater Amazon River Basin, as well as the subsequent oil spills, serves to 
illuminate how grave environmental crimes are encompassed within the Statute’s definition of 
crimes against humanity. These crimes touch upon the spilling of chemical, nuclear, biological, 
and other dangerous waste materials. In the early 1990s, the government of Ecuador had 
recorded nearly 30 serious oil spills. They discharged roughly 17 million gallons,
512
 and millions 
of those gallons were harmful toxic waste which entered the surrounding lands and waters.
513
 
The legal suits that were brought to seek compensation were dismissed on substantive grounds in 
the aftermath of these spills.
514
  
 The U.S. District Court concluded that it must dismiss the case because it did not have 
general jurisdiction to preside over matters.
515
 Contrary to that reasoning, the International 
Criminal Court has jurisdiction over the “most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole.”516 The ICC would be acting negligently if it were to completely 
disregard these grave environmental crimes. The facts of this involve supranational corporations 
knowingly and continuously discharging several millions of gallons of oil and toxins. These 
materials flowed into the lands of innocent people, resulting in displacement, injury, and death; it 
is clear that this action resulted in a “widespread or systematic attack directed against any 
civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.”517 
  ii. Genocide 
 
 The horrible crime of genocide was clearly defined in the Rome Statute. In fact, the crime 
is defined exactly as it was in the Genocide Convention.
518
 The Rome Statute defines genocide 
as: 
Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) 
Causing serious mental or bodily harm to members of the  group; (c) Deliberately 
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction 
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in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
519
 
 It is easy to envision a supranational company knowingly acting to allow toxins into a 
water supply which may injure, displace, or possibly kill the native inhabitants of a particular 
land. It has been recorded and visibly observed, that economic development, particularly in third 
world countries, causes fatal environmental degradation.
520
 An example of such an occurrence 
took place in the 1970s, when the Ache and other native people in Paraguay were the victims of 
acts of genocide by their own government. The government, in its efforts to grow the economy, 
allowed unrestricted oil exploration by supranational companies on native lands.
521
 Today, those 
indigenous inhabitants are considered to be a wholly extinct group of people.
522
  
 As seen in Paraguay, where there is a clear “intent to destroy,” the means by which the 
genocide is formulated should not be dispositive. It has been argued that any perpetrator who 
knowingly destroys a native people by destroying their land and their right to life is guilty of 
genocide. Attached with this crime is the grave environmental harms contemplated by this 
Chapter. This clearly shows that the Rome Statute guarantees some level of environmental 
protection from acts. 
  iii. War Crimes 
 
 Article 8 of the Rome Statute states that “[t]he Court shall have jurisdiction in respect to 
war crimes.” This has a caveat as an additional clause that stated the court shall have jurisdiction 
“in particular when [an act is] committed as part of a plan or policy as a part of a large-scale 
commission of such crimes.”523 This additional clause was intended to increase the low threshold 
for jurisdiction, but that intention has been dead letter.  
 The eight war crimes of section 2(a) were derived from the grave breaches of the four 
Geneva Conventions of 1949.
 
The twenty-six war crimes of section 2(b) were derived from the 
Hague law.
 
The three crimes in section 2(c), applicable in armed conflict not of an international 
character, were derived from Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions.
 
Finally, the 
twelve war crimes of section 2(e) were derived from the Second Additional Protocol of 1977 to 
the Geneva Conventions.
524
 
 This statute has a fully articulated penal provision that addresses grave environmental 
damage. It is the only explicit addressing of the environment and its need for protection in the 
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Rome Statute. Article 8(2)(b)(iv) defines as a war crime “[i]ntentionally launching an attack in 
the knowledge that such attack will cause . . . long-term and severe damage to the natural 
environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall 
military advantage anticipated.”525 The completed text requires full knowledge that damage will 
be excessive in relation to the advantages gained by the commission of the act. This is a classic 
balancing test that urges us to consider the environment and its need to be protected.  
 Article 8(2)(b)(iv) may be vague in its terms, but there are specific acts that do meet the 
burden articulated under the Statute. These crimes produce grave environmental harm and are 
clearly. An example is the Iraqi bombing of the oil fields in Kuwait and the subsequent discharge 
of millions of barrels of harmful oil into the Persian Gulf, during the Gulf War.
526
 It is clear that 
the exact perimeter of what is “excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military 
advantage anticipated” may be tough to gauge. What is clear is that horrible acts of illegal 
environmental conduct, such as those in the Gulf War, would be a war crime and punishable 
under the Rome Statute.  
  
V. Domestic Law Enforcement is Ineffective to Adjudicate Environmental 
Crimes 
 
It must be noted that domestic laws, where they exist, are not effective in policing   
environmental crimes. The reasons for this are numerous and out of scope for this section. What 
will be analyzed are the consequences of harmful conduct when countries exploit their native 
lands in hope of economic prosperity.  
Many countries, especially developing states, are the unfortunate dumping grounds for 
first world nations, as well as powerful corporations. This happens often and systematically 
because these countries do not have sufficient means to enforce their environmental laws. In 
many cases, environmental laws themselves do not exist for a prosecutorial body to act on.
527
 
These groups clearly take advantage of the naivety of the indigenous residents and their money 
hungry political officials. Criminal groups have also taken advantage of infant political systems 
by paying bribes in order to have access to dumping of toxic wastes.
528
 
 Developing nations rely on strong companies to invest in their land and economy.
529
 
These corporations, armed with limitless financial assets play a controlling role in the political 
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and economic development of the countries they invest into.
530
 This puts tremendous pressure on 
these developing nations. In a global economy, it seems that no country can have powerful 
environmental laws that would hurt the bottom line of international corporations. If a legislative 
body does this, they risk putting themselves at an economic disadvantage.  Deregulation of law 
enforcement has also resulted in many problems for these exploited countries. Numerous states 
have implanted what is known as “free trade zones” in which companies have placed themselves 
in superior positions, evading civil and criminal liability.
531
 Wherever these “free-trade zones” 
are established, there is enormous and long lasting environmental harm.
532
 However, 
international law has yet to clearly state whether a corporation operating abroad can or should be 
forced to follow the environmental laws of its home country.
 
Until this question is clearly 
answered, transnational corporations will be allowed to continue their exploitation of these 
countries. 
 This recurring problem of economic growth and the resulting environmental damage 
clearly illuminates the need for an International Environmental Court. The need is even more 
glaring in light of the inter-connectedness of countries and economies in the 21
st
 Century.  
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CHAPTER 7 
THE EUROPEAN UNION 
  
I. History of the European Union  
 
In 1951, Belgium, Italy, Germany, France, the Netherlands and Luxembourg were faced 
with the after effects of World War Two. They banded together to promote economic progress 
and created the European Coal and Steel Community. This turned out to be the foundation of the 
European Union.
533
 By delegating their collective steel and coal production to a single entity, 
they chose to start a forum for greater European integration. The idea of European integration 
was further pushed by the terms of the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and 
the European Economic Community (EEC).
 
This was done with the initial goals of establishing a 
common market, common competition and economic policies.
534
  
 In 1957, the Treaty of Rome articulated the goals of the free movement of goods, people, 
services and capital, but it would take years for those goals to become reality. To facilitate the 
accomplishment of these benchmarks, the customs union was achieved in 1968. Still, more was 
needed to be done to move from a customs union into an integrated market without internal 
borders. 
The Single European Act was the legal foundation for the start of the single market.
535
 
The states that were privy to this act fully dismantled all their national borders, and they began a 
single market in which goods, capital, and services can move freely. Today, citizens of member 
states are free to move and live anywhere in the E.U. The last bastion of traditional borders was 
removed by the signing of the Schengen-Agreement, which established the free movement of 
people entirely. The Treaty on European Union
536 
enhanced the mechanism of the integration of 
the European community, and it brought member states closer to a modern economic and 
political structure. This treaty and its kin have laid the roots for the introduction of the single 
currency system. The combined efforts of multiple nations have setup a new, largely 
intergovernmental political structure, in the form of a single institutional. 
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II. The Union's Contemporary Legal Environment 
 
The European Union is a group of independent countries that envision a collective that 
respects human rights. These principles have formed the bedrock of their treaties policies and 
political goals. The European Union is empowered with sovereign authority, its own sovereign 
rights and an independent legal power. This legal framework results in the citizens residing 
within the borders of the E.U. to be subject to the jurisdiction and laws of the international body. 
The longer the European integration occurs, the greater the amount of domestic rights that will 
be surrendered to the central order.   
 The legal foundation of the Union is not established in a constitution, but it is 
compromised by the totality of rules and basic values found in its treaties. These doctrines form 
the political and legal system that establishes organization’s procedural mechanisms for 
rulemaking and the basic rights of the member states.  
 The main functioning body of the European Union is the European Council.
537
 This entity 
within the E.U. is composed of the leaders of the member states. Although the Council does not 
have any legislative power, the Treaty of Lisbon defines their charge to set forth “the general 
political directions and priorities” of the Union.538 Their main purpose is to provide guidelines 
for the envisioned European integration. With the Council at the helm of E.U. planning, 
substantive legislative items receive significant influence from its decisions and 
recommendations. 
 Since the Council consists of numerous national leaders, domestic political parties fall 
into the analysis E.U. decision making.
539
 Within each governing entity of the E.U., there are a 
wide variety of politicians, many from the leading political parties of their home countries. This 
creates a complicated political stage for moving forward a legislative agenda.
540
 For example, if 
a political a minister who belongs to the German Christlich Demokrastische Union (CDU) votes 
in support of a conservative regulatory scheme, would their fellow CDU party members vote 
similarly? In certain cases, voting takes place along national party lines, and in other instances, 
members of the governing apparatus vote in accordance with their opinion on continental 
government.
541
  
 The European Council however has bucked the notion of domestic party influence 
through recent studies. The natural assumption would be that agreements would be hard sought 
125 | 
 
with such varying degrees of political backgrounds of the European leaders. The Council 
however has created a “culture of consensus.”542  Decisions made by the body are only contested 
one-third of the time. This is due in part to the negotiation tactics used by the Institution. When 
topics are discussed and deliberated, the Council goes to extra lengths to include all of the 
member states and their political representatives. This in turn has created a Council capable of 
making decisions with a vast array of political players. 
543
 
 The E.U. is also composed of a legislative body called the Parliament. This institution is 
composed of the General Secretariats, Staff of the European Parliament’s Political Groups, and 
the Members of European Parliament (MEP).
544
 MEPs are selected by the citizens of the E.U. 
through a democratic election process.
545
 Member states are allowed a formulized number of 
representatives in accordance with their current population. The parliament has been charged 
with the responsibility of formulating legislation to govern under the Council’s long-term 
direction. This governing body has the mechanism for producing rules that will govern its 
member states.
546
 
The commission performs the executive functions of the European Union.
547
 This 
institution safeguards the ratified treaty, and it also promulgates legislation across Europe. The 
commission is akin to the administrative organs seen domestically in the U.S.  Enforcement 
powers rest within the authority of the commission, and individual parties who break rules can be 
brought to justice within the European system. Employees who serve within the executive body 
must receive the consent and approval of the European Parliament.  
The law is interpreted by the Union’s judicial branch, also known as the Court of 
Justice.
548 
This branch is the sole authority that is empowered to interpret and answer questions 
of law for the European Union. This court, as the sole judicial body, delivers legally binding 
orders. Its case load is first prioritized by the Court of First Instance and it is regulated for 
optimal efficiency.  
Throughout the 1970’s the European Court of Justice engaged in judicial activism that 
helped establish the Treaty of Rome as a supranational constitution granting rights to citizens 
within the E.U.
549
 This in turn has allowed the Treaty of Rome to stand as one of the premier 
international bodies of law that support and propel environmental protection. The E.C.J.’s ability 
to co-opt domestic judges and lawyers, serves as another driving force in European integration. 
Domestic legal systems that have developed in a construction that is against their own interests 
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are now routed through an international judicial entity that supports the interests of the entire 
European body.
550
 The E.C.J. has continued to rule against the interests of the most powerful and 
influential bodies within the E.U. This institution serves as a beacon of supranational authority 
and functioning integration.
551
  
A recent example of the E.C.J. paving the way for European integration beyond its 
economy is the matter of the European Commission v. Italy (C-297/08).  The Court found that 
found Italy in breach of Article 4 and 5 of Directive 2006/12/EC when it incorrectly disposed of 
wastes.
552
 This not only shows the power of the E.C.J. to hold member states accountable, but it 
also shows the power of a judicial institution in creating integration on an international scale 
beyond the economy (e.g. the environment and human health).  
The Union’s acts are structured to provide boundaries for individual autonomy of the 
states. These formulas are careful to safeguard states’ rights as independent and functioning 
actors, with pathways to retain their own sole laws and regulations. Individual state autonomy 
allows members to execute their own administrative tasks.  Generally, the European Union will 
only be allowed to exercise its jurisdiction when the autonomy of the individual state is not 
threatened. This is an area where environmental criminal law legislation fits perfectly. In the 
enactment of such laws, member states would be relinquishing independence for the betterment 
of the entire environment, by allowing a supranational organization to police illegal conduct. 
This would be the appropriate course of action since individual states find great challenges in 
handling these particular crimes autonomously.  
 Decisions made within the E.U. create controlling regulations for member states. These 
laws establish the principles that guide European nations when administering rules. Upon the 
ratification of legislation within the E.U., member states are given the authority to enforce the 
related provisions. This form of implementation is appropriate for the problem of international 
environmental crimes. The E.U. can articulate the criteria for a crime and the minimum penalties. 
Furthermore, the act of sanctioning can be left to the member states. This type of mechanism can 
allow member states to abandon jurisdiction to the E.U. and the Court of Justice to adjudicate 
any particular claim that may be difficult for a state to prosecute.  
Upon its formation, the European Commission was the sole enactor of Union law.  The 
Parliament was merely granted an advisory function. Through the passage of time, new 
procedures were adopted because of the need for more efficient promulgation of laws. These 
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new procedures allow the Parliament to amend laws by providing review and policy assessments. 
The Parliament has the discretion to reject these policies by motions, and they can assert 
comments for amendment. These procedures are similar to the Notice and Comment approach 
provided by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) that is utilized by Federal administrations 
who engage in the promulgation of rulemaking. Similar to the APA, the E.U.’s procedures 
address rules in a far reaching spectrum of issues, including economic and environmental 
concerns. 
Law is created in the European Union pursuant to the procedures outlined above. The 
correct application of these laws are controlled and adjudicated by the European Court of Justice. 
This court is the proper adjudicatory organ for complaints of international environmental crimes. 
It has the authority given by community, in a supranational forum. This type of forum will bind 
the states to a certain order of regulation, and this is necessary in response to the factual realities 
of environmental crimes.  
What is attractive about this model for implementing environmental criminal provisions 
is the breadth that these laws provide. The legislation, with authority from its organic treaties, 
imposes affirmative duties on the individual member states and their citizens. The aim is for the 
community to act as a union, for the betterment of the group as a whole.
553 
The European Court of Justice enforces principles laid down by the community, and they 
are applied to the member states uniformly.
554
 This direct application is the type of enforcement 
that is needed to deter and sanction environmental criminals. The proper mechanism for this type 
of enforcement is a strong and united supranational forum that articulates clear regulations and 
while simultaneously enforcing any breaches of its law.  
It is especially promising that in the case of a conflict of law, the court requires that the 
Union’s law to be controlling over the domestic laws of the member states.555 Union members 
have willingly relinquished some of their rights in order to allow Union law, as principal, to be 
properly applied throughout the EU. This has been advanced by institutions such as the E.C.J. 
which has used legal doctrine to push forward integration of the various European States.
556
 It is 
important for the application of legal duties of the member states be uniform in defining, 
prosecuting, and adjudicating international environmental crimes. Allowing the E.U. to have 
supremacy when there is a conflict of law, allows for the circumvention of any country that may 
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have been bribed or forced to accept pollution against their interests. The Union has the capacity 
to override this coercion and properly execute the laws it is legally bound to impose. 
III: Criminal Law Provisions for Environmental Crimes: History and Structure 
 
The European Community promulgated decisions that are written to protect the 
environment through the use of criminal sanctions. These decisions are structured to safeguard 
the environment through the use of several avenues, including the use of criminal sanctions. 
Member states also provide feedback which is appropriate to reach the goals established by the 
collective.
557 
The increasing number of international mechanisms prescribing penalties for 
environmental infractions comes during an era where law makers are internationally embracing 
their role as the protectors of the environment. This is a stark change from past politicians 
following the traditional cost-benefit analysis. Growing social and public pressure has pushed 
this view as obvious environmental damage continues to mount. To adhere to the public pulse, 
the European Union has put the enforcement power back into environmental protection by 
formulating environmental laws that prescribe criminal sanctions. 
Currently, there exists minimal international environmental enforcement provisions. 
There is however existing sanctions enumerated by the environmental laws of the European 
Union (compared to the damaging effects of the criminal acts).
558
 An introduction of penal 
provisions and standards from the European Union will be helpful in taking a more holistic 
approach to environmental protection.   
 Legal principles suggest that the E.U. adopts baseline laws. This puts into place a 
foundation that shall provide stability and uniformity for which member states must conform 
with and abide. These provisions are important for instructing member states on what acts of 
environmental pollution will rise to the level of criminal conduct. Such laws must be enacted to 
promulgate the appropriate level of criminal sanctions that encompass the vision policy makers 
had when they drafted such provisions.
559 
 
The implementation of these regulations find their justification from the numerous 
environmental crimes that are international in nature; crimes that continue to impact nature 
across national borders. The uniformity of criminal sanctions is needed so that perpetrators 
cannot take advantage of weak national laws, and the differences between domestic legal 
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provisions. It seems the E.U. must face its problems head on regarding international 
environmental damage. Its directive asserts that provisions are important where the crimes have 
damaging results or are acted out in a forum of criminal mechanisms that play an important role 
in environmental crime. In response to organized environmental crime, the Directive requires 
strict criminal provisions by clearly articulating the disapproval of the malice mens rea 
requirement. 
IV. Legal Structure of Criminal Provisions of International Environmental Crimes 
 
 A sound and firm legal structure is needed to combat international environmental crimes. 
An instructive piece of international legislation which forms a basis for the proper mechanism 
for criminal provisions is found in the 2007 Directive Proposal.
560 
 
This Proposal aims to formulate a set of grave environmental crimes to be labeled as 
criminal conduct throughout the E.U. The provisions are applicable to water, soil, and living 
beings (animals, plants), and it also encompasses the conservation of certain species.
561
 The 
Directive enumerates the list of acts that constitute criminal offenses. This list is instructive for 
an international organization who aims to criminally sanction environmental crimes. It includes 
offenses that incorporate the discharge of emissions or materials into a natural medium; the 
unlawful discharge of emissions or materials into a natural medium that will likely cause death 
or injury; the unlawful handling of waste that will likely cause death or injury; the unlawful 
operation of an electrical plant; the unlawful handling of nuclear materials; the unlawful 
handling of animals; and the unlawful act of degrading a protected habitat.
562
 
A.  Analysis of the Crimes 
 
 This Directive states that a particular act is criminal in nature if it causes an enumerated 
result. Furthermore, a “significant” risk that may cause damage to the environment is to be 
punished, as is an omission to act if if there is an affirmative duty to act.  
An unlawful commission of an act is required to violate this directive. This is an act that 
impinges on controlling legislation, administrative provisions, or opinions proscribed by proper 
authorities that seek to protect the environment.
563
 The lone exception is the particular offenses 
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enumerated in Article 3(a). This provision touches on an end result that is nothing less than 
devastation (death, disease, etc.), rather than the illegality of the act. 
 The mens rea requirement for these offenses are satisfied when the act is performed with 
intent or with gross negligence. Aiding and abetting the offense is equally criminal and will be 
sanctioned.
564
 
B.  Corporate Criminal Liability 
 
 Nations that are members of this Directive must make certain that corporations can and 
will be held criminally liable for offenses committed on their behalf by employees and agents.
565
 
The Directive provides the choice to enforce criminal sanctions against corporations.  This was a 
policy compromise that attempted to downplay the concerns of certain states that do not provide 
for criminal liability for corporations. Some nations have articulated that the criminal sanctioning 
of corporations goes against their legal statutes.
566
 What is needed to truly combat the harmful 
emissions of corporations is the establishment of a Directive that binds all states to criminally 
sanction corporations. Corporations continue to use the dishonorable trade of bribery and 
monetary pressure. These international sanctions can help strike a balance between international 
governance and domestic failures. Binding sanctions that are uniformly applied seems to be the 
best way to fight back against strong corporations and deter them from future pollution.  
C.  Criminal Sanctions and Fines 
 
 The enumerated criminal offenses are to be deterred by basic criminal doctrines. The 
punishment should be effective and proportionate for both citizens and corporations.
567
 For 
certain crimes performed under certain parameters, such as causing severe and long lasting 
damage, the level of criminal punishment for the actors, regardless of if the actor is a citizen or a 
corporation, should be within a specified range of punishment. This range of punishment is 
necessary in order to deter criminals from exploiting the differences in national criminal laws. 
This scheme is an effective method in deterring environmental crimes from occurring. 
Uniformity across all nations, bound together, will ensure the successful application of sanctions.  
 This particular Directive contrasts primary criminal sanctions and collateral criminal 
sanctions. Primary punishments include imprisonment and certain fines against citizens or 
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corporations. Prison time and its proposition approximate a certain balance that correlates to the 
conclusion of the Justice and Home Affairs Council.
568 
 
This scale encompasses the criminal structure that defines incarceration times, based on 
the illegal conduct. The exact terms depend on the mens rea of the actor, combined with the 
totality of the circumstances.
569
 This structure also provides for crimes that are conducted by 
organized bodies by making punishment much steeper.
570
 It must be noted that these criminal 
sanctions and their application must not be left to the individual nation to implement. This 
problem arises frequently when attempting to establish an adjudicatory process. The international 
community must be willing and able to enforce these provisions, which require unison among 
countries. Providing a forum for the several nations to effectuate a uniform application of 
environmental criminal laws would be optimal. It must not however be left to the individual 
nation.  
D.  Secondary Sanctions and Measures 
 
The directive provides articles enumerating lists for restitution that will hopefully stymie 
future environmental acts of degradation from occurring. Also, ancillary punishment is listed for 
environmental criminals. This gives powers to states to disbar businesses from activities that 
require official approval. This sanction is enforced when the criminal’s activity presents a 
probable chance of repeat breaches of law, and this may be accompanied by a requirement to 
repair the damage done to the environment. Also, sanctions exist that may bar a criminal from 
public benefits and effectively disqualifying them from certain business practices. This forces 
them to adopt safety provisions to manage and repair damage already done to the environment. 
V. Implementing the Directive   
 
Past civil sanctions have not been effective in curing the issue of environmental crimes, 
which is why criminal sanctions are necessary. Promulgating such criminal sanctions is seen to 
be the appropriate method for deterring future environmental crimes. Civil sanctions have 
continued to fall short in being effective. One of the main reasons for this revolves around the 
monetary penalty principle itself. When a company is asked to pay a civil fine, the corporation 
will automatically engage in a cost benefit analysis. This balancing of the scales allows the 
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company to see if it is financially profitable to pollute the environment (if the costs of civil 
penalties are still cheaper than changing their modus operandi).  
Adopting criminal sanctions will alter this analysis. Polluters will now be forced to factor 
in criminal sanctions when choosing their actions. Furthermore, unified criminal laws will be 
symmetrical across all member states. It will deter polluters from planning illegal actions in 
countries that do not criminalize such conduct.  This is crucial in the implementation of criminal 
sanctions.  
VI. Current Analysis of the European Union’s Impact on Environmental Protection 
 
 At the center of various E.U. treaties, including the 1992 Treaty on European Union, is a 
strong push for the protection of the natural environment. This prioritization is focused on the 
long term sustainability of the human habitat. The 1992 Treaty was especially important because 
it provided for an express enumeration of environmental goals. It asserted that the E.U. should 
“aim at a high level of protection” for the environment.571 The 2007 Treaty of Lisbon continued 
this push by forming the structure of legal goals encompassing environmental protection.
 
 
The European Union has shown a deep enthusiasm for a continental scheme for 
environmental protection. This however is challenged by the goals of individual states and 
economic integration. The first major balancing test that the E.U. faces in creating such laws 
revolves around the need to protect the environment versus the protection of free trade 
principles. The E.C.J. has created a proportionality test to protect regulations that come into 
conflict with free movement priorities.
572
 There is also the larger balancing test that includes the 
interests of domestic governments with their own environmental protection schemes versus the 
creation of a universal European law designed to protect the same interests on a larger scale. 
Although the E.U. has faced these conflicting interests, they have continued to push forward 
regulations that have created an international impact.
573
  
Through regulation, subsequent European Law has formulated environmental protective 
measures. These laws have given signed treaties a more defined role as they used to create 
controlling law in prosecuting future crimes. A calling card for Union legislation surrounds its 
regulatory provisions that are legal doctrines, created at an international level. These pieces of 
international agreements have been integrated and implemented on the domestic governmental 
level.
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In particular, these laws have been designed to merge domestic and European Union 
regulations to create a proper structure for environmental protection.  It also allows for the 
individualized enforcement of relevant legislation by national governments.
574
 Currently, there 
are more than 175 different forms of regulations that expressly speak to the protection of the 
environment. These provisions control different forms of pollution including water, air, waste, 
and nuclear discharge. Furthermore, being held responsible for environmental damage has led 
the Union to promulgate laws that will control other important arenas of environmental 
protection.
575
 
The E.U.’s environmental laws have been influential in shaping legislation passed on the 
domestic level for its member states. A glowing example is that of the United Kingdom. This 
nation has seen an 80% increase in their environmental regulations since they joined the E.U.
576
 
Additionally, other countries within Europe have been required to adopt all existing 
environmental legislation into their national legal system in order to obtain E.U. membership.  
This requirement is coupled with the mandate of effective enforcement to the prevailing 
standards.
577 
A helpful mechanism in the proliferation of E.U. environmental policy has been the 
E.C.J.’s willingness as a judiciary to create case law that assists in the strengthening of 
international protection. In the ADBHU case, the court incorporated environmental priorities into 
a supranational context. Paragraph 12 of the judgment stated “that the principle of freedom of 
trade is not to be viewed in absolute terms but is subject to certain limits justified by the 
objectives of general interested pursued by the Community provided that the rights in question 
are not substantively impaired.”578 Rulings like this continue to define the thin line between free 
trade interests in environmental protection. As seen in this ruling however, concerns such as 
environmental protection, are given superior status in certain circumstances.  
The E.C.J. has also strengthened the plaintiff’s position in litigation against polluters. In 
Handelskwekerij GJ Bier v. Mines de Potasses d’Alsace, the Court dealt a polluter that 
discharged tens of thousands of tons of chloride into the Rhine River. The Court ruled that 
victims of transboundary pollution may bring suit in the jurisdiction of their choice that is either 
where the harm occurred, or within the country where the event that gave rise to the harm 
occurred.
579
 Although legal scholars argue that this promoted forum shopping, it is undeniable 
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that parties wishing to bring suit against polluters have been empowered to bring accountability 
to environmental polluters in the E.U.
580
  
Legislation aimed at the protection of the natural environment is another expansion of 
positive environmental regulations within the European Union over the past two decades. A 
provision that is in line with this growth, Directive 2008/99/EC, articulates the enforcement of 
criminal law in relation to environmental protection. This is an important nexus between criminal 
and environmental law.  The application of criminal law upon members has largely been 
shielded from the European Union’s jurisdiction. Criminal justice, including environmental 
criminal justice, is an arena in which European Union effectiveness has fallen short. Through the 
various treaties and covenants established by the E.U., under this sphere of law, member states 
have not granted full power over such matters to the Union.  Nevertheless, cooperation among 
and between the Member States and the E.U. is at an all-time high, resulting in effective 
implementation of environmental criminal law provisions. 
European Criminal Law is a new body of legal provisions, and its use has become 
increasingly noteworthy. It is a well-known fact that cooperation on forums previously foreign to 
the competence of the Union is currently one of the most exciting zones of E.U. legislation and 
policy formations. The criminal justice system is within this area, and the European Court of 
Justice has been interpreting and adjudicating cases that have been brought under this field of 
law. This is a positive development for the E.U., as it exerts its jurisdiction over national actors 
to effectively protect the environment.  
VII. Current Concerns with European Union’s Policing of Environmental Crimes 
and Solutions 
 
 The E.U. is a leader in international policy formation, and it is during global conventions 
that it thrusts its political power with large international entities. World leaders are aware of the 
Union’s power, and they must be keen to the possibility that Union policies will be pressed upon 
individual states.   
 The European Union is a mix of many components, including the right of members to 
partake in treaty drafting.
581
 Its authority has been developed by separate treaties that define and 
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allocate power to the Union.
582
 It is important it note that member states remain independent with 
powers outside those enumerated within the E.U.   
While sovereignty of the members is a prevailing concern, the E.U. has gained 
considerable power from the member states. This can be seen in the ECJ, where the court 
submits orders that are to be followed by all member states and even if it overrides decisions by 
the independent countries. The rationale behind this power of the ECJ, revolves around the need 
for a substantive norm of law to govern Europe in certain areas of concern.
583
 When a single 
judiciary governs multiple states, individuals residing in the many nations effectively become 
citizens of the larger body.  
 The Parliament is the legislative branch of the E.U., but it is striking to see that this body 
has very limited decision making powers.
584 
This organ cannot promulgate law, lacks the power 
of the purse, and it cannot elect representatives who can perform legislative duties.
585
 The limited 
power vested in this E.U. organ primarily rests in its veto powers. The reason for this limited 
authority is clear; member states are not willing to establish a central power that will be 
authoritative over their domestic governments.
586
 The E.U.’s controlling votes remain entrenched 
in the several administrations that are comprised of officials from the member states. The format 
of voting allows for a minority of states to retain veto powers over matters that could affect the 
entire group.
587 
 
The fragmentation of control could pose a problem in addressing environmental crimes. 
The need to act quickly when an environmental crime occurs is almost always necessary. Having 
a system that is not self-aware of what mechanisms it can use to act and with what authority, can 
hinder the whole operation. It is also crucial to outline the level of enforcement authority 
available to allow for effective implementation of regulations.  
 A fundamental problem the E.U. faces comes from the divided interests its member states 
face when they vote in favor of the entire body and their domestic interests.
588
 The system 
creates pressure that is placed upon the sovereign states to gain additional votes for their favored 
legislation. This is evidenced by the U.S. Senate demanding that the U.S. be allocated additional 
votes, equal to Great Britain in 1919.
589 
The Soviet Union demanded the same compensation to 
equalize their share with those totaled by the United States in the mid 1940’s.590 Maintaining 
voting power that is equal to opponents creates a major issue. This causes conflict when 
attempting to advance the interests of environmental protection. 
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The protection of the environment is an important issue that is discussed greatly among 
international leaders.
591 
The E.U. has taken the opportunity to promulgate environmental policy. 
Concurrently, the United States has disfavored the Union’s attempts to protect these vital 
interests. Regardless, European leaders have paved the way for law and policy in the field of 
environmental law.
592
 
Another important aspect of this international body is its member states ability to assert 
their individualized policy concerns. This is illustrated by the divided perspectives and priorities 
for enhancing environmental protection. Support is strong in Germany and Scandinavia but less 
in Portugal and Ireland.
593
 Regardless of individual state preferences, the Union has promulgated 
strict environmental policies by impressing high standards of environmental health upon all 
countries.”594 
The E.U. has shifted towards regulating environmental policy that affects its entire 
member pool. Environmental policy however, exists for issues that are not international in 
nature. An example of this is the European model for solid waste disposal. Though the E.U. is 
furthering the application of its regulation equally, it becomes frustrated when attempting to 
impose costs upon business and producers in fair divisions.
595
 
NGOs have become an accepted and promoted aspect within Europe. They have been a 
part of the decision making process within the Union since its inception.  Recommendations and 
reports appear alongside E.U. policy implementation and legislation as NGOs employ multi-
level lobbying strategies when they address the European Commission and European Parliament. 
Their role within the E.U. has been one of great import given the lack of information that the 
European Commission operates with.
596
 The disappearance of NGOs from the policy creation 
process would be similar to “driving with eyes shut.”597 Throughout the history of the European 
project, these international organizations have led to the growth of democracy and intelligent 
planning for the continent.  
NGOs have taken a foothold in the field of environmental protection. There exists an 
NGO which is comprised of several environmental support administrations called the European 
Environmental Bureau. This NGO is financially supported by the E.U., and it helps to 
promulgate policy that the E.U. supports.  
 In addition to NGOs, Europe has developed other organizations to help spread its 
environmental policies throughout the continent. These organizations in conjunction with the 
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E.U., have been a positive force in overseeing the environment through regulations developed at 
the transnational level.
598
 These policies are often pressed forward by the individual member 
states that are in support of additional environmental protections.
599
 
An example of the E.U.’s influence on environmental regulation can be seen by their far 
reaching efforts in reducing greenhouse gas emissions during the 1997 Kyoto Protocol 
negotiations.
600 
During these talks, Europe communicated a growing concern in reference to the 
emissions of greenhouse gases. They called for all developed states to reduce their greenhouse 
gas emission by 15% from levels emitted in 1990. Several countries did not accept that reduction 
number and agreed to a lower percentage. The E.U. was the most ambitious in its proposed 
reductions, which is encouraging in light of the great harm that these emissions inflict upon the 
environment.
601
 
Analogous to the enforcement agreements seen in the wake of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol is 
the European effort to create an international enforcement agency. The E.U. is a leader in this 
field as it has defined international enforcement agencies which require member states to adhere 
to regulation.
602
 These agencies are well respected and followed by the European population. 
This is the key component in maintaining high environmental standards through enforcement 
mechanisms.
603 
The E.U. is now seen as the transnational organization that is given the authority to 
promulgate environmental policy and law that will be binding upon all member states. That is the 
correct approach and the best method to remedy and sanction environmental disasters. 
 VIII. The European Union as a Model for a Global Union  
 
The European Union is a model for more comprehensive global cooperation in an effort 
to protect the environment.  The European method has laid down a foundation to prosecute and 
remedy crimes of transnational environmental import.  The E.U. model has implemented 
environmental criminal provisions for environmental crimes by imposing duties on its 
institutions, member states, and private citizens.  A very similar model is needed in order to deal 
with the realities of environmental crimes and their transnational character on a global scale.  
 The European Union model for addressing environmental crimes has been outlined 
previously in this Chapter. This process can guide world leaders in adopting a global union to 
combat environmental crimes. There are several aspects of the E.U. that make a global union an 
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attractive option for combating global environmental degradation. However, there are drawbacks 
that must be factored in.  
A. Positive aspects of the European Union as a model for a Global Union  
 
 Prior to the eastern expansion beginning in 2004, the E.U. was a smaller international 
government with less member states and conflicting interests. After 2007, the European 
institution almost doubled in size. Scholars immediately began to forecast a divided and sluggish 
government that would be unable to strike concord between the many nations.
604
 However, the 
E.U. stayed relatively the same, passing laws and effectively enforcing them as it did prior to 
2004.
605
 This has been credited to the informalization of European negotiation, where proposed 
policies are debated and hashed out prior to large votes and decisions.
606
 A Global Union can 
also use the same model of negotiation and policy development that has been in effect since the 
eastern expansion. Such a scheme of negotiation and legislation can be effectively used for a 
large body of member states that can encompass an international government that exceeds the 
size of the E.U. 
There are also several positive aspects that can be pinpointed when observing the 
European model of international integration. For our purposes, the most attractive aspect of this 
model is its ability to review and penalize environmental criminals. The E.U. is known as a 
Community of Laws
607
 which bases its regulations on the provisions articulated in Article 6(1) of 
the Treaty of the European Union.   
The right to a clean and healthy environment is regarded as a fundamental right by many 
leaders.  The boundaries of this right and actions that infringe upon it are adjudicated by the 
European judiciary. This is an important component of the European Model that is extremely 
desirable if a global union is established to combat environmental crimes. This global governing 
body must have a court of proper jurisdiction to adjudicate crimes if it is to be capable of 
properly sanctioning environmental crimes. The European Court of Justice serves as an effective 
judicial protection of the environment that is ingrained in the European legal order. This right 
and the protective shield obtained from it, is clearly one of the laws common to the constitutional 
traditions of the member states. The implementation of a holistic procedure will push individual 
nations to include within their constitutions, protective measures to safeguard environmental 
interests.  
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 The Global Union should be structured with modified with guidance from the European 
Union as it presents the most advanced system for a practical international diplomacy and 
institutionalized enforcement mechanisms. A recommendation for this expansion can be 
summarized briefly in several points. 
 First, the EU model should be considered for its effective ability to achieve diplomatic 
consensus. The E.U. acts in large part by its ability to come to agreement on a wide array of 
issues. Unlike domestic legislatures that bicker and cease government operations, as seen in the 
United States with their recent 2013 government shutdown, the E.U. climbs above their 
differences to institute effective laws that benefit the commons. In context of the environment, 
the Global Union could follow this by instituting the same mechanisms used to achieve such 
cooperation when making decisions for the environment.  
 Next, the E.U. provides individuals standing to bring suit against parties across the 
European Union. Jurisdictional boundaries have been limited and rules of jurisdictional exercise 
have allowed courts to reach farther than before when adjudicating cases. Within the Global 
Union, a similar approach will allow for individual parties to bring violators of international 
regulation to justice. It will avoid the limitations of courts and allow for more cases to be 
adjudicated in venues favorable to common citizen litigants.  
 The European Union is also ahead of its American in Chinese counterparts in standards 
stretching from manufacturing to energy consumption. In essence, the highest standards in the 
world are their minimum. The Global Union can attempt to achieve such standards while 
balancing the interest of economic growth. However, the analysis will be shifted away from 
business and towards sustainability, which in the long run will boost human prosperity.  
 The Libson Treaty is a recent attempt by the E.U. to emulate a form constitution that 
establishes and sets out authority for its institutions on a cohesive and single agreement.  The 
Global Union must create a constitution to serve as its core document to govern its institutions, 
and set forth its principles. The right to a clean environment would be one of the fundamental 
rights set forth in this constitution. Courts and laws that are created under the Global Union 
could not violate this fundamental right, and a court inside the Union would adjudicate such 
issues by interpreting the constitution.  
 This court or courts will be charged with rendering fair and balanced decisions, in line 
with the mission set forth at the founding of the Union. The job of the Courts will be to 
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determine the meaning of the constitution and set out orders that require states and citizens to 
comply with them. A proposed method of establishment would involve multiple courts in 
different fields of law. For instance, an International Environmental Supreme Court would be the 
international court of last resort in the area of environmental law. Courts under the hierarchy can 
be assigned to already existing courts, such as domestic high courts.  
B. Drawbacks of the European Union as a model for a Global Union  
 
Over recent years, the weakness of the E.U. has taken center stage during the economic 
recession that was started in 2008 by a melt-down of the global financial system. Shortly after 
the world entered into the “great recession,” certain European states have found it difficult to 
maintain current payments on their public debt. None has been as prevalent as Greece which 
totaled over €363 billion in public debt during the year 2011.608  
Traditionally, a single state that defaults on their public debt payments could be contained 
depending on the size of the country, and the nature of their debts. Within the E.U. however, 
each state is inextricably tied the other member states through their common currency, the Euro. 
A default in Greece could have resulted in a total collapse of the European project or pushed the 
political mechanisms that bind the E.U. to the brink of dysfunction. A Global Union would have 
to take a clear lesson from recent world events so it may create the infrastructure to protect itself 
against near calamity.  
It is worth noting however, that even though the E.U. has faced severe issues with 
member states being overburdened by their public debt. The economic bloc’s GDP per capita in 
purchasing power is three times that of Brazil’s, four times that of China, and nine times that of 
India.
609
 Scholars have argued that the E.U. is not in absolute decline, but in a relative drawback 
as the entire global economy has slowed.  It is imperative for a global union to be decentralized 
economically and committed jointly to the goal of sustainable development, in order to protect 
the progress in environment protection from the utter effects of economic drawbacks.     
Additional drawbacks to following Europe as a model for a Global Union revolve around 
the notion that globalization has been an economic force that has imposed unwilling nations to 
unwanted policies and influences. Resistance to globalization, whether through terrorist violence 
like that directed at the World Trade Center in 2001, or through increasingly oppressive 
immigration and detention policies directed against noncitizens,
610 
may prevent the continuing 
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development of a global order. The United States has a strong interest in facilitating this 
development and ensuring a global order incorporates a strong commitment to human rights, 
including environmental protection. It is difficult to distinguish between policies and practices 
that “impose” values on unwilling cultures, and policies and practices that foster communication, 
consensus, and adherence to particular values. However, characterizing efforts to develop 
communication and consensus on national and global adherence to human rights norms such as 
environmental protection and criminalizing against those protection as “imposition” of values, 
serves only to frustrate communication and change. 
 It seems that Western Cultures have a leading interest in encouraging and nudging the 
development of a world order that outlines that a strong commitment to human rights. These 
rights would include the protection of environmental. A key aspect to the Global Union would be 
an enforcement mechanism to penalize criminals who violate environmental regulations. It is 
very difficult to separate the difference between policies that impose ideas on unwilling societies 
and ideas that are in place to further communication and adherence to certain basic fundamental 
rights. Another concern centers on the capability of an effective judicial body adjudicating cases 
of environmental crimes. It has been argued that fundamental rights without access to judicial 
review would have little enforcement power and be dismissed as irrelevant. To have this model 
work properly, sovereign states would have to give up some power over domestic matters to a 
court that would have international jurisdiction.  This is necessary for this Global Union to 
properly enforce its goal of protecting the environment and criminally penalizing those who act 
in an interest against the global good. If a court can be established, and a proper enforcement 
mechanism adopted, the world’s nations can put to rest concerns of an international body being 
incapable of handling such a vast undertaking. An impartial court, with prosecutors, judges, and 
enforcement officials would be able to effectively control the contamination of our water, land 
and air.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
I. Status of International Criminal Law Currently 
 
 The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill in the Gulf of Mexico may yet allow for a renewed 
interest in the possible use of criminal charges for the damage done to the Gulf waters and coast. 
Currently, there has been debate on whether to prosecute the corporate executives of BP further 
within the United States, but as seen with the Chernobyl radioactive cloud, pollution in many 
cases does not respect territorial boundaries. Currently, there exists no legal platform to remedy 
the situation on an international level.  
The International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction covers crimes that cause the deliberate 
destruction of the environment, forcing mass exoduses of civilians.
611
 For many years the 
international community has been challenged when attempting to find a legal formula that is 
suitable for redress of international crimes against the environment.  This need is urgent in light 
of the obvious incompetence of national forums to effectively provide a solution to this complex 
problem.  Environmental activists have continuously called the mass destruction of ecosystems 
an international crime against peace. They urge for a codified classification of such crimes under 
this category, which will place these acts on the same level of genocide and crimes against 
humanity.   
There is a growing possibility that international crimes against the environment may one 
day fit into the jurisdiction of the ICC. This Court has shown that it is very efficient in penalizing 
polluters through criminal sanctions. Pressure will continue to mount as domestic systems of law 
are incapable and unwilling to handle transnational polluters. Within a nation, environmental 
offenses may fall under a range of watery offenses that do not punish in accordance with the 
seriousness of the crime.  
Opponents of this categorization argue that the illegal act of environmental degradation 
may not necessarily be targeted toward a specific state or population. They also assert that 
environmental crimes are not crimes against the humanity, under the original guise of the 
classification. Rather than understanding the consequences of the crime, they seek to artfully 
play with legal classifications to strip enforcement power. Observing the conduct and the result, 
what makes an illegal environmental act a crime against humanity is the considerable impact it 
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creates by destroying the living conditions of man. Such global acts should fall under a special 
category of crimes operating under the conditions of globalization.
612
 
A. Current International Treaties 
 
 A number of international treaties contain mandates for criminal sanctions that address 
violations of certain environmental norms embodied within their texts.  However, all of these 
agreements unanimously fall short of expressly asserting international jurisdiction over illegal 
environmental conduct, exacting punishment, or designating an international body for 
enforcement. They have also failed to create an international system independent of state 
mechanisms to deal with these crimes.
613
 
These international conventions have handled the issue of environmental crimes against 
the environment with general directives. They require member states to follow a certain 
protocols of handling criminal conduct, while leaving specific details to domestic decision 
making.   States have varied in their individual implementation of these treaties for multiple 
reasons; chief among them is the resilience of the perpetrators committing prohibited acts, 
corruption and the cost of implementation.  It is important to note that many attempts to create 
the desired level of protection on the international level through criminal sanctions were 
frustrated and stymied during their genesis.  An example of such an event took place at the Rome 
Conference when the body adopted the ICC statute to include a regime for criminal liability for 
moral personas. This was rejected like many other initiatives that could have brought 
advancement to the protection of the environment.   
 Currently, the laws that have been adopted to penalize criminal conduct is limited in 
scope and application. There is an incompetent range of laws that have been adopted by several 
nations. International bodies have been created to prosecute and penalize war crimes and human 
rights criminals, but there is no binding jurisdiction for international law when it comes to the 
matter of environmental crimes. The boundaries and circumstances of environmental crimes do 
not have an international legal definition. There is a distinguishable difference between crimes 
against human rights and war crimes. It is often said that “most polluting activities not only 
cause costs for society, but also generate some benefits.”614 Such an argument continues to stem 
efforts attempting to categorize environmental crimes as a severe breach of international 
conduct.  
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 The directives and aspirations of many international treaties have failed to bring results 
because of their lack of enforcement mechanisms.
615
 For example, at the 1992 UN Conference 
on Environment and Development (the Earth Summit), the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD) was born. Here, one hundred and ninety two nations, including the governing body of the 
European Union, are now parties of that convention.  
In April 2002, the parties to the CBD committed themselves to significantly reducing the 
loss of biodiversity by 2010.
616
  Predictably, that goal was never achieved.  Rather than oversee 
the reduction of bio diversity, international leaders have become stewards of a world that is 
losing its vibrant spread of organisms.  
 The Kyoto Protocol is another global agreement that aims to deter international 
environmental criminal law. The Protocol introduced flexibility mechanisms which were defined 
as methods to achieve the reduction of emissions in an effort to stem climate change.  
 Further treaties have been adopted and proposed for the purposes of protecting the global 
environment.  The Economic and Social Counsel of the United Nations reached resolution 
1994/15 in 1995, wherein it called upon the community of nations to “consider acknowledging 
the most serious forms of environmental crimes in an international convention.” The 1994/15 
resolution also urged member states to give consideration to the need for law enforcement 
resources. This monetary support would be used to address environmental crimes and facilitate 
the prosecution of international crimes, in particular environmental crimes. The takeaway from 
the meeting of these nations was an urging to strongly consider the viability of establishing an 
international criminal court.
617
 
 According to sources within the U.N., there are now more than 500 international treaties 
and other agreements related to the environment. The majority of these accords have been 
concluded in recent years.
618
 Making agreements however, is only a step towards a tremendous 
goal. The difficulty lies not in the creation of treaties, but applying the agreed upon principles to 
practice and enforcement them.  Countries that embrace a treaty by becoming a signatory state 
are not bound by its accords until its internal legislative bodies ratify the treaty. 
B. Failure of Individual States 
 
 The role of a given state in implementing international treaties can be examined by 
analyzing the process by which a treaty can be implemented and enforced through their penal 
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code. Civil and criminal statutes can be used to implement environmental treaties by states.  
Nations usually create or authorize existing administrative agencies to carry day to day 
implementation of environmental treaty obligations. 
 Environmental treaties usually require states to enact penal laws to enforce its provisions 
with respect to “prohibited activities.”619  Ambiguity arises under this mandate as most treaties 
do not provide a definition for the “prohibited acts.” Signatory nations may use administrative 
regulations to impose penalties for violating set levels of toxic discharge, maintaining improper 
permits or keeping a false account. Here, the control of criminal conduct merges with the 
administrative scheme. The concept of environmental harm is usually not presented; it is the 
protected interest of the administrative measure itself, and not the ecological value. This 
highlights some of the failures of individual states in implementing international criminal 
environmental law.  
C. Failure of Domestic Legislation 
 
 There have been strides made on the domestic level with creating laws and enforcement 
mechanisms to prosecute environmental infractions, but a gap remains. Nation states have 
generally recognized that legal persons as well as natural persons can be held criminally liable. 
However, when attempting to prosecute and charge corporate actors, it becomes difficult to 
follow through with current principles. This is because it is hard to distinguish between 
individual actors within the corporation. With various layers, and hidden aspects of corporate 
business, prosecution is almost unmanageable. A shift in the paradigm to hold certain individuals 
within corporations consistently responsible for certain acts would cure this.  
Sovereign states are naturally concerned about their security and Economy. This in turn 
pushes environmental protection down on the priority list as other short term benefits are found 
to be far more attractive. This has made the growth and effectiveness of domestic legislation 
non-existent in terms of environmental protection.
620
 The goal of regulating environmental crime 
is challenging for individual states.
621
 Domestic governments have natural weaknesses that are 
difficult to overcome, and interstate cooperation is a necessary mechanism to solve this crisis 
involving a lack of regulation. International cooperation has proven to be the correct mechanism 
for combatting similar international challenges in the past.
622
 For instance, cohesive efforts led to 
the elimination of cholera that ravaged human populations.  
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 Corruption at the state and corporate level has proven to the most challenging obstacle to 
neutralize for preventing environmental crimes. Public officials under domestic governmental 
regimes continue to take bribes or other consideration without consequences. To combat this 
issue, efforts should push for administrative reform. Corruption prevention is the most effective 
and historically successful way to combat this type of problem. Another beneficial focus should 
be drawn to developing easy to access technology that reduces human interaction in areas of 
trade in natural resources. The proper use of technological advances can be a game changer in 
promoting transparency. Online access for the average citizenry and media organizations can 
create a self-check system for heavily regulated industries.
623
 
Individual nations in regional agreements also differ in their domestic circumstances, and 
this often this leads to exceptions and exemptions being applied to that specific country. Such 
exceptions often remain as the steadfast rule. Also, sovereignty issues have held back the full 
integration of international law into domestic law. Nations often use the sovereignty argument as 
a shield to defend their views on the social cost of progress and the contradicting benefits that 
coincide pollution control.
624
 These nations argue that their privilege as a sovereign country 
allows them to use all the means within their disposal to obtain economic success on par with the 
affluence enjoyed by the developed countries. The argument draws valid points as many 
developed countries exploited the natural resources within their own territories and beyond to 
obtain their current financial status. A counter argument must be made to insure developing 
nations that the time has come and gone for the quick exploitation of the environment for 
immediate benefit. If we continue to use our natural resources and pollute the planet, any short 
term gain will be offset by the diminishing returns of the future.  
II. Regional Cooperation  
 
Regional efforts have proven to be more dynamic in their agreements. Many mandate 
states to resort to criminal sanctions to reinforce their environmental protection. The 
international community must accept that environmental crimes demand a committed and 
sustained global response. The success of this initiative requires proper regional cooperation 
between all interested parties. There have been some global mechanisms, both governmental and 
non-governmental, that have taken this burden in an attempt to connect groups and help create 
regional cooperation.
625
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 The consequences for failing to adequately address environmental crimes are potentially 
disastrous. There exist well-funded criminal organizations that continually profit from exploiting 
the environment. The Environmental Investigation Agency has urged “the international 
community to wake-up to the menace of environmental crime and show the necessary political 
will to tackle the criminal gangs plundering our planet for a quick profit.”626 The reality of 
environmental crimes requires an appropriately measured response that will regulate it down to a 
level that no longer threatens the life of wild animals and the health of humans. Similar to other 
criminal conduct, the intolerable level of environmental crime is still unknown. Regardless of 
this measurement, a sufficient regulatory response is still required from all parties that aim to 
police environmental crimes. Observing historical data, initiatives that have attempted to reach 
this mark have fallen short.  
 Regionally located organizations seem to be better equipped than global institutions, both 
in efficiency and implementation terms, to deal with the burden of implementing effective 
environmental policies.
627
 Regional cooperation is most effective in policing and regulating 
environmental crimes.
628
  Local organizations have access to additional information because of 
their personal relationships to regional entities. This makes it easier to create cooperation among 
states with similar cultures and environments. 
In an effort to implement sound environmental law, regional regimes have developed to 
connect and reinforce the common interests of various nations.
629
  Local institutions include the 
Council of Europe, The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, The Asian 
Regional Partners Forum on Combating Environmental Crime (ARPEC), and the environmental 
security regime established for the Baltic Sea region. ARPEC, which embodies many regional 
organizations, has made the fight against environmental crimes a paramount goal, and is an 
example of such cooperation.
630
 This organization was created because of the unfortunate reality 
of a flourishing illegal trade in commodities such as endangered wild flora and fauna, ozone 
depleting chemicals, and hazardous waste. The black market that seeks and distributes these 
products seriously undercuts the burgeoning progress of several environmental protection 
agreements. More importantly, the continuation of this trade furthers the endangerment of 
humans and their health and safety. 
A. European Union 
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The European Union is a group of sovereign democratic countries that envision a 
continent which respects human rights and peace. They have formed an agreement in various 
treaties for their commitment to each other and the greater good. This international governing 
organization is empowered with sovereign authority and an independent legal power that has 
jurisdiction over its citizens. Coupled with proper enforcement mechanisms, the E.U. is a fully 
functioning governing organization that is able to legislate laws, and punish violators.  
 The interpretation and application of these laws are determined by the European Court of 
Justice. Its functions embrace actions such as treaty infringement proceedings (Article 169 EC), 
actions for annulment (Article 173 EC) and complaints of failure to act (Article 175 EC). The 
ECJ seems to be the proper adjudicatory organ for complaints of international environmental 
crimes. This Court has the authority of the community to preside over such cases. The power of 
the ECJ stems from its ability to bind subjugated states to orders that are issued. This is 
necessary to establish a proper response to environmental crimes. The model of the E.U. can 
serve as the foundation for a broader and more comprehensive Global Union.  This proposed 
international governing body will take away the strongest mechanisms of the E.U., which include 
imposing duties on domestic institutions and private citizens. This direct application of 
international law is the appropriate enforcement device that is needed to deter and sanction 
environmental criminals.  
A strong and united supranational forum that allows for unambiguous regulations and 
decisive acts of punishment, with binding enforcement mechanisms, is the clear choice for an 
environmental protection scheme. Especially promising about the E.U. is the way it handles 
situations when a conflict of law arises. Here, the ECJ grants the Union’s law supremacy over 
national laws of the member states.
631
 Regulatory administrative law concerning the environment 
remains at the heart of environmental protection for the European Union member states. The 
current international environmental enforcement and criminal sanction provisions are minimal at 
best. The E.U. has enumerated
632
 the readily necessary introduction of penal provisions and 
standards from the European Union will be productive from a policy perspective. 
B. Criminal Sanctions and the European Union 
 
A sound and comprehensive legal structure is needed to combat international 
environmental crimes. The 2007 Directive proposal serves as an instructive piece of international 
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legislation that forms a basis for the development of proper criminal enforcement mechanisms.
633
 
This proposal aims to formulate a set of grave environmental crimes to be labeled as criminal 
conduct throughout the E.U. The provisions are applicable to water, soil, and living beings 
(animals, plants, etc.). It also encompasses certain species conservation.
634
 The agreement 
enumerates the list of acts that constitute criminal offenses. This list is instructive for an 
international organization that aims to criminally sanction environmental crimes. 
 Corporations continue to be the main perpetrators of international environmental crimes.  
They use the illegal methods of bribery and monetary pressure. The best method to tackle this 
increase in corporate money and its distasteful use is by installing sanctions to strike a balance. 
Binding sanctions that are uniformly applied seems to be the best way of fighting back against 
international companies. Such measures would deter their unlawful conduct. The European 
Union provides the choice to enforce criminal sanctions on corporations, and this was a policy 
compromise that aimed to downplay the concerns of certain States that do not provide for 
criminal liability for corporate entities. A number of these states have articulated that criminally 
punishing corporations goes against their legal provisions. Punishing corporations criminally is 
the best way to deter acts of environmental crimes.  
C.  International Court of Justice 
 
 The International Court of Justice has been established to adjudicate crimes against 
fundamental rights. The ICJ may be the proper forum to sanction environmental crimes that are 
counter fundamental human rights. Customary international law has been defined as a legal body 
of accepted norms that branch from general practices of states that owe each other a standard 
legal obligation. This obligation has been cultivated over an extensive period of time, and it is 
now developed into jus cogens. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has held that 
“multilateral conventions may have an important role to play in recording and defining rules 
deriving from custom, or indeed in developing them.”635 
 Recently, there have been numerous conventions and agreements by international 
tribunals that have reinforced the conclusion that grave environmental harm constitutes a basic 
violation of customary international law. This practice between states illustrates a clear pattern of 
willingness by nations to be bound by customary legal obligations through international and 
domestic law.  
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 The ICJ has developed into a proper forum to adjudicate crimes against the environment. 
The duty not to cause grave environmental harm has been witnessed in numerous cases by many 
international tribunals. These tribunals have recognized that environmental harm that poses 
severe risk to health and life of humans is illegal under customary international law.  
The very first case to recognize this concept of international environmental law is The 
Trail Smelter case, which expressly recognized that international liability may stem from 
supranational actions that cause grave environmental harm.
636
 The breadth of scholarly opinion, 
together with judicial authority in this field, supports the proposition that the duty to prevent the 
most serious forms of environmental harm. There is an agreement in particular that harm that is 
suffered on an international scale should be guarded against under basic rights established by 
customary international law.
637
 
D. Failure of Proposed International Environmental Courts 
 
 Currently, there is no intact judicial tribunal with explicit mandatory jurisdiction, right to 
monitor, right to serve, or legally bind parties to orders for sanctions on international 
environmental crimes. There exist only a few treaties that allow for the monitoring of 
noncompliant parties to established international norms.
638
 The International Court of Justice 
(ICJ), technically has the power to exercise jurisdiction over international environmental cases, 
but it has not exercised this power in nearly 40 years. Furthermore, this unused jurisdictional 
power is expressly limited to conflicts between state parties. This implicitly excludes private 
citizens, corporations and NGOs from procuring standing in these cases. 
 The Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which has expressly defined its 
jurisdiction over the most grave international concerns, does not expressly confront the issue of 
its jurisdictional power to prosecute environmental crimes. In Article 22 of the Statute of the 
ICC, the provisions ensure jurisdiction over environmental crimes by the ICC would need an 
amendment of the Statute.
639
 This cause for concern was highlighted in the language of Article 
19(d) of the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on State Responsibility. It stated,  “a 
serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for the safeguarding and 
preservation of the human environment” shall constitute an international crime.640 
 It is evident that there is lack of compliance with these international conventions that 
national courts have instituted in adjudicating crimes against the environment. There is strong 
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advocacy for an international court to exercise universal jurisdiction over such cases. The need 
for world-wide coordination of existing international courts and tribunals exists.641 
III. Exemplary Models to Criminally Sanction Environmental 
   
 There are two primary organizations that are models for a comprehensive attack on 
environmental crimes. These two models are the European Union and the International Criminal 
Court. Both are fully able to adjudicate crimes against the environment.  
 
A. International Criminal Court 
 
The Rome Statute created a court with “jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community . . . .”642 This Statute gives this International Court 
jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, war crimes, the crime of genocide, and the crime of 
aggression.
643
 This Court’s primary purpose is to address human rights abuses without expressly 
extending its jurisdiction over grave environmental crimes; acts that deeply deprive humans of a 
safe and healthy environment. The only express mention of environmental sanctions in the 
Statute states that it is a war crime to "intentionally launch an attack in the knowledge that such 
attack will cause... long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which would be 
clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.”644 
Although environmental crimes are not expressly articulated as under the jurisdiction of 
the International Criminal Court, their inclusion is not only legally proper but necessary to fulfill 
the purpose of the Rome Statute. For the International Criminal Court to have the power to 
properly address the violation of the “most serious crimes of international concern,”645 it must 
have the power to prosecute crimes that gravely harm the environment. The perverse nature of 
that environmental harm is inherent in the core crimes enumerated by the Statute. It is an 
important conclusion to draw that environmental harm is inherently inseparable from the Rome 
Statute’s core crimes.  
The ICC would only be responsible for hearing offenses that rise to the same level of 
egregiousness as those covered in the Rome Statute. With the limited resources and the singular 
nature of the ICC, effectiveness would be reduced if all environmental matters were brought to 
the court without a gate keeping mechanism. The issue would arise as to whether the signatory 
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states of the Rome Statute would allow the ICC to increase its jurisdiction. If so, the ICC would 
be a useful tool in beginning the process of prosecuting these crimes.  
For the inclusion of environmental law under the jurisdiction of the ICC, there are three 
roles that the court must fulfill to give the environment the same treatment as other crimes 
against humanity. The ICC must serve as a criminal court, a watchdog court, and a world 
security court in the realm of environmental protection.
646
 The first role as a criminal court is 
similar to the system seen in many domestic judicial institutions. Through this core function, the 
ICC should engage in the investigation, prosecution and sentencing of parties that engage in 
illegal pollution or violation of the environment. It is important to note that domestic cooperation 
is key in allowing the investigation of matters involving corruption and corporate dereliction of 
duty. As a watchdog court, the ICC serves the function of supervising signatory states to comply 
with their obligations egra omnes.
647
 This effectively gives the ICC a form of enforcement power 
to keep nation states in line. In the context of environmental criminal law, the court should 
investigate and prosecute parties that do not comply with international law directed at protecting 
the environment. To fully be able to perform this function however, the international community 
must specifically create, through the United Nations, a comprehensive environmental protection 
regime which the ICC can adopt and enforce. Once this is achieved, the Court can continue its 
duty by enforcing compliance among member states.  
Within the context of this dissertation, the final role as a World Security Court is arguable 
the most important aspect of the ICC. The environment is a fragile resource that can cause severe 
damage to the human race if infringed upon. For example, mass pollution and climate change has 
led to thousands of environmental refugees. The existence of these refugees and the degradation 
of their homes present a significant issue for world security. As natural resources are further 
depleted and local habitats less untouched by global corporations, a drastic change to the human 
environment can cause a catastrophic impact to the security of nation states. The ICC can bring 
criminal enforcement against actors who contribute most to the instability of global security. The 
end would undoubtedly be a safer world.  
B. European Union 
 
The objectives of environmental protection demand a comprehensive approach 
employing a range of mechanisms that will influence the actor’s conduct. These range from 
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public participation to the use of criminal sanctions. Regulatory environmental administrative 
law remains at the very heart of individual European nations’ mechanisms for environmental 
protection. Very recently, the EU issued a new Directive on the Protection of the Environment 
through Criminal Law (2007 Directive Proposal, Directive Proposal) which follows the example 
of both the Council of the European Union and the Council of Europe.
648
 
The ECJ’s ability to choose the legal grounds and mechanisms for the protection of the 
environment has mustered opponents.  From this Directive, the Union must force member states 
to provide for effective criminal sanctions for violators of international environmental laws. The 
Directive provides the framework for environmental protection and penalties against polluters. 
The same proposed arguments that led to this Directive Proposal in the field of environmental 
protection can easily extend to other common policies while encompassing the four freedoms of 
movement, persons, goods, services and capital.  
Several E.U. treaties, including the 1992 Treaty on the European Union, continue to 
emphasize the protection and sustainability of the natural environment. That Treaty was 
especially important as it provided for an express enumeration of environmental goals. It stated, 
that the Union should “aim at a high level of protection” of the environment within its scope.649 
Continuing with the purpose of that agreement is the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon, which forms the 
fundamental legal goals of the EU. The covenant touched domestic and international spheres of 
environmental protection. 
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These agreements have been effectuated to meld regulations by creating the proper 
infrastructure for environmental protection in the E.U. Individualized enforcement is also 
centralized on the domestic level. Currently there are more than 175 different forms of 
regulations that expressly speak to the protection of the environment and the European Union’s 
control over such matters. These matters include the pollution of the water and air, waste 
disposal, nature conservation and nuclear energy. The E.U.’s regulations speak to the free flow 
of information that is pertinent to the protection of the environment, liability for criminal acts, 
and the formation of the European Environmental Agency.  
In 1992, the dispensing of justice became an integral part of the European Project. 
Measures have been made to guarantee certain rights and minimum standards across the E.U. 
However, these initiatives have not enjoyed the same legal status as regulations and directives 
that are commonplace in other areas. Rather, through the use of so-called “framework decisions,” 
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a much higher degree of discretion is reserved to member states. E.U. institutions also have a 
lower level of competence to propose amendments. 
 European criminal law is a new body of law that has become increasingly glairing. 
Cooperation on the forums previously untouched by the E.U. is currently one of the more 
exciting areas of Union legislation and policy formation. The criminal justice system is within 
this area and the Court of Justice has been interpreting and adjudicating cases that have been 
brought under European Criminal Law. That is a positive outlook for the European Union and its 
jurisdiction over these environmental crimes.  
III. Suggested Methods to Increase International Cooperation 
 
 Interests of nations vary differently and can be based on numerous circumstances. For 
instance, global climate change talks are generally divided between the developing world and the 
developed. Developing nations are hesitant to reduce their consumption of greenhouse gases that 
play an important role in the industrialization and economic growth of their countries. All while 
the developed nations attempt to persuade the developing countries into sacrificing carbon 
consumption to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.  Location, colonial history, current economic 
conditions, natural resources, and military security all factor in to the varied interests of nations.  
 Establishing environmental criminal law and the appropriate mechanisms will receive its 
fair share of discord and discontent from certain parties around the world. This dissertation 
proposes alternative methods of increasing the viability of an eventual comprehensive scheme. 
This system should eventually prosecute and sentence violators of international law within the 
environmental spectrum.  
A. Promoting Regional Cooperation Towards a Unified World Order 
 
 Since the establishment of the League of Nations in 1919 after World War I, the 
international community has viewed international government organs as a mechanism to solve 
difficult problems that are unmanageable on the domestic level. The United Nations, the 
successor entity to the League of Nations, was established after World War II in an effort to 
decrease the probability of War and increase the dialogue between countries. The U.N. has 
served as a global government, but it lacks true enforcement power among member states. There 
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are numerous procedural road blocks that disallow democratic policies by bind signatory states, 
mainly the veto powers of the U.N. Security Council.  
 This inability to act during difficult situations is best exemplified during the genocides of 
Rwanda in 1994 and Darfur in 2004. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell delivered an emotional 
and persuasive speech to the United Nations regarding Darfur on September 9, 2004.
651
 
Unfortunately, the U.N. Security Council and the Secretariat failed to apply the term genocide to 
the massacres occurring in Sudan. 
652
 This eerily resembles the stance of the United Nations 
during the horrific acts in Rwanda that led to the massacre of at least 500,000 people. In both 
situations, the U.N. failed to protect innocent people by remaining silent in the midst of an 
international crisis.  
The factors behind this delayed response stems from the inability of the U.N. Security 
Council to handle matters of pressing concerns in the immediate. This exemplifies a fundamental 
failure of global governance in contemporary international politics. Other instances of conflict 
and disagreement can be seen within the U.N. in more recent years. International outcry for 
sanctions and intervention against Kim Jong Un of North Korea and Bashar Al-Assad of Syria 
meet resistance from China and Russia on the security council. It is generally known that 
members of the U.N. Security Council will vote in favor of their private interests above those of 
the international community. 
 In light of these conflicting interests in our premier international body, the United 
Nations, implementation of environmental criminal law must be pushed from separate angles. 
Rather than attempting a full international adoption of an aggressive system designed to 
investigate, prosecute, and reduce this types of crime, smaller attempts at local regional 
governments should be explored. We can take note from the historical legislation designed to 
combat human trafficking. The issue of women and children being trafficked became a part of a 
growing social reform movement in the U.S. and Europe during the late 19
th
 century. After 
numerous international agreements in light of these movements, an international conference on 
White Slave Traffic ratified earlier treaties from 1901 and 1904.
653
 The agreements created a 
foundation for international bodies and domestic governments to protect against human 
trafficking.  
 This leads us to the presumption that grass roots movements touching on different 
regions of the world can eventually lead to international recognition and adoption of 
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comprehensive legislation. In addition to the supranational union, the E.U., there are numerous 
regional unions, governments and alliances that can be lobbied to enact reforms implementing 
environmental penal law. These entities are the African Union (AU), Arab League, Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Caribbean Community (Caricom), Central American 
Integration System (SICA), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Commonwealth of 
Nations, Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (CCASG), Eurasian Economic 
Community (EurAsEc), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), South Asian Association 
for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), Turkic Council (Turkon), Union of South American 
Nations (UNASUR) and the Union State.  
 A good place to begin would be in the African Union. On January 30, 2007, the A.U. was 
established to promote democratic principles and institutions within the continent of Africa.
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With its own charter, the A.U. has worked tirelessly to deincentivize parties within Africa from 
participating in military coups.
655
 Similar to the ICC, the A.U. has proposed the African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights (ACJHR) to be a regional tribunal in Africa.
656
 This court would 
“create the world’s first combined state-level and individual-level criminal accountability 
mechanism for human rights violations on an international scale.”657  
 The A.U. along with its proposed court brings a new dimension to the promotion of 
environmental criminal law. The ability for more local international governments to prosecute 
crimes allows environmental activists and academics the ability to achieve smaller victories for 
the greater good. Like other international movements, every large body of law protecting human 
rights had their start at an incident or local level. Eventually, the world catches on and large 
international frameworks are created to protect human rights and liberties. With a push on 
regional governments to include a criminal law regime to prosecute and bring environmental 
polluters to justice, the world may one day accept the need to institutionalize a global mechanism 
to do the same.  
B. Model of Harmonization  
 
 There have been occasions throughout the history of international cooperation that 
international laws and regulations have been implemented by numerous agencies with unified 
success. As we seek to find ways for an international regime to assist in the application of 
international criminal law, it is important to branch out to other areas of developing law. One of 
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these examples stems from the banking industry that received a jolt of international attention 
after multiple bank failures in the 1970s and 80s. During this period, the world became well 
aware of the effects of bank failures and the danger of the domino effect regardless of national 
boundaries.
658
 
 In light of these bank failures, the international community has sought to create the 
minimum level of capital requirements that banks were mandated to hold in order to protect 
against further failures.
659
 The Basel Committee, an international body that provides a forum for 
cooperation on bank supervisory matters, agreed to look into the matter of under capitalization in 
1982. A year later, the Congress of the U.S. expressed its own concern with the passage of the 
International Lending and Supervision Act that mandated U.S. bank regulators to cooperate with 
foreign counterparts, insuring proper bank capitalization.
660
  
 The main elements that propel the adoption and concord between the involved 
international actors stem from two origins. First, there must exist an issue that the international 
community as a whole has given attention too, in a public and formal way. Second, domestic 
governments must implement and support the recommendations and attitudes of the community 
of nations. Coupled with both of these elements, domestic enforcement can be achieved even for 
the most complicated international issues.  
 With international environmental criminal law, efforts must be focused on tackling these 
issues with both prongs. To begin however, an international agreement must be reached that 
shows public concern and focus that the environment deserves. As proposed in the earlier 
models, the adoption or resolution of any of these examples can provide for the fundamental 
ground work to progress international environmental criminal law.  With the establishment of the 
foundation needed to move forward, the second phase must revolve around the domestic 
legislators of the nations involved.  
 
V. INDIVIDUAL STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT IS INEFFECTIVE  
 
 Domestic laws have time and again shown that they are ineffective in policing crimes 
against the environment. Nations continue to exploit their native lands in hope of prosperity. 
Many countries, especially developing states, are the unfortunate dumping grounds for First 
World Nations as well as powerful corporations. Various interests groups take advantage of the 
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naivety of the indigenous residents and their money hungry political officials. These criminal 
syndicates continue to use the tactics of bribery to ensure corrupt officials allow them to use third 
world countries as toxic waste dumping grounds. These are examples of wide spread problems 
that individual nations cannot effectively protect against.
661
 
Developing nations rely on strong companies to invest in their land and economy. These 
corporations, armed with limitless financial assets, play a controlling role in the political and 
economic development of nation states. This puts tremendous pressure on these developing 
countries. In a global economy, a country who does not fall in line with corporate demands, risks 
losing a substantial amount of economic benefit. This could in turn harm the security interests of 
a specific country. Deregulation of law enforcement has also meant many problems for these 
exploited countries. Many of these nations have implanted what is known as “free trade zones” 
in which companies strategically placed themselves. This relocation allows corporate entities to 
navigate any criminal or environmental regulations in place to their favor. Wherever these “free-
trade zones” are established there is an enormous and long lasting environmental harm. 
International law has yet to clearly state whether a corporation operating abroad can or should be 
forced to follow the environmental laws of its home country.
 
Until this question is decisively 
answered transnational corporations will be allowed to continue their exploitation of these 
countries. 
 Corruption also severely interferes with a nation’s ability to combat environmental 
crimes. Corruption itself has been recognized as a global issue and over the years, international 
covenants have been signed to combat it. This includes the OECD Convention of Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (ratified 1999), the 
Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption (ratified 2001), the Criminal Law 
Convention on Corruption of the Council of Europe (ratified 2002), and the United Nations 
Convention Against Corruption (ratified 2006).
662
 The largest of these was the Convention 
Against Corruption signed under the banner of the United Nations by 150 nations. This 
criminalized numerous conducts under the umbrella of corruption.  
 The laws to combat corruption have already been laid down. Strict enforcement is the 
only element that is missing in creating a global community that lacks corrupt political systems. 
The United States, United Kingdom, and Germany are the leading nations fighting corruption on 
the global stage. 
663
 Germany has been second to the U.S. in the number of tried bribery cases, 
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and third to both the U.K. and the U.S. in the cases charged.
664
 These three nations are optimal 
examples of how the global community should tackle political corruption.  
 In light of current U.S. policies against corruption, coupled with its enforcement powers 
backed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Security and Exchange Commission, and the 
Department of Justice, corporations have adjusted their conduct to avoid illegal conduct. 
Companies now implement comprehensive compliance control regimes to insure their 
noninvolvement in corruption activities. This self-policing in the private sector is a boost to 
enforcement interest of states attempting to reign in political bribery.  
 These three countries teach us that fighting corruption must be a priority of the nation 
state. If done correctly, corporations will find that participating in corruption is against their 
financial interest. Through a comprehensive penal system of fines, lost contracts, and public 
relations efforts, company directors will seek to adjust practices to fall in line with domestic 
regulations that take root from international law.  
With economic growth comes numerous problems that are attached to environmental 
damage. This clearly illuminates the need for an International Environmental Court and an 
enforcement mechanism against corruption. The need is even more glaring in light of the inter-
connectedness of the global economy in the 21
st
 century.  
VI. International Environmental Supreme Court 
 
This dissertation proposes a key method in creating uniformity and an adjudication 
process that is effective for the international community. An International Environmental 
Supreme Court (IESC), would be a supreme body that would be a court of last resort. The 
following diagram charts how a such a court could established within a legal hierarchy:  
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To implement this system, traditional notions of jurisdiction and sovereignty would have 
to be addressed.  All nations place their own courts of last resort as the supreme body of 
jurisprudence that is responsible for dispensing ultimate justice within territorial boundaries. 
However, these courts are limited in scope and adjudicate matters not based on international 
interests, but those set out by citizens from their own country. Therefore, single courts charged 
with dispensing justice on the environment, a category that affects all nations, only issues orders 
and opinions in line with national interests and doctrine.  
This proposal does not call for an ultimate international court that would be a court of last 
resort for all matters. It only seeks to establish a system of international adjudication in matters 
involving the environment. Its strict limits of subject matter would allow nations to be friendlier 
to the idea of a higher bodied court superseding domestic institutions.  
The referral system can be based in two proposed ways. First is through a referral from 
the United Nations Security Council. In this instance, for criminal matters, a prosecutor would be 
assigned from a neutral nation to bring a complaint against the violators. Through an 
international grand jury of sorts, a diverse panel would determine if such a complaint is well 
founded through the presentation of evidence. If so, an indictment would be issued and either a 
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summons or a warrant for arrest. The arrest warrant could be executed by signatory states that 
are willing to participate in the court’s application.  
Matters adjudicated within domestic court systems face a different form of referral. Here, 
the Supreme Court of the United States for example can adjudicate a matter and issue an order 
granting or denying a petitioner’s application. In instances where the court feels unable to 
comfortably exercise its jurisdiction, for example when multinational corporations begin putting 
political pressure on domestic judges, it may formally refer the matter to the IESC.  This would 
have allowed Ecuador to refer the Texaco-Chevron matter to the IESC in light of corporate 
corruption tactics. Once the IESC has heard the matter, it can issue order upon which domestic 
states would be bound by international law.  
For the IESC to remain effective, it should also have the ability to exercise jurisdiction 
over matters that are being heard in domestic courts; when those cases are being improperly 
handled by the courts. At any time during proceedings, a petition can be lodged to the IESC by 
parties who are engaged in litigation. The grant of certiorari would be determined after a fact 
finding hearing in which the moving party would have the burden of showing impropriety of the 
domestic tribunal. Once established, the IESC would exercise jurisdiction and move the case into 
its court.  
Within many nations, lawyers and judges themselves are disciplined and managed by 
their court of last resort, or another judicial body. The IESC should be granted some form of 
review for attorney and judge statuses when it is shown that impropriety has been alleged. This 
would require an additional surrender of sovereignty on the part of the nations as the IESC would 
govern lawyers in a limited manner. This type of authority could proceed in the form of 
sanctions, forbidding travel or seizing assets for those attorneys and judges who are culpable in 
corruption or environmental destructions schemes.  
The IESC would also be armed with special knowledge cultivated through its 
specialization. Marshalling international experts in the field of environmental study, the Court 
can implement studies and rely on crucial findings to assist in its decision making process. It 
could also provide these experts on request to nations who require scientific or technical 
consultation. This will also assist in the competency of the court to hear these matters. Given the 
delicate nature of sovereignty issues, integrity and competency in a judicial body is paramount 
for participants to agree and follow court order.  
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The ICC serves a solid example for the proposed international structure of the IESC. The 
IESC should consist of three chambers, pretrial, trial, and appeal. Each division receives eight 
judges from signatory states.  The office of the Prosecutor would also be attached to the 
institution to bring action against parties who violate international law protecting the 
environment. In addition, the common law of both the United States and the European Union 
serve as sufficient legal back drop to begin issuing opinions. Although the judges themselves 
will decide the area of law that they find influential, these common law areas are established on 
fundamental rights such as privacy, liberty, and property. Using the ICC as an example, and the 
environment as its guiding principle, the IESC can do much to change the way criminals are 
prosecuted on the international scale. 
  
VII. The Need for a Global Union 
 
 The growth of an increasingly global marketplace coupled with a growing concern for 
environmental protection has resulted in a complex scheme of regulations and treaties. 
Corporations are now capable wielding tremendous power around the world, and their actions 
continue to produce criminal consequences for the environment. Furthermore, environmental 
harm is transboundary in nature and must be regulated by a global court. It is this reality that 
urges the need for a Global Union.   
 Within the past decade, new efforts to put enforcement powers into international 
agreements have been initiated by creating new supranational enforcement authorities. What is 
unique about the E.U. is that it already has very well developed institutional authorities to make 
its members comply with adopted standards. European governments have learned how to work 
through such structures, and their citizens have become accustomed to obeying international law. 
Thus, the European Union can be a persistent force for tugging other states towards following the 
European example; an example that teaches countries how to hand over bits of their sovereignty 
to a supranational institution in order to combat transborder issues. This is the best mechanism 
available for a comprehensive protection scheme for the environment.   
There are several attractive aspects of the European Union that serve as a model for a 
Global Union. Effective judicial protection of the environment is necessary to combat 
environmental crimes. Within Europe, a central judiciary is able to prosecute and adjudicate 
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cases that would otherwise not be pursued on a domestic level. This should be one component of 
an international body that governs environmental protection across the world.  
It is important to note the differences between the charter of the United Nations and a 
possible constitution of the Global Union. The charter of the U.N. was not designed to be a 
constitution, but rather an affirmation and commitment to certain beliefs. As stated in the 
preamble of the charter, its purpose is to solidify the principles of peace, human rights, social 
progress, and freedom. Furthermore, the charter is not the supreme law for which all signatory 
states are bound to. In domestic constitutional governments, the constitution serves as the source 
of all law, and a guiding force in common law.
665
 In comparison to this type of legal system, the 
U.N. Charter was created after the acceptance of many other sources of international law, 
“including fundamental elements of international law such as the Genocide Convention which 
requires its signatories to prevent, stop, and punish genocide….”666 For a new Global Union, a 
charter would be inappropriate as it would not create the legal system needed to combat issues 
like environmental criminal conduct.  
To establish this Global Government, member states would draft and approve a 
Constitution with a judiciary, an enforcement mechanism, and representative form of legislative 
development. Its principles should be based on the inherent values of human rights and 
environmental protection, similar to the principles laid out in the U.N. Charter. The fundamental 
rights listed in the Constitution should, without modification in substance, become legally 
binding on all signatory states as an integral part of the Constitution. The purpose of this is to 
create a new legal system that uses this constitution as the supreme law of the global community. 
Rather than using separate domestic systems and laws to settle international issues, one common 
legal scheme, with grand humanist principles, can be utilized to push an enlightened agenda of 
progress.  
A unified effort from all nations is required to take the appropriate steps to secure our 
environment. The models vary and the methods to implement change are challenging. Individual 
nations on their own cannot achieve what requires a global community to accomplish. With 
academic recommendations, and in depth analysis of current systems, we can build a better 
world by building a better supranational government. 
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